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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
Building Futures Markets: Infrastructure and Outcome on the Chicago Board of Trade 
and New Orleans Cotton Exchange, 1856-1916 
 
 
 
by 
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Professor Akos Rona-Tas, Chair 
 
Professor Isaac Martin, Co-Chair 
 
 
 
Derivative financial instruments figure prominently in the modern global 
economy, but their modern origins date back to the use of agricultural futures contracts in 
the mid-19th century. This dissertation analyzes the construction of markets in futures 
contracts during this period on two exchanges—the Chicago Board of Trade and New 
xiv 
 
Orleans Cotton Exchange. Building these markets posed a unique problem. Unlike extant 
markets, which could operate autonomously, futures markets had to be constitutively 
linked with a second underlying market in order to work (e.g., a market in cotton futures 
linked with an underlying market in cotton itself). Making this linkage required creating  
infrastructural connections—with institutional, material, and cognitive components—that 
would allow the two markets to work in concert. Infrastructures had to support an 
environment in which traders on the futures market could incorporate spot market 
information into intentionally rational decisions.  
 The Chicago Board of Trade and New Orleans Cotton Exchange built their 
infrastructures differently. This dissertation asks two questions about this divergence: 
What factors caused the infrastructure on each exchange to take the shape it did? And, 
what consequences did these infrastructures have for market behavior? I answer these 
questions through analyzing the construction and impact of three critical infrastructural 
features: (1) the classification schemes by which spot commodities were assigned grades; 
(2) the material means of gathering and disseminating data, both statistics on the growth 
and movement of the spot crop, as well as price quotations from global markets; (3) the 
economic and cultural theories by which traders understood the nature of speculation in 
futures and its effect on spot markets. I find that the characteristics of these infrastructural 
elements were shaped less by any uniform concern with efficiency or fairness and more 
by the distinct economic, cultural, political, and organizational environments on each 
exchange. Additionally, I suggest that these distinct infrastructures promoted different 
types of trading on each market—high-risk speculation in Chicago and low-risk hedging 
xv 
 
in New Orleans—which contributed to the divergent price volatility on these markets 
during the period of my research.  
 
  
1 
 
Introduction – Building Futures Markets 
 
In the period of American history between the Civil War and the First World War, 
markets in agricultural futures contracts became integral to the global commodity trade 
(Hieronymus 1977; Hoffman 1932). Futures contracts are fairly simple derivative 
instruments that bind two parties to a transaction for a particular class of goods, at a 
designated future date and price—e.g., a contract made in mid-March might specify the 
sale of 500 bushels of #1 spring wheat at a price of $1 per bushel at some time in June.1 
These contractual obligations were then traded on the futures markets. The trader above 
who bought a contract for spring wheat could easily transfer his obligation by simply 
selling a contract for the same commodity in the same amount. Standardization of 
commodities and contractual terms enabled an active, year-round market of people 
trading obligations to buy or sell agricultural commodities at a future date.  
 Futures markets solved two major problems that had previously plagued the 
marketing of agricultural commodities (Santos 2002; Working 1953). First, they evened 
out cyclical fluctuations in supply and, thus, price. Before the advent of futures markets, 
spot market prices would rise and fall dramatically in concert with the seasons: at 
harvest time, a burst of supply would drive prices down, and the opposite occurred during 
the planting and growing seasons. With futures markets, farmers and middlemen had a 
year-round market of speculators ready to commit to buying the commodities, often even 
before they were out of the ground. Second, futures market removed much of the risk 
                                                 
1 Economic terms in bold are defined in the Glossary, Appendix A.  
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associated with storing commodities. Prior to futures markets, middlemen faced the 
possibility that market prices would drop between the time at which they bought and 
when they sold. Futures markets solved this problem, allowing them to reliably find 
buyers quickly after coming into possession of their goods. While storage still had certain 
other costs, the risk of a significant price drop was mitigated.  
In these ways, futures markets revolutionized the worldwide marketing of 
agricultural commodities. But, critically, they did not do so simply by establishing a new 
market that operated as a more efficient, independent entity for buying and selling goods, 
but by tethering the new market to an existing one to create a more efficient system. Spot 
markets trade commodities, while futures markets trade promises to exchange those 
commodities. Together, they create a powerful system for mobilizing capital and 
marketing commodities. I describe this relation as a constitutive linkage between markets. 
This linkage did not emerge naturally or simply; it required the active construction of 
institutional, material, and cognitive connections between spot and futures markets. 
Tasked with making this connection, two of the earliest exchanges in the United States to 
create futures markets for agricultural goods—the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and 
the New Orleans Cotton Exchange (NOCE)—took different paths. This divergence, its 
causes and its effects, are the topics of this dissertation.  
 In this dissertation I conceptualize the connection between spot and futures 
markets as an infrastructure enabling their co-functioning. Infrastructure is a concept with 
roots in science and technology studies that is beginning to be applied in sociological 
studies of markets. It refers to the systems, technologies, standards, and protocols that 
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underlie market action and allow interchange across multiple parties (Bowker & Star 
1999; Lampland & Star 2009; Pardo-Guerra 2014; Star & Ruhleder 1996). To conceive 
of the connection between markets as an infrastructure is to understand it as a politically 
contentious and practically consequential object that broadly shapes market behaviors. It 
was these infrastructural connections that enabled futures traders to make intentionally 
rational buying and selling decisions and made futures markets viable.   
 An infrastructural perspective on the roots of futures markets synthesizes 
material from the literature on market creation on one hand, and derivatives on the other. 
On the topic of market construction, scholars have identified fundamental problems that 
markets must solve in order to operate successfully. Jens Beckert (2009; 2012) argues 
that markets face fundamental coordination problems stemming from the uncertainty of 
economic action, which they must solve by socio-structural, institutional and cultural 
means in order to operate at all. Rona-Tas & Guseva (2014) add data to this theoretical 
framework, studying the particular problems of value and cooperation that arose in the 
creation of credit card markets in post-communist countries. They also highlight the 
deceptively difficult problem of recruiting actors into the market, often against the 
backdrop of unstable institutions or extant social divisions (see also Yenkey 2011, 2015). 
The literature on derivatives focuses directly on the social foundations of the linked 
relation between derivatives and their underlying commodities. Scholars identify that this 
connection is constituted by the overlapping actions of diverse individuals and 
organizational actors (Millo 2007), and that the seeming abstractness of derivatives in 
fact comes from particular material actions (MacKenzie 2007; Maurer 2002). Others 
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examine the consequences of the practices by which derivatives are created. Pryke & 
Allen (2000) demonstrate how the calculative, risk management practices at the heart of 
derivative trading alter understandings of what money is capable of doing.  
 By analyzing futures markets in terms of their infrastructural connection with 
spot markets I aim to combine useful features of both of these approaches. An 
infrastructural approach highlights the theoretical and practical puzzles facing market 
creation, while also focusing on the unique constitutive linkage between derivative and 
underlying markets. This perspective allows for a market-wide perspective on the 
connection between derivatives and their underlying entities. Particularly, I focus on the 
infrastructural features that created the information traders needed in order to make 
intentionally rational decisions on the futures market—what I call their information 
infrastructure.  
 This dissertation focuses on three features of these information infrastructures. 
Each of these linked the futures market and spot market in some way, made futures 
markets possible, and enabled futures traders to make intentionally rational decisions:  
(1) The classification schemes by which spot commodities were assigned abstract 
grades: Futures contracts did not specify the exchange of particular bushels of wheat 
or bales of cotton, but for a certain general class of goods (e.g., strict middling Upland 
cotton or #1 spring wheat). Both exchanges needed to create systems that delineated 
the categorical types available and sorted spot commodities into a particular grade. It 
was through the operation of these systems that the trading of futures contracts was 
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made possible. They linked the commodity as a physical good with the commodity 
classifications traded on the futures market.  
(2) The material means of gathering and disseminating data on both the growth and 
movement of the spot crop and the states of worldwide markets: These socio-technical 
systems expanded traders’ perspectives on the market beyond the exchange floor. 
They brought into the exchange data on the growth and movement of the agricultural 
commodity, as well as price quotations from spot and futures markets around the 
world. Traders used this information to discern trends in worldwide supply and 
demand, or track price trends in other important markets. These systems provided 
material by which traders could orient themselves and attempt to discern future short- 
or long-term trends in futures or spot markets.   
(3) The economic and cultural theories by which traders understood the nature of 
speculation in futures and its effect on spot markets: With the introduction of futures 
markets came a new type of trading: speculation in futures contracts. In order for 
speculative trades to be seen as legitimate features of the market, members of the 
exchanges needed to justify their economic and cultural value. Making this evaluation 
required detailing futures speculation’s relation to the spot market. But more than 
simply bringing legitimacy, these understandings allowed traders to understand states 
of the market, the relation between spots and futures, and the impact of their own 
actions. It provided reasons for engaging in speculation, as well as lines between 
legitimate and illegitimate trades.  
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All three of these infrastructural elements had to be created form scratch. All features of 
how they would work were up for debate, and could be solved in several ways. The 
decisions these exchanges made with regard to these three features would influence the 
character and operation of their futures markets for decades to come.  
This dissertation asks two main sets of questions about these infrastructures. The 
first relates to the social factors that caused the infrastructures to take the shape they did. 
Why did these exchanges link spot and futures markets they ways they did? What social, 
cultural, organizational, technical, or economic factors influenced the construction of 
their linking infrastructures? The second set of questions asks how differences in the 
exchanges’ infrastructures may have affected behavior on their markets. Did the systems 
promote, or make more feasible, distinct styles of trading with differing levels of 
volatility? This question has the potential to illuminate the puzzling long-term divergence 
in price volatility found on these exchanges over the period of my research (see Figures 
1 and 2; also, more generally, Bouilly 1976; Cronon 1991; Lurie 1979; Markham 2002)?  
To summarize my answers to these questions, which I develop over the course of 
this dissertation: The infrastructures built on CBOT and NOCE differed significantly in 
how they constructed, gathered, disseminated, and interpreted information about the 
market. These differences were the outcome of struggles between diverse organizational 
and political actors, who drew on distinct economic, cultural, and technical logics in their 
attempts to make the market suit their own needs. The effects of these infrastructural 
differences were significant. The infrastructure on NOCE led to a futures market that  
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Figure 1. Intra-month commodity price volatility, September 1870 – August 1913. Volatility is calculated 
as the difference between monthly high and low prices divided by the average of the two. In mathematical 
terms, V = (Monthly high – monthly low)/[(Monthly high + monthly low)/2].  
 
Figure 2. Intra-month price volatility, total months (N=516).  
Source: Monthly high and low price data for the most commonly traded grades of wheat on CBOT and 
cotton on NOCE from Boyle (1922) and Boyle (1934). 
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featured a large amount of low-volatility hedging and a close connection with spot 
markets, while the infrastructure on CBOT promoted excessive, high-risk speculation and 
a rift between futures and spot markets.  
 
Hedging and speculation on futures markets 
The method by which I make this last claim regarding the effects of infrastructure 
on price volatility differs enough from a standard sociological style that it warrants 
further explanation. The argument hinges on an analysis of the different types of trades 
that could be made on futures markets—speculative and hedging—and the infrastructural 
features that made one or the other more feasible or rational. Speculation and hedging 
had a symbiotic relation: speculation made the constant market upon which hedging 
relied, while hedging gave legitimacy to speculative trading by offering direct benefits in 
the spot market. Both types of trades were present on both exchanges. Yet, the ratio of 
speculation to hedging could vary widely, variation that would impact the level of price 
volatility seen on the market. My analysis hinges on highlighting the infrastructural 
features one ach exchange that might have impacted this ration of speculation to hedging.    
To understand this argument, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of how 
hedging and speculation on futures markets work. Hedging is a way of using the futures 
market to insure against adverse price movements in the spot market. Middlemen 
connecting buyers and sellers in the spot market would often have to buy and store 
commodities to sell at a later date. Until these goods were sold traders faced the risk that 
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the market price for their commodity would fall, causing them a significant loss. To 
mitigate this risk, traders would take up a complementary position in the futures market, 
which they generally settled by difference, in addition to their dealings in the spot market. 
In this way, any loss in the spot market (e.g., from the price of spot wheat dropping while 
looking for a buyer) would be offset by a gain in the futures market (e.g., from having 
sold wheat short and profiting from the price decline). Hedging thus involved making two 
trades that played out in parallel, one entirely within the futures market, the other entirely 
within the spot market.  
In contrast, speculation occurred solely within the futures market. Its goal was not 
to reduce risk, but to profit from it. Speculators made their money by betting on changes 
in the price of futures contracts. They could go “long,” buying contracts they believed 
were underpriced with the aim of selling an equivalent amount once prices had gone up, 
or “short” selling contracts that were overpriced and buying once the price had dropped; 
their profit came from the difference between the prices at which they bought and sold. In 
this way, speculators would cancel out their contractual obligations by buying and selling 
contracts for equivalent amounts and qualities of goods; Only rarely did speculators ever 
deliver or receive any actual wheat or cotton, or have direct contact with the producers or 
consumers of these goods. In fact, on the majority of speculative short sales, traders 
promised to sell commodities that they did not even own, and had no intention to own. 
These trades, while both necessary components of the futures market, involved 
opposed rationales and relations to the underlying product market that would have had 
distinct impacts on price volatility. Hedging worked best when the spot and futures 
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markets were relatively stable and stayed roughly in step with each other, since this most 
effectively enabled the insurance function of the hedge. Speculation, however, was 
stimulated by an active market with a great deal of movement in prices, which increased 
the uncertainty under which speculation thrives. Hedging also had a built-in limit on the 
amount traded in futures, since traders would hedge only the amount of the underlying 
commodity they were actually moving, and end their engagement in the futures market as 
soon as their spot dealings were through. Speculators had no such limits. They 
maintained ongoing portfolios of contracts and could pump up the volume of trade as 
high as would benefit them.2 Additionally, greater levels of speculation, ceteris paribus, 
increased the likelihood of manipulative actions such as cornering the market. Corners 
worked by trapping traders who had built up sizeable speculative positions. Corners were 
highly disruptive events, causing massive fluctuations in price and often scaring traders 
out of the market for long stretches of time. We can conclude from these differences in 
trading that a market that featured far more speculation than hedging would be more 
likely to see price fluctuations than one with a greater proportion of hedging.  
Unfortunately, it is impossible to empirically determine what percentage of trades 
in the futures market were made as hedges versus speculation, since formally they were 
exactly the same. But I argue that by analyzing the infrastructural connections between 
product and futures markets, we can determine whether a particular exchange would 
make one or the other type of trading more or less feasible. This is because speculation 
and hedging have distinct information infrastructures under which they would thrive. 
                                                 
2 Marx’s (1976) two circuits of capital, C-M-C and M-C-M’, describe this difference quite well.  
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Hedging, since it involved parallel trades in the spot and futures markets required 
conditions where information was useful in both markets. Also, since hedging is a longer-
term strategy, it did not require that information travel especially quickly, only that it be 
accurate. For speculation, the needs were opposite. Since traders were constantly looking 
to adjust their portfolio towards greater profit, the speed of information was critical. 
Additionally, since speculation almost always occurred entirely within the futures market, 
with no actual delivery of commodities, the accuracy of information was secondary—all 
that mattered was that everyone was working with the same information, good or bad. 
The distinct orientations and infrastructural needs of hedging and speculation are 
summarized in Table 1.   
Over the course of the dissertation, I demonstrate that CBOT’s infrastructure 
offered more support for speculation than hedging, while NOCE’s infrastructure did the 
opposite. As a result, I argue, CBOT would have seen a higher proportion of speculation, 
as hedging trades moved to other markets better suited to their needs; conversely, NOCE 
would have encouraged hedging, while making speculation difficult. These differences 
would have created different baseline levels of volatility in their futures markets, offering 
a partial explanation for the divergence in price volatility across markets.  
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Table 1. Orientation and infrastructural needs of hedging and speculation. 
 
 
Hedging Speculation 
O
ri
en
ta
ti
o
n
 
Relation to markets Acted in both markets Acted only in futures market 
Market goal Price insurance Bet on price movements 
Orientation to risk Reducing risk Assuming risk 
Orientation to price Favor price stability Favor price fluctuation 
In
fr
a
st
ru
c-
 
tu
ra
l 
n
ee
d
s 
Classification needs Index physical qualities Create stable symbols 
Information needs Long-term crop data Fast price updates 
Theoretical needs 
Show spot market 
value 
Distinguish from gambling 
 
Data sources 
 The data for this dissertation comes from three primary sources. The first, and 
largest, source of data for this dissertation was the archives of the exchanges. The CBOT 
archive is held at the University of Illinois – Chicago. Sources included annual reports, 
official rules and regulations, meeting minutes, and statistical data displayed on the 
Board. I additionally reviewed materials and reports from several important standing 
committees: Arbitration and Appeals; Grain; Warehouse; Market Reports; Membership; 
and Transportation. I also consulted books and pamphlets from the period— both those 
published by CBOT and those simply related to topics of interest—that were included in 
the Board’s library. Finally, I rounded out the data with the records of the Education 
Department, the Secretary’s correspondence, and the reports of the Annual Meetings of 
the CBOT affiliate, Council of North American Grain Exchanges. While CBOT was 
founded in 1848, the Board did not begin to keep records until ten years later. Most of 
these records, however, were destroyed in the Great Chicago Fire of October 1871. Thus 
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almost all of the material is from 1872 onward. Data for from prior to this point were 
gathered through secondary sources.  
 The NOCE archive is housed at Tulane University, and includes copious records 
from the time of the Exchange’s founding. These include annual reports, official rules and 
regulations, and meeting minutes. Reports from several standing committees provided 
material for my analysis, including the Committees on Supervision; Membership; 
Information and Statistics; Arbitration & Appeals; Futures; Exchange Quotations; and 
Telegraph. Books and pamphlets published by the Exchange were also included, as well 
as several issues of Cotton World, the periodical produced by NOCE Secretary Henry 
Hester. In addition to the materials at Tulane, the New Orleans Public Library also has a 
number of additional books and pamphlets, as well as miscellaneous documents related to 
the New Orleans cotton trade that filled out the collection of documents.  
A second source of data was exchange members' testimonies before state and 
federal legislators. On a number of occasions, representatives from CBOT and NOCE 
were asked to publicly defend the desirability and safety of commodity exchanges, 
futures markets, or speculation. The transcripts of these public hearings provide evidence 
of the exchanges’ workings, as well as traders’ orientations to speculation and its role in 
the economy. Representatives from CBOT spoke before Illinois legislators in 1870 during 
the Illinois constitutional convention, and again in 1883, before a special committee 
charged with investigating speculative trading. They also appeared before the U.S. 
Congress in 1914 to comment on proposed legislation. NOCE representatives testified 
before the New York state senate in 1882 regarding speculation in the cotton market, and 
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before the House Committee on Agriculture in 1895 and 1914 to comment on several 
proposed pieces of legislation. Members of both CBOT and NOCE gave testimony at the 
House Committee on Agriculture’s 1892 hearing on “fictitious dealings in agricultural 
products,” undertaken in connection with the pending Hatch Bill, which sought to 
regulate futures markets.  
The final source of data for the dissertation was articles from the New Orleans 
Daily Picayune (later Times-Picayune), the Chicago Tribune, and the New York Times. 
These papers both reported on and editorialized the actions of the exchanges and attitudes 
of traders. They offer context and a non-exchange-centered perspective. Newspaper data 
was used selectively to flesh out areas of interest and noteworthy events from other 
sources.   
 
Outline of the dissertation 
The first chapter of the dissertation sketches the foundings of the CBOT and 
NOCE and the creation of their futures markets. CBOT was founded prior to the Civil 
War, amid a technologically-fueled growth spurt that turned Chicago into a commercial 
hub of the North. Futures trading was introduced during the Civil War. The uncertainty 
and volatility produced by the War created ample opportunities for speculation in the 
price of commodities, and futures provided a less capital-intensive way to engage in it. 
By contrast, NOCE was founded after the war, in an effort to regain New Orleans’ once-
dominant position as the country’s cotton export capital. Focused largely on revitalizing 
the spot trade, NOCE adopted futures trading only reluctantly, once the volume of the 
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business grew too big to pass up. I also discuss the regulations put in place by the federal 
government beginning in 1916, which ended the period of associational and state-level 
regulation. Finally, I justify my case selection, arguing that CBOT and NOCE allow me 
to investigate both the causes that shaped infrastructures in particular ways and the 
effects those infrastructures had on market action.   
Chapter 2 develops the concept of market infrastructure, which I use to 
understand the production, dissemination, and interpretation of information on spot and 
futures markets. I begin by highlighting three broad perspectives on information within 
markets, taken by information economists and some sociological network theorists, 
institutional sociologists, and science and technology scholars. I bring together these 
three approaches through a discussion of “information infrastructures”—the institutional, 
material, and cultural means by which information is created, disseminated, and 
interpreted. This broad perspective enables us to consider all three of the areas 
highlighted above, while additionally analyzing the character of information on markets 
and the uses to which it can be put. According to the nature of the infrastructure involved, 
information may take on wholly different properties, constructing vastly different market 
information environments. This is seen in the cases in my dissertation, were the distinct 
infrastructures in place on CBOT and NOCE created information environments that 
promoted very different types of trading on the futures markets. The conceptual 
framework of “information infrastructure” thus seeks to encompass the established 
literature on how market devices and institutions impose a relation to information and 
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also to determine how market infrastructures give particular qualities to information, and 
how these qualities come to matter in market situations.  
The next three chapters examine different components of the infrastructures that 
linked spot and futures markets and enabled futures trading on each exchange. Chapter 3 
studies the grading systems that transformed concrete commodities into abstract grades 
that could be embedded in futures contracts. On CBOT, the grading system developed 
contemporaneously with the futures market and was shaped by the (not always honest) 
opportunities for profit available to powerful elevator owners and speculators within that 
system. Even when the state took over grading, political pressure on the regulatory board 
resulted in continued inaccurate grades. On NOCE, grading was created for the benefit of 
spot traders long before futures trading arose. For much of my period of research the 
system was based on antagonistic negotiation between buyer and seller, which resulted in 
grades that closely indexed the physical qualities of cotton. This was supplemented by a 
top-notch system of supervision and inspection that watched over cotton as it was 
processed and loaded onto ships. Even once NOCE centralized grading in an official 
body, powerful spot traders worked to ensure its continued fidelity. Finally, I argue that 
these differences in the ability of grades to accurately index the commodities’ physical 
qualities resulted in a higher proportion of speculation to hedging on CBOT than on 
NOCE.  
Chapter 4 discusses the systems for gathering and disseminating price quotations 
and crop statistics on each exchange. The former type of information changed from 
minute to minute and linked each exchange to other worldwide markets; the latter came 
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on a longer time scale and connected exchanges to the worlds of agriculture and 
transportation. CBOT and NOCE differed in the value they assigned to each type of 
information and their methods for gathering them. CBOT fought hard to ensure control 
over the dissemination of their own quotations and speedy telegraphic service with other 
exchanges, making credible threats that forced Western Union to meet their demands on a 
number of issues. But this focus on quotations came at the expense of developing an 
accurate system of crop statistics. On NOCE, the situation was reversed. From its 
inception, NOCE gathered vast amounts of statistical data on the growth and movement 
of the crop. But their telegraphic facilities continually lagged behind those of rival 
markets, particularly the Cotton Exchange in New York. I claim that these differences in 
the type of information gathered and the speed of its dissemination also contributed to 
CBOT having a higher proportion of speculative trading than NOCE. 
Chapter 5 addresses the theoretical orientations that traders brought to the futures 
market. Traders on CBOT and NOCE differently assigned different economic and 
cultural value to speculation and futures trading. On CBOT, the cultural defense of 
speculation was made overwhelmingly in response to threatened legislation and thus 
focused on its distinction with gambling. But among Board members, a speculative 
market was contrasted economically to a dull market: speculation created action and 
opportunities for profit, which was good for the market as a whole. These arguments 
converged in the rejection of options trading, a close relative of futures that took on both 
a negative economic and cultural character. On NOCE, the value of futures came from 
being tools by which traders could push for higher cotton prices in the spot market. 
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Higher prices, in addition to their economic value, would help bring autonomy to the 
South, freeing it from reliance on Northern and foreign capital. I suggest that these 
infrastructural differences, unlike those in the previous two chapters, would have had 
only minor impacts on market behavior. Both encouraged speculation, only for different 
reasons. Still, the distinct understandings of futures speculation adds richness to our 
accounts of the evolution and institutionalization of futures markets in this period.  
 In the concluding chapter, I summarize the argument of the dissertation, reviewing 
the infrastructural differences on these two early futures markets, their causes, and their 
consequences. I also discuss two general contributions of the dissertation and their 
potential to guide further research. The first is demonstrating the necessity of studying 
derivative markets in terms of their constitutive, infrastructural linkages with underlying 
markets. I suggest that this perspective challenges and supplements the literature on 
market creation by noting the distinct challenges present in the creation of derivative 
markets. Second, I highlight infrastructural analysis as a useful analytical approach to 
studying the regulation of financial markets. This extends recent arguments about how to 
influence market-level outcomes not by imposing regulatory strictures, but by reshaping 
market architectures.  
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Chapter 1 – CBOT, NOCE, and the Birth of Futures 
 
 
The middle of the 19th century saw the rise of a new type of organization, which 
transformed the marketing of agricultural commodities: the exchange. Though exchanges 
for trading stocks had existed in the Unites States since 1792, commodity exchanges took 
longer to arrive. Commodity exchanges were corporations that brought together a range 
of businessmen—including merchants, warehousemen, millers, spinners, shipping agents, 
insurance agents, and others—for the promotion and regulation of trade. Some exchanges 
hosted markets in a large number of commodities, while others focused on particular 
commodities such as cotton, coffee, butter, eggs, leather, or petroleum.  
Commodity exchanges served two broad functions. First, they regulated and 
oversaw a city’s commodity trade. Exchanges set rules of competition and cooperation, 
and promoted uniformity in trade practices such as delivery, giving of margins, and 
setting commission or storage rates. Many exchanges established standards for assigning 
grades to commodities, facilitating large-scale, institutionalized trading. They also served 
as sites for the speedy and fair settlement of business disputes. This private arbitration 
process kept business from getting mired in protracted court battles and ensured that 
well-qualified peers would judge the cases. Beyond this regulatory function, exchanges 
also acted as aggregators of information and sites of markets. Prior to the founding of 
exchanges, commodity trading occurred scattered throughout the offices, street corners, 
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and saloons of a city. Information traveled through private channels and varied from one 
locale to the next. Exchanges centralized this information and, with it, trading. The result 
was a lively market, with a large common pool of information.  
CBOT and NOCE were major exchanges both founded in this mid-19th century 
wave, CBOT in 1848 and NOCE in 1871. Soon after their foundings, both also became 
the sites of large markets in agricultural futures contracts. The exchanges, as 
organizations, were central to developing the infrastructures of these new markets in 
derivative financial products. This chapter outlines the histories of these exchanges, 
beginning with the developments that spawned the formation of the exchanges, then 
following on to their subsequent institutionalization of futures trading. The chapter also 
provides broader context on the exchanges’ defining characteristics as well as their 
positions within the global commodity trade. This historical background provides context 
for the in-depth infrastructural analysis that follows in chapters three to five. I also 
explore why these cases are especially well-suited to an infrastructural analysis; this 
provides a methodological justification for the dissertation as a whole.   
 
CBOT: The ascendance of Chicago & the founding of the Board 
The city of Chicago grew rapidly in the 1830s and 1840s. What was, at the start of 
the period, a forgettable local trading post for Native tribes and English and French 
settlers was, by the end of it, a booming city attracting massive investment form 
breathless capitalists. Chicago’s population increased twenty-fold and the value of its 
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land grew by a factor of three thousand in just a few years of this initial growth (Cronon 
1991). Along with the flood of capital came a spate of growth in shipping and storing 
technology. By the end of the 1840s, the growth of railroads, grain elevators, and lake 
transportation had made Chicago the central transit point for wheat, corn, oats, barley, 
rye, and others agricultural commodities from the expanding hinterland, “the 
intermediary between small and large lots, between box cars and lake boats, between 
small seller and large buyer” (Lee 1938: 63). Railroads connected to northwest Illinois 
and southwestern Wisconsin, enticing farmers to send their wheat in by rail, rather than 
haul it in on wagons. Steam-powered elevators, built with train tracks on one side and a 
waterway on the other, stored grain and transferred it from rail to lake vessels. Once grain 
was loaded onto ships, the newly opened Illinois & Michigan Canal allowed shipment 
along either the Great Lakes or the Mississippi River, leading to the two largest ports in 
America. The increasing flow of goods and capital into the city led the Cleveland Plain 
Dealer, in 1858, to perceptively quip: “Chicago is a bustling city. It was formerly in 
Illinois, but now Illinois is in it” (Cited in Lee 1938: 95). 
Alongside this growth in transportation infrastructure, a number of specialized 
functions emerged within the growing market, including storage, shipment, forwarding, 
and commission buying or selling (Lee 1938). The chain by which grain went from 
farmer to miller was long. Commonly a farmer sold grain to a local buyer, who would 
then consign the grain to a commission merchant in Chicago. Grain was shipped to 
Chicago by rail, almost always entering an elevator aligned with the railroad. The 
elevator proprietor issued receipts for this grain to the commission broker, who, seeking 
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to limit his exposure to price changes, sold these receipts, usually to a speculator. The 
receipt would then often be exchanged among speculators multiple times before 
eventually ending up with a shipper who would go to the warehouse and get grain that 
matched his receipts, which was then shipped to the mill (Lee 1938).  
This complex marketing system was growing at an astonishing rate and handling 
increasingly large sums of both commodities and money. By the mid-1850s, more grain 
was moving through the city than ever before. From 1852-1857 receipts and shipments of 
wheat grew more than ten-fold (Taylor 1917: 141).1 This was matched by an increase in 
the storage capacity of the city’s elevators, which grew from 700,000 bushels in 1848 to 
5,000,000 bushels in 1860. During this period, fully half of the wheat shipped to the 
eastern seaboard went through Chicago (Lee 1938). Unsurprisingly, members of the trade 
sought to establish some level of order and stability amid this growth. In March 1848, 
thirteen firms and individuals organized to establish a Board of Trade that would settle 
disputes, establish regulations, share information, and generally serve as a center for 
Chicago businessmen. In the first year eighty-two people joined the organization, 
representing all areas of the commodity trade (Taylor 1917). The Board drafted a 
constitution and by-laws, which provided for an elected Board of Directors and a handful 
of standing committees dedicated to critical issues in the grain trade, such as Shipping, 
                                                 
1 Information about the early years of the Board is scant. They did not print an annual report until 1858, and 
newspapers took little interest in reporting on the activities or composition of the Board in its earliest years. 
More seriously, their records were destroyed in the Great Chicago Fire of 1871. As a result, figures from 
the time before 1871 are imprecise. Nevertheless, they give a proper sense of the market’s enormous 
growth.   
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Warehousing, and Arbitration.  
In these early years, the Board of Trade served primarily as a voluntary 
association for administering and supporting agricultural trade. But it was not until the 
Board’s transformation into a marketplace that the organization truly caught on. 
Merchants had discovered that gathering together at a single trading place offered them 
constant opportunities for speculative dealing. These were especially frequent from 1853-
1856, as the Crimean War made European markets highly volatile, offering multiple 
chances to try to take advantage of price movements.  
The speculation of the Crimean War period was done with spot commodities; 
traders would buy low with hopes to sell high. This spot speculation was soon largely 
replaced with speculation in futures contracts. Following the creation of a set of 
standardized grades in 1856, traders began making and exchanging contracts to buy or 
sell a particular grade at some future point. The use of standardized grades and soon 
thereafter standardized contracts allowed futures trading to happen en masse. This system 
of futures trading required far less capital and thus enabled a larger amount of 
speculation. The Civil War provided—as the Crimean War had before it—a large supply 
of external jolts that resulted in sudden price movements (Taylor 1917). Battles 
represented not only advances and setbacks in the war, but opportunities to make large 
sums of money. The famous warehouse owner P.D. Armour, for example, made some $2 
million after selling pork short in anticipation of the peace at Appomattox—a peace 
which sent the price of pork tumbling from $40 to $28 a barrel (Markham 2002: 269).   
In the spot trade as well, the Board’s reach continued to grow throughout the Civil 
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War. Chicago took on extra rail traffic as southern routes became inaccessible. Between 
1859 and 1866, the quantity of grain handled in the city more than tripled (Kendall 1956).  
Nine new grain warehouses, providing seven million bushels of space were built in the 
first half of the 1860s (Lee 1938: 109). CBOT also gained new, expansive legal powers 
when, in March 1859, the state of Illinois granted them a special charter bestowing the 
ability to appoint weighers, inspectors, and measurers whose judgments would be binding 
upon both buyer and seller, as well as quasi-judicial powers to decide cases of arbitration, 
issue subpoenas, and administer oaths (Lurie 1979). Between 1859 and 1863, the Board’s 
membership rolls had swelled from 520 to 980 (CBOT, Annual reports). By the end of 
the war, the Board was established as a central player in worldwide agricultural trade. 
 
Illinois’s regulation of the grain trade 
 Following the war, dropping prices and high demand for agricultural commodities 
created an environment ripe for corners. CBOT suffered a large corner in wheat in 1866 
and, two years later, saw three corners on wheat, two on corn, one on oats, and one 
attempted on rye (Cronon 1991). On top of these disruptions to the market, elevators and 
railroads were cementing collusive agreements that limited competition and consumer 
choice. These injustices, foregrounded through the agitation of Illinois’s strong agrarian 
bloc, led to the state’s regulation of the grain trade. Through the Illinois Constitution of 
1870 and the Warehouse Act of 1871 the state assumed authority to regulate railroads and 
warehouses. As part of this regulation, it also created the Illinois State Railroad and 
Warehouse Commission (RWC). A central duty of this commission was the inspection, 
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grading, and issuance of receipts for all grain changing hands in the Chicago market, 
tasks which had previously been handled by the Board itself. This involved the state to an 
unprecedented degree at a very early point in the history of the derivative market. 2  
CBOT’s relation with the state was to color the development of their market over the next 
forty years.   
By the time of the RWC’s founding in 1871, Chicago’s rapid rise from “frontier 
town” to “world’s greatest market” (Chicago Daily Journal, April 22, 1919) was almost 
complete. Not even October’s Great Fire slowed the commercial progress of the city.  
Though a number of other Midwestern cities (e.g., Duluth, Minneapolis, Kansas City, St. 
Louis) formed boards of trade that competed for grain forwarding business, no other 
primary market received even half as much grain as Chicago in any year between 1860 
and 1890 (Goldstein 1928; Lee 1938). By 1880, elevator storage space had grown to over 
19 million bushels (Lee 1938), and Chicago exported 153 million bushels of wheat, a 
new record high (Shannon 1945). Chicago was the clear center of the grain trade in the 
country, a position they held throughout the period studied in this dissertation.  
 
NOCE: Impact of the Civil War on the New Orleans cotton trade 
The commercial history of New Orleans was quite different than that of Chicago. 
In the pre-railroad era New Orleans’s geographical position made them a natural cotton 
                                                 
2 This was the first instance in the country of a state assuming responsibility for grading commodities. After 
the RWC’s constitutional authority was established in the 1876 U.S. Supreme Court case Munn v. Illinois  
several other states, including as Minnesota, Kansas and Missouri, established similar grading authorities.   
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market. The city stood at the mouth of the Mississippi and within close range of the lands 
where the majority of American cotton was grown. New Orleans was the central port for 
cotton, the primary export crop of the US (Rothstein 1966). In the six crop years prior to 
the Civil War, New Orleans merchants sold, on average, just over 47% of all the 
country’s cotton (Bouilly 1976). As cotton accounted for over half of all American 
exports, this made New Orleans the commercial center of the South, and cotton the 
leading source of business. 
The central figure in the marketing of the cotton crop during this period was the 
factor, an all-purpose commission merchant who connected the otherwise disparate 
groups of planters, financial interests, shipping companies, and merchants (Stone 1915). 
Factors were the sole link between planters in the country and all city, northern and 
international interests. For this reason, as compared to commission merchants in Chicago, 
the factor’s work had a far broader scope. Factors were closely intertwined with planters’ 
every economic action. They would lend money to planters at the start of the season, and 
advance them up to two-thirds or three-fourths of the market value of the produce 
consigned to them after the harvest (Jones 1937). They acted with great latitude to market 
the cotton consigned to them, based on their superior knowledge of the market and the 
close, trusting relationships established with clients (Woodman 1963). In fact, Stone 
(1915) states that relations between factors and their clients “were of the  most  intimate  
and confidential  character,  as  close probably as was  ever  the  case  between  business  
associates;” their associations “frequently were life-long” (Stone 1915: 559). This is not 
to say that factors did not exact a sizeable toll for their services. Planters were forced to 
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buy supplies for the farm and the homestead through factors, at greatly inflated prices, 
which amounted to an effective interest charge of from 40 to 110% (Shannon 1945). If 
the total receipts of a farmer’s crop was not enough to wipe out his indebtedness for the 
year, his obligation to the merchant rolled over into the next year (Hammond 1897). This 
effectively created a system of debt peonage for many small farmers, giving Stone’s 
previous comment about “life-long” relations a far dimmer interpretation.  
But after years of prosperity, the New Orleans cotton market entered into a 
protracted decline, beginning in the mid-1850s and lasting for twenty years.  The advance 
of the railroad turned New Orleans’s geographic position from an asset into a liability. 
Railroads offered planters an attractive alternative to sending their goods down the river. 
This was especially true as rates dropped and improvements in cotton presses at interior 
towns made it possible to pack over twice as much cotton into the same car space 
(Hammond 1897; Shannon 1945). Once cotton arrived at the east coast, the ports of New 
York, Charleston, and Savannah offered better facilities and lower prices than New 
Orleans (Caldwell 1980). From 1860 to 1870, the number of bales shipped eastward by 
rail grew from 109,000 bales to 381,000. Between 1868-1871, New Orleans merchants 
sold an average of only 37% of the total crop, down from the ante-bellum figure of 47% 
(Bouilly 1976). The Civil War also led to a significant loss of business. Crop returns were 
remarkably low during the war years. In 1861, the South’s cotton crop totaled 4 million 
bales; in the years 1862-1865, the combined total did not reach 3 million (Shannon 1945). 
Of the little cotton that was produced, even less brought money to the South. Many bales 
went to waste for lack of adequate storage, were thrown up on the lines of fortifications 
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to impede cannon balls, or were burned by the Confederates to prevent capture by the 
Union (Shannon 1945). Once New Orleans was occupied, northern merchants assumed 
control of large quantities of cotton, either through outright theft or by trading with 
Southern businessmen who preferred the relative security of Northern greenbacks to their 
almost worthless Confederate dollars (Shannon 1945). 
This decline in business spelled the end of the factorage system that had reigned 
prior to the war. Concentrating multiple functions in the single person of the factor 
created an inefficient system that required large margins to cover the extensive risk being 
born by the factor. In times of flush production, the inefficiencies of the system caused 
little concern, but this period of sustained decline put increased pressure on the system. 
Buyers began to bypass factors, using new communication facilities to strike deals with 
planters in the interior directly, and shipping the cotton on through bills of lading that 
seamlessly moved goods across varieties of transport (Ellis 1973; Woodman 1963). Store 
merchants in the interior went from being adjuncts of seaport factors to being key players 
in the marketing of cotton in their own right (Woodman 1963). Each of the major 
functions of the factor—salesman, buyer and supplier of credit—was gradually being 
replaced by other, more efficient agencies (Woodman 1963).  
 
Founding & development of the NOCE 
In 1871, in the midst of this decline and transformation of the cotton trade, the 
New Orleans Cotton Exchange was founded. The organization was proposed in January 
29 
 
 
by thirty-six local cotton firms. Within two weeks it had over 100 members and by 
September had secured a charter from the state (Boyle 1934). Unlike CBOT, there was 
sustained interest and membership in the Exchange from the start, and a year after its 
founding the Exchange’s had more than doubled to 225 regular members. The formal 
organization of the Exchange was quite similar to that found on CBOT. Government was 
vested in a board of directors, subject to a charter, constitution, by-laws and rules; 
standing and special committees were formed, dedicated to issues such as Information & 
Statistics, Membership, Arbitration and Appeals, Futures, Supervision, Deliveries and 
Finance; the membership committee and Board of Directors were given disciplinary 
power, and Arbitration and Appeals committees settled commercial disputes.  
NOCE was a stable organization. Antebellum trade in New Orleans had been 
organized through elites; following the war, the occupations of the elites changed, but the 
reliance on tight-knit networks did not. There were several instances of well-entrenched 
families whose influence in the Exchange spanned decades. The Glenny family is 
particularly telling. J.E. Glenny served for three years on the committee on classification 
and quotations, twice as chair; I.E. Glenny served for four years on the board of directors, 
and multiple committees, including one chairmanship; E.J. Glenny served practically 
every year from 1898 to 1915 on the board of directors, including two stints apiece as 
president and vice-president; and J.W. Glenny served twice on the arbitration committee. 
During the period of my research, the office of NOCE president was held by three 
different father-son pairs – R.M. Walmsley and S.P. Walmsley; Andrew Stewart and 
W.P. Stewart; and John F. Clark and Russell Clark (Boyle 1934).  
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NOCE was founded one year after the creation of the New York Cotton 
Exchange; both New York and New Orleans followed the Liverpool Cotton Brokers’ 
Association, which had formed in 1841.3 Together, these three exchanges dominated the 
global cotton trade. New York and Liverpool were large and had sizeable speculative 
markets; New Orleans was third in size and remained more involved in the spot trade, at 
first (Bouilly 1976: 39). In New York, especially, spot trading was quite low by the time 
the Cotton Exchange was founded. The New York exchange was developed not to build 
up the trade in commodities, but to standardize futures contracts, and promote futures 
trading, fact which kept NOCE members wary (Bouilly 1976).  While NOCE did what it 
could to promote business across the exchanges, adopting similar rules and working to 
align their classifications and practices, it remained suspicious of  the other markets. 
While members saw the revival of the spot trade as the primary objective of the 
Exchange, this did not mean that traders in New Orleans were unfamiliar with, or 
unamenable to, futures trading. Traders had sold commodities “to arrive” in antebellum 
times, and during the war futures contracts were used to keep a steady supply of cotton to 
Southern mills. In fact, NOCE, upon its founding in 1871, featured futures trading. But it 
remained quite rare at this time. Using the large, established futures market in New York 
was more appealing to traders than building their own in New Orleans. In the first month 
of trading on the Exchange, there were only three transactions in futures. From this 
inauspicious beginning, the trade managed to shrink even further, with only a smattering 
of futures trades in the Exchange’s first three years. Between 1873 and 1879 no futures 
                                                 
3 This group spawned the Liverpool Cotton Exchange in 1888.  
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transactions took place on the Exchange (Ellis 1973).  
NOCE finally established its own futures market in 1879, once it became clear 
that futures were becoming a central feature of the global agricultural marketplace, which 
NOCE did not want to cede entirely (Bouilly 1976). Once established, futures trading 
found fertile soil. While the volume of futures never matched that seen in Liverpool or 
New York, New Orleans maintained a sizeable volume that attracted orders from clients 
around the world. The city’s spot trade also leveled off at this time, stemming the decline 
of the previous years. While spot sales had plateaued at a level approximately 20% below 
their high-water mark of the 1850s, they remained steady throughout the remainder of the 
19th century (Bouilly 1976). New Orleans, though less dominant than before the war, 
remained important to world trade as a viable market for futures and the largest cotton 
port in the United States. 
 
Federal regulation of commodity exchanges 
The period of time covered in this dissertation spans from the introduction of 
futures on CBOT to the beginnings of federal regulation of the futures market. 4 Up until 
1916, futures trading took place on CBOT and NOCE free from constraints at either the 
                                                 
4 The federal government’s one brief foray into this arena during the period of my research, the Anti-Gold 
Futures Act, was a disaster. Passed in the midst of the Civil War, it was designed to suppress speculation in 
gold in order to build up the value of Union-issued greenback currency. Its effect was the exact opposite. 
The price of gold shot up more than 50% in two weeks and Congress quickly repealed the act. Following 
this, another piece of legislation regulating the futures trade was not passed for fifty years. 
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state or the federal level.5 Though, this lack of regulation was not for lack of trying. An 
1874 bill in the Illinois legislature sought to limit speculation by prohibiting the sale of 
grain that was not owned by the trader. In 1883, the state appointed a special House 
committee to investigate the Board’s practices; the committee issued a scathing report 
urging the suppression of futures trading. The Louisiana legislature, in 1888, debated a 
bill aiming to affix a prohibitively large tax to speculative trades in futures. The federal 
government was also busy with proposed legislation. Between 1880 and 1920 some 200 
bills were introduced in Congress to regulate futures and options trading; the 60th 
Congress (1907-1909) alone, introduced 25 bills designed to prohibit futures trading 
(Markham 1987). While the vast majority never made it out of committee, some were 
able to do so and a few, in fact, came close to passing: the Hatch Bill in 1892 and Scott 
Bill in 1910 both required significant lobbying from the exchanges to be defeated.  
The first pieces of legislation providing for federal regulation of the commodity 
trade were the Cotton Futures Act and Grain Standards Act, both found in the same bill 
from 1916.6 These first acts were tentative. The federal government mirrored the steps 
taken by individual states, regulating commodities (whether traded on spot or futures 
markets) rather than the futures markets themselves. Both acts established, and mandated 
the use of, federal grading standards for cotton and grain (Markham 1987). But the 
Cotton Futures Act did dip a toe into regulation of the futures market. It mandated a 
                                                 
5 While Illinois did oversee the grading of commodities via the RWC, it did not directly regulate futures 
trading or speculation in any way. 
6 The 1916 version of the Cotton Futures Act was a second version of a bill Congress had passed two years 
earlier. The prior act was ruled unconstitutional on a technicality shortly after becoming a law: the bill had 
originated in the Senate, when, as a revenue measure, it should have been drafted in the House.  
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single method for setting premiums and discounts on future delivery and required 
separate grade certificates for each bale delivered on contract rather than one for the lot 
(Garside 1935). While mild in their effect, these laws established the federal 
government’s involvement in commodity exchanges.   
While not regulatory in nature, the federal government did temporarily disrupt the 
workings of the futures market in wheat following the entry of the United States into 
World War I. In an effort to provision the Allied forces, the Food and Fuel Control Act of 
August 1917 gave the federal government the power to set the price of wheat by fiat. The 
Wheat Price Guarantee Act, passed in February 1919, extended the President’s authority 
to regulate speculation and other practices on exchanges. Under these extraordinary 
circumstances, CBOT had little choice but to suspend their wheat from August 1917 to 
July 1920 (Markham 1987). Though not regulation, this interference from the state 
clearly makes these years unsuitable for a comparison. 
Finally, following World War I, the federal government firmly established 
oversight over the futures trade with the passage of the Grain Futures Act of 1922.7 The 
law required exchanges to act to prevent price manipulation and the dissemination of 
false and misleading crop or market information. It forced exchanges to maintain records 
of their transactions, which were made open to the Department of Justice and Department 
                                                 
7 The Grain Futures Act, like the Cotton Futures Act before it, had two iterations. It was first passed in 
December 1921, and was soon thereafter found unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court. After this 
rejection by the courts, Congress quickly went back to drafting a new law. Ironically, in order to craft a bill 
that would not run afoul of the Court’s logic, the new bill had to make stronger claims about futures trading 
than the original, including that it damaged the national public interest and often caused obstructions in 
interstate commerce. 
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of Agriculture. The law also caused the establishment of the Grain Futures 
Administration, a predecessor to the present-day Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission. This administration was tasked with holding exchanges to these rules. To 
ensure compliance with the law, they had the ability to impose a prohibitive tax of 20 
cents per bushel on contracts executed on exchanges that failed to meet these 
requirements (Markham 1987). This fully established the federal government’s regulatory 
role in relation to commodity futures markets, a role it has continued playing to this day. 
In sum, between 1916 and 1922 the federal government significantly reshaped the 
operation of both spot and future markets in wheat and cotton, putting an end to the 
period of decentralized, private and state-level regulation. But in the sixty years prior to 
1916, futures markets developed in an open environment of experimentation and local 
regulation. This dissertation traces CBOT and NOCE through their development and 
institutionalization during this period. The unique paths taken on these exchanges 
exemplify the variety of meanings and practices attached to futures trading at this 
formative time. They illustrate how futures markets grew out of, an in interaction with, 
extant spot markets in agricultural commodities. To understand futures markets, this 
dissertation argues, we must consider their myriad points of connection with these 
underlying spot markets.   
 
Case selection 
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 CBOT and NOCE both developed futures markets in the sixty years prior to federal 
regulation. But they were not alone in doing so. Grain futures were traded on boards of 
trade in New York, St. Louis, Minneapolis, and Duluth; cotton futures were traded in 
New York and Liverpool. So why choose CBOT and NOCE for study? Answering this 
question requires considering this dissertation’s dual analytic goals, as described in the 
Introduction. The primary goal of my analysis is to reveal through an empirical argument 
how material and social factors directly impacted the creation of information 
infrastructures linking spot and futures markets. Thus, the first task of this section is to 
discuss what features of these markets make them useful cases with which to investigate 
this topic. The secondary analytic goal of the dissertation is to examine how these 
divergent infrastructures established unique conditions of possibility that indirectly 
impacted behavior on these markets. This is necessarily a theoretical argument. The 
second task of this section, then, is two-fold: first, to establish how these cases serve as 
illustrations of this theoretical argument; second, to parse the relation between this 
indirect cause of behavior and traditional, direct causes.  
 
Empirical analysis 
Since the object of my empirical analysis is the infrastructural linkage created 
between spot and derivative markets, it is useful for my two cases to have spot markets 
whose histories differ up to the point of initiating the futures trade. As shown in the 
above history, NOCE and CBOT meet this requirement. CBOT developed out of the need 
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to control the Chicago spot market’s rapid, technologically-fueled growth. The Board 
attempted to balance the interests of several powerful market actors—including railroads, 
elevators, and merchants—as they jockeyed for advantage in the young market. NOCE, 
by contrast, developed out of a more stable and established spot cotton trade in New 
Orleans. NOCE was formed, not to control the market, but to rebuild it after the setbacks 
of the Civil War. When the time came to build futures markets on these exchanges, their 
distinct histories with and relations to the spot market would likely push them to privilege 
different aspects of trade, support different groups, and develop different understandings 
of the economy, all of which would be reflected in their market infrastructures. These 
cases thus offer a chance to explore how distinct spot market backgrounds influence the 
creation of derivative markets and their constitutive, infrastructural linkages to the 
underlying spot market. 
These cases are also useful because they feature markets built upon different 
underlying spot commodities. This difference creates space between the cases that allows 
for a more thorough analysis of the social and material influences on the infrastructure 
that emerges. If the underlying markets dealt in the same commodity both would likely 
implement quite similar infrastructures, since they would be dealing with the same 
material features of production, transportation, storage and manufacture. Additionally, we 
would expect to see a process of isomorphism among such markets whereby their 
infrastructures would converge into a single model. In the course of doing business, the 
exchanges would adopt the same sets of classifications, use the same statistics on the 
crop, and even develop similar ways of theorizing the market through exposure to shared 
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sources of information, such as those presented at national conferences. Having markets 
with distinct commodities at their bases therefore allows for their infrastructures to 
evolve along separate paths, enabling a clearer analysis.  
A final worthwhile feature of these cases is the differing role of the state in the 
construction and enactment of their infrastructures. NOCE developed their infrastructure 
free from any direct state interference. CBOT, in contrast, was forced early on to 
cooperate with the state via the RWC. Through this agency, the state established control 
over an important component of the market infrastructure, the system for grading and 
creating receipts for spot wheat. This distinction provides an opportunity to explore the 
origins and challenges of state involvement in the construction of market infrastructures. 
How did the state’s involvement affect the quality of infrastructure created? Did state 
involvement in this one area of infrastructure impact the form and operation of other 
areas? How did infrastructure become a source of power for the state? These questions 
are critical for understanding efforts at state regulation of financial markets from an 
infrastructural perspective. 
 
Theoretical analysis 
The secondary goal of my analysis is to understand how infrastructure affected 
behavior on these markets. Here, NOCE and CBOT are useful cases because they 
exhibited a striking difference in behavior—a long-term divergence in price volatility 
(see Figures 1 and 2, p. 7 in introduction)—which I use as a focal point for my theoretical 
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argument. I argue that it is possible to trace this difference in volatility back to the 
distinct infrastructures on each market. But this claim is limited in its scope. I claim not 
that infrastructure directly caused market volatility, but rather that it created an 
environment that made volatility-producing behaviors, such as heavy speculation and 
running corners, more plausible and rational on CBOT, and less so on NOCE.   
This is necessarily a theoretical claim. I argue that infrastructure acted as a 
“limiting cause” of volatility, a factor that sets the conditions of possibility, or establishes 
a range of possible outcomes, within which certain events actually occur (Wright, Levine 
& Sober 1992). Limiting causes are contrasted with “selective causes,” the familiar 
causes of economic sociological analysis, such as network geometry, institutional 
environment, status distinction, culture, and more. There were undoubtedly several 
selective causes of volatility, discussed below, at work in my cases, including network 
position, institutional environment, and market culture. One could assume that until the 
influence of these factors are definitively disproven, any analysis that proffers another 
possible cause (e.g., infrastructure) is worth little—it simply adds one more hypothesis to 
the bunch. But I argue that this is not the case. The presence of selective causes, such as 
differences in networks, institutions and culture, does not invalidate a study of limiting 
causes; these causes are complementary, not exclusive. 
Still, in order to place my own infrastructural analysis in context, it is necessary to 
briefly review the major economic and social structural factors that might have been 
selective causes of price volatility on these markets. I discuss four: (1) predictability of 
supply; (2) network structure; (3) institutional environment; and (4) culture. I do not 
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discount that these features might have impacted volatility. I do, however, offer evidence 
that suggests their impact in these cases was likely smaller, and more mixed, than theory 
might at first lead us to believe. My goal in presenting this contrary evidence is to suggest 
that these factors do not inevitably, entirely account for the difference in volatility seen 
on these markets.8   
 
Possible selective causes of volatility 
One partial source of the volatility on these markets was simply a difference in the 
consistency of supply. Central here is the fact that wheat rots far more easily than cotton. 
Wheat was therefore more likely to go bad while in storage or in transit. The sudden 
drops in supply that would accompany this spoilage would cause prices to spike. This 
suggests that the greater volatility in the price of wheat was, in part, a function of its 
particular physical qualities.  
But it seems unlikely that this mechanism could account for the market’s 
persistently higher volatility over fifty years. Instances of mass spoilage were rare. 
Taylor’s (1917) history of the Chicago Board, which includes detailed yearly accounts of 
                                                 
8 The inability to precisely pin down the sources of volatility on these markets is partly due to a mismatch 
of scale between the phenomenon and the data. Volatility occurs on a micro time scale—it depends on 
judgments occurring from minute to minute, or second to second. This is why ethnography is so well suited 
to studies of market decision-making (e.g., Beunza, Hardie & MacKenzie 2006; Beunza & Stark 2005; 
Smith 2011; Zaloom 2006). Historical documents capture a longer time frame, and so miss many of the 
immediate causes of volatility. But what historical data do capture well are differences in infrastructure that 
set the conditions within which these micro-level phenomena occur.   
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the markets for several commodities, only notes six years with significant instances of 
heating, four of which were for stocks of corn, not wheat.9 He makes only one mention of 
spoilage in stored wheat, which occurred in 1870—unfortunate timing for warehousemen 
who were just then facing scrutiny from Illinois’s Constitutional convention. In addition 
to its infrequency, the revelation of spoilage, at least as a statement of supply used in 
rational calculations, would be reflected in prices fairly quickly, preventing long-term, 
multi-month effects. Though, if we were to imagine that instances of spoilage had 
broader effects—say, as rumors about further spoilage continued to circulate—volatility 
might last longer, as speculators wagered over the extent of the damage. But, though the 
evidence does show instances of uncertainty over the status of the crop, the infrequency 
of these moments tends to make any long-term effect less plausible.  
A second influence on volatility might have been the network structures of the 
two exchanges. Trade networks in New Orleans were more tightly-knit than in Chicago. 
As discussed above, many NOCE leadership positions were filled by a rotating cast of 
prominent members. These small, elite-driven trading networks were a legacy of the 
factorage system, which had severely limited the number of middlemen in the cotton 
trade. We can assume that volatility within such a market might have been dampened by 
a number of different forces, including more rigidly enforced social norms against 
excessive speculation or market manipulation, the individual need to repeatedly trade 
with the same people, and personal friendships (Biggart 2001; Burt 1992; Rauch & 
                                                 
9 These mentions were found by searching the PDF file for the terms “spoilage,” “heating,” and “rotten,” 
along with their alternates, e.g., spoil, spoiled, spoiling, etc. 
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Casella 2001; Sabel 1992). CBOT, by contrast, developed out of a far more specialized 
and differentiated marketing system. This social distance between traders could have 
weakened the norms of behavior on CBOT, allowing opportunistic and manipulative 
behavior to become more prominent. In fact, CBOT did have some trouble getting 
members to follow the rules, as discussed more extensively below.  
However, there is also evidence that these dense network connections did not 
always serve to keep markets orderly and stable. Dense networks can breed rivalry as 
well as trust (Dalton 1959), and in 1825, 1839 and 1842, years when the elite-based 
factorage system was at its peak, New Orleans saw large corners in the spot market for 
cotton (Bouilly 1976).10 The first of these left many of the largest firms in the world 
insolvent and disrupted trading for months after. For fourteen weeks after the corner, the 
New Orleans Price Current magazine posted no prices because there was simply no 
trading to report, stating that “cotton at present is in as little demand as if there never had 
been such an article in the market” (cited in Boyle 1934: 24). The presence of these 
speculative manipulations on the antebellum New Orleans market casts doubt on the 
notion that the Exchange’s close ties would have necessarily lowered volatility.   
Another network-related influence on volatility might have been the size of the 
markets. It is probable that the group of traders in the wheat pit at CBOT was larger than 
its counterpart at NOCE. Unfortunately, the size of these groups is difficult to discern. 
Records list the number of overall members in each exchange, not the number of traders 
                                                 
10 This is especially noteworthy because this took place in the spot market, which requires far more capital 
to corner than does the futures market (Bouilly 1976). This suggests that traders, in fact, were willing to 
expend a great effort to fleece associates in their tightly-knit network. 
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in the pits. In terms of overall numbers, CBOT’s membership during the majority of the 
period under study hovered around 1,800, while NOCE averaged about 400, making the 
Board four and a half times larger; but, of course CBOT hosted large markets in multiple 
commodities (including the biggest corn market in the world), while NOCE hosted only 
one market in cotton. Thus it is difficult to compare the number of traders who populated 
the two pits. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that some traders engaged with 
multiple commodities, while others specialized in one.  
But if the CBOT wheat pits were larger, this might have been a selective cause of 
volatility. Large size has been shown to promote distinct cliques of traders, which 
impedes the flow of information and thus increases volatility (Baker 1984; Carruthers 
1996). Without data on the number of traders occupying each market, however, it is 
impossible to even speculate as to whether in these cases size had any effect on volatility.  
Another possible influence on volatility might have been the institutional settings, 
understood as the governance structures and rules, both official and unofficial, of the 
exchanges. For the most part, though, CBOT and NOCE were quite similar 
institutionally. Both were state chartered organizations which set and enforced their own 
rules. Individuals bought a membership in each, and new applications were screened by a 
standing committee and put to a vote. Both organizations had similar rules regarding the 
types of trades that were allowed (e.g., futures trades of all kinds, as well as corners) and 
those that were not allowed (e.g., trades executed outside of exchange hours or off the 
trading floor and trading in options). One distinction, however, was that CBOT was less 
willing to hand down harsh punishments for engaging in prohibited trades. This 
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reluctance might have lowered the cost of—and increased the presence of—volatility-
inducing behavior on their exchange (Abolafia 1996; Greif 1989; Williamson 1981). But, 
in fact, in the specific case of CBOT, this effect would likely be negligible, since the 
prohibited trades had countervailing affects on market volatility: trading away from the 
floor and at off hours tended to increase volatility, while trading options dampened it. 
Thus, the laxity of rules did not uniformly make CBOT more volatile.     
 A final influence on volatility might have been differences in cultural beliefs about 
how a trader should make money, or how commodity markets should operate. On this 
topic, there is some evidence to suggest that Chicago simply had a more permissive 
attitude to speculation than New Orleans—after all, the city itself was born in a 
speculative boom. Big-time speculators such as Benjamin P. Hutchinson—“Old Hutch,” 
as he was known—were mythologized in popular newspaper accounts. As Chicago 
gained a reputation as wild market, traders with a taste for speculation were drawn to it, 
creating a feedback cycle (Ferris 1988; Markham 2002). At the same time, in New 
Orleans, many old-guard factors decried speculation as creating a “spirit of gambling” 
(New Orleans Daily Picayune, Dec. 27, 1879). The ethos of NOCE in its early years was 
focused largely on the revival of the Southern spot trade in the aftermath of the Civil 
War, not on speculative trading (Ellis 1973). This difference in the legitimacy of 
speculation as a commercial activity could certainly have created a more volatile market 
on CBOT (cf., deGoede 2005; Fabian 1990). Yet, to say that speculation was absent or 
generally discouraged in New Orleans is mistaken. As noted above, the antebellum cotton 
market was “replete with speculative attempts to manipulate the price or corner the spot 
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market” (Bouilly 1976: 13). Additionally, NOCE members defended speculation using 
the same language of increased efficiency and risk management as did members of 
CBOT. Traders in both cities embraced and defended speculation and short selling in 
their quest to make a profit.  
These possibilities thus remain neither proven nor disproven. While 
countervailing evidence and alternative explanations suggest that their influence might 
have been small, or mixed, the impact of differences in supply, networks, institutions and 
culture has by no means been disproved. Because of this I cannot argue that the 
divergence in volatility on these markets was caused by a difference in infrastructure and 
nothing else. It is, in fact, difficult to imagine two cases where all selective causes are 
controlled for, leaving only the influence of infrastructure present.  
This inability to definitively pronounce on the relation of infrastructure to 
volatility may appear to be a weakness. But a symmetrical weakness exists in traditional 
economic and sociological analyses, which ignore market infrastructures. Both economic 
and sociological approaches to volatility invoke an ideal version of “the market” in their 
analyses (cf. Krippner’s (2001) critique of “embeddedness”). Neoclassical economists 
use this idealized form as is, combined with reductive assumptions about individual 
behavior. Institutional economists and sociologists embed this ideal of a market in myriad 
social relations, which they then understand to shape actors’ behaviors. Yet neither 
approach recognizes that markets are complex, socio-technical settings, which require 
extensive infrastructure to function, nor that these infrastructures themselves underlie and 
shape market behavior. For instance, Abolafia (1996) fails to control for the underlying 
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assets (futures, stocks, and bonds) in his study. The assumption he makes is that any 
difference in the instrument being traded and its connection to an underlying asset is of 
no consequence to market behavior. Baker (1984), though he studies only stock options, 
glides past the fact that different classes of options were traded in each of the networks he 
studies. There is no thought that differences at the infrastructural level (e.g., that the 
classes are composed of differing numbers of options) might impact volatility at all. 
These analyses look to social factors within the market, but fail to analyze the 
infrastructural features at their base. Thus they give only a partial explanation of market 
phenomena.  
Infrastructures must be incorporated into sociological analyses of markets. 
Infrastructure is an imminently social object, shaped by competing interests and 
attachments. It is a battleground upon which social actors create frameworks that set 
fundamental limits to action. The fact that these social influences tend to disappear into 
the technical functionality of a complex system over time is all the more reason to bring 
them to light. But the general lack of work on the subject means that any such research 
must first address the issues of infrastructures’ boundaries and characteristics, as well as 
how best to integrate it into our studies of markets. These are the topics of the next 
chapter.  
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Chapter Two – Information and Infrastructure 
 
In many popular and even academic perspectives on markets, information is held 
to be a—or the—critical feature. Traders gather, withhold, share, and act on information; 
information is good or bad, truthful or misleading; it both gives context to and is 
conveyed in prices; it enables judgments of the future and actions in the present. In this 
chapter, I examine how exactly information as a feature of markets has been 
conceptualized in sociological or sociologically-informed accounts. The goal is to 
discover which features of information can be drawn from these diverse perspectives and 
to consider how to integrate these elements into a single conceptual framework.   
I highlight three broad perspectives on information within markets. The first 
approach, taken by information economists and some sociological network theorists, 
focuses on the movement of information through markets and among economic actors. 
By highlighting the unequal dissemination of economic information, and thus, the 
unequal distribution of economic resources, these scholars draw a sharp contrast with the 
information-related postulates of neoclassical economics. The second approach discussed 
notes that, in addition to receiving information through network channels, actors must be 
able to interpret and use this information in their everyday environments. The processes 
of meaning-making, judgment, and calculation this entails are not simple, nor are they 
individualistic; significant institutional and material means are put to work in the service 
of these ends. The final approach conceives of information as a product of socio-material 
construction. It focuses on the systems by which the information at the heart of the 
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market is created, the power relations inscribed therein, and the qualities it takes on as a 
result of its origins.   
I bring together these three approaches through a discussion of “information 
infrastructures”—the institutional, material, and cultural means by which information is 
created, disseminated, and interpreted. This broad perspective enables us to consider all 
three of the areas highlighted above, while additionally analyzing the character of 
information on markets and the uses to which it can be put. According to the nature of the 
infrastructure involved, information may take on wholly different properties, constructing 
vastly different market information environments. This is seen in the cases in my 
dissertation, were the distinct infrastructures in place on CBOT and NOCE created 
information environments that promoted very different types of trading on the futures 
markets. The conceptual framework of “information infrastructure” thus seeks to 
encompass the established literature on how market devices and institutions impose a 
relation to information and also to determine how market infrastructures give particular 
qualities to information, and how these qualities come to matter in market situations.  
 
Disseminating information in markets 
Some of the earliest work on information in markets was concerned with its 
dissemination. Neoclassical economics centrally features postulates regarding the 
movement of information within and across markets: all available information was held 
to be reflected in prices; information was understood to move costlessly through the 
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market and be held in common by all participants (Fama 1970). In response to the 
proliferation of quantitative models based on these neoclassical assumptions, mid-century 
economists sought to more carefully study the flow of information in markets. Hayek’s 
(1945) early efforts did little more than more explicitly draw out the mechanisms 
assumed by neoclassical economics. Hayek claimed that the price mechanism in a free 
market could efficiently disseminate local knowledge to distant parties, a feat that could 
not be accomplished through central planning. Though each actor has only a limited view 
of the economy, the whole is efficiently coordinated by the price mechanism—to Hayek, 
this is the “marvel of the market.”  
Subsequent economists, however, have questioned just how marvelously markets 
actually do distribute information. They note that market transactions are often marked by 
asymmetric knowledge and a strong incentive not to reveal information to others, due 
either to the nature of the transaction (e.g., buying a used car, Akerlof 1970) or to the 
costs associated with gathering information (Stigler 1961). Under such conditions, price 
ceases to be an effective conveyor of information, and market order collapses. Further 
work among economists developed a distinct perspective that treated information as a 
scarce good, the acquisition of which involved a cost—information became a commodity, 
similar in many ways to any other commodity. The dissemination of information 
throughout a market then itself became an economic problem, and unequal distributions 
were understood as the outcome of market imbalances.   
The work of information economists formed a baseline from which to consider 
the uneven distribution of information within markets. Sociologists built on these initial 
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economic analyses through a number of network-based studies. One style of network 
analysis studies the differential patterning and movement of information within networks. 
The size and density of networks are critical in this regard: information moves more 
uniformly through small networks, while in larger networks it breaks up among cliques 
(Baker 1994); it travels quickly through dense networks, but becomes more varied and 
useful in sparse networks (Granovetter 1973, 1974, 1985; Mizruchi & Stearns 2001; Uzzi 
1997). Another type of network analysis focuses on the distribution of control over 
information based on an actor’s network position. Being in a position to control 
information or broker the connection of two groups—a “structural hole” (Burt 1992) or 
tertius gaudens (Simmel 1950)—makes an actor powerful within a market. Thus, the 
small handful of executives that serve on the boards of multiple companies exert 
significant influence thanks to their ability to connect otherwise distinct parties (Mizruchi 
1996; Palmer & Barber 2001; Useem 1984). Similarly, in the realm of politics, Padgett & 
Ansell (1993) show that the Medici’s power in pre-Renaissance Florence came from 
spanning network disjunctures within the elite. This geometric approach to understanding 
network dynamics suggests that two actors who occupy similar positions within a 
network are “structurally equivalent” and will have roughly equivalent amounts of power 
in those networks (White, Boorman & Breiger 1974; Lorraine & White 1971).  
This work demonstrates decisively that information travels uneven and unequal 
paths through the market. However, this approach fails to consider what happens once 
actors get ahold of this information. Implicit in this lack of attention is the idea that 
information is a self-evident signal, which must only be received to be understood; the 
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processes of interpretation and cognition remain unstudied, and tacitly understood to be 
individualistic cognitive acts rather than social ones. As such, this work still relies on a 
model of action that presupposes a rational actor involved in individual calculation. The 
second approach to information in markets, discussed below, critiques these assumptions, 
showing that information, in fact, requires a multi-faceted social setting to become 
meaningful. The approach thus moves beyond a focus simply on the socially patterned 
movement of information to scrutinize processes of judgment, meaning-making and 
calculation as social acts.  
 
Interpretation & calculation  
The theoretical ground for the critique of the information economics and network 
sociology perspective is the uncertainty of economic action. Even if we accept the 
notions—explicitly stated within information economics and implicit in network 
geometry approaches—that individuals will act in rational, calculative pursuit of their 
goals whenever possible, there are a number of environments in which this is impossible. 
In an uncertain environment, rational calculation is impossible because there is no way to 
meaningfully assess the probability of future events, whether because the causes are too 
numerous, too unpredictable, or too interdependent (Knight 1921). In an important sense, 
this is a problem of information. If we assume uncertainty, it is impossible for even the 
most rational economic actor to individually interpret and calculate from information. 
Under such circumstances, economic actors must create and rely on a multitude of social 
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and technical aides to narrow the possible interpretations, calculations, and actions that 
actors may take in an economic setting. These include “social devices” (Beckert 1996) 
that narrow the range of possible actions, “judgment devices” (Karpik 2010) that 
legitimate and validate information, and “calculative tools” (Callon 1998a) that routinize 
and constrain the practices of calculation. In all of these perspectives, we see that 
interpreting the economic environment and engaging in economic action is not an 
individual task, but an irreducibly social one. 
Institutions and culture constitute economic actors’ cognitive experiences of the 
market. Institutions fundamentally construct understandings of the economic 
environment (DiMaggio 1994) and establish the framework of “the market” such that 
individual actors can then engage in creative activity (Beckert 2009; Krippner 2001). 
Institutions provide schemas, classifications, scripts, and routines that structure 
interpretation and cognition of market information (Powell & DiMaggio 1991). These 
interpretations of information often come to market actors readymade and determined by 
other economic actors. For instance, the shared cognitive schemas that provide a common 
frame for evaluating and interpreting events, behaviors, and actions are often constructed 
at the organizational field level (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Powell & DiMaggio 1991). 
This is seen in the fact that CEOs drawn from different divisions within a firm view the 
same business environment in fundamentally different ways, interpreting the same 
evidence via different cognitive schemes (Fligstein 1990). These socially-constructed 
frameworks for interpretation are found also in other areas of the economy. For instance, 
in the world of art, the interpretation of market information is fundamentally shaped by 
52 
 
 
cultural beliefs about the value of art. Works of art are priced not according to the 
principles of supply and demand but according to gallery owners' roles as advocates for 
the artists they feature in their shows and the symbolic meaning of the prices they post 
(Velthuis 2003). In all cases, cultural meanings and institutionalized behaviors 
dialectically reinforce one another and mold social life into recognizable patterns (Zucker 
1983).  
Often, these broadly shared interpretations of the economy become embedded in 
economic theoretical models. These theories then expand in scope and taken-for-granted 
status, providing common guides for interpreting, and acting in, the market (Callon 
1998a; MacKenzie, Muniesa & Siu 2007). These generally accepted ways of measuring 
and understanding the world can be considered components of an economic style of 
reasoning, a general perspective on how and why economic action occurs the way it does 
(Hacking 1992; Hirschman & Popp-Berman 2013). These are foundational, paradigmatic 
features of theoretical approaches to the economy. As such, they become deeply 
embedded in the ways of thinking within a given environment, and built into more 
elaborate theories as fundamental truths (Fleck 1979; Kuhn 1962). These act as 
calculative tools that push market actors to interpret and act upon information in similar 
ways (Callon 1998a).  These elements also work their way more visibly into the 
calculative tools by which traders make sense of, and act in, the market, including sheets 
of stock option prices (MacKenzie 2006), tables of figures (Didier 2007), or the portfolio 
(Smith 2011), a process that can have performative effects on the market, as discussed at 
length later in this chapter.  
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Information also is made meaningful through the interpolation of “judgment 
devices” that flag differences in the qualities of products and the status of producers 
(Aspers & Beckert 2011; Karpik 2010). These provide mechanisms by which information 
is made credible, enabling actors to have faith that their information accurately represents 
the qualities of the commodities—or, at least, that most people will act as if it does. They 
include diverse features such as personal networks of close friends and associates that 
vouch for information’s accuracy, as well as a number of devices that give validity to 
third-party judgments, such as those form critics, guidebooks, the state, or independent 
certification boards (Karpik 2010). Judgment devices exist in a mutually supportive 
relationship with broad cultural understandings, and similarly work to eliminate 
uncertainty and promote coordination between market actors.  
In addition to taking shape through the institutionalized intervention of actors 
outside an economic actor’s immediate circle, information is also interpreted in situ, by 
materially embedded actors on the market. Meaning-making is pragmatic and guided by 
the particular goals and capacities of the actors, as well as the affordances of the material 
environment. This pragmatic process is affected by a set of influences distinct from those 
impacting the creation and use of elements in the institutional environment.  
One particular pragmatic challenge is that traders must constantly construct 
interpretations of unique and rapidly changing market situations. This involves creating 
frames that distinguish between those relations actors will take into account and those 
that will be thrown out of the calculation (Callon 1998b). These more specific, temporary 
framings of a market environment enable traders to spot particular profit-making 
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opportunities (Beunza & Garud 2007; Beunza, Hardie & MacKenzie 2006; Stark 2009). 
The construction of these frames is shaped by both social and material features of the 
environment. A company’s organizational structure may come to play a significant role, 
in terms of how strictly they control how frames get made or used, and the flexibility of 
these frames in practice (Beunza, Hardie & MacKenzie 2006). Additionally, the physical 
layout of an office can encourage or discourage conflict between frames among different 
actors (Stark 2009). These frames are designed to be constantly revised and edited as they 
are “overflowed,” as flexible, moment-to-moment calculative and interpretive tools.   
 Also, the material configurations of information displays have been shown to shape 
the methods of cognition and interpretation among economic actors. The stock ticker, for 
example, introduced a smooth temporal structure to the market, which enabled actors to 
make price variations objects of symbolic interpretation (Preda 2006). Prices written on 
white boards, rather than spoken between traders, made network and interpersonal 
relations forged on the floor of the exchange less critical than previously (Pardo-Guerra 
2010). Screens function as “reflexive mechanisms of observation and projection” or 
“scopes” that project the reality of the market to traders (Knorr-Cetina 2003: 8). These 
enable traders to conceptualize the market in new ways, e.g., as intrinsically dynamic and 
processual (Knorr-Cetina & Grimpe 2008) or as autonomous from the individuals who 
comprise it (Zaloom 2004).   
The connection between the macro-level institutional and micro-level pragmatic 
environments is revealed in the case of performativity. The theory of performativity 
argues that economic theories, thought only to describe the market as an external reality, 
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in fact craft actors and the economy as a whole so as to bring their actions more in line 
with the predictions of economic theory (MacKenzie 2007). But performativity is not 
simply a new version of the self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby economic agents 
collectively will into existence a new reality (Merton 1948). The efficacy of economic 
theory in a performative situation rather comes from its incorporation into material 
objects and processes “beyond human minds" (Callon 2007: 323; but see also Duhem 
1996 [1894]); these range from calculative aids (MacKenzie & Millo 2003; Preda 2009) 
to market procedures (Garcia-Parpet 2007; Guala 2007). These objects come together in a 
mutually attuned assemblage of human actors, discursive elements, procedures, and 
technical devices—an agencement—that transports the theoretical perspective into a 
material realm (Callon 2007). Garcia-Parpet (2007), for example, documents how the 
physical layout and carefully controlled procedures established in the strawberry market 
in Fontaines-en-Sologne, France—ranging from the style of auction used to the rigorous 
physical separation of buyers and sellers—amounted to the “practical realization of the 
model of perfect competition” (Garcia-Parpet 2007: 20). The agencement serves as both 
the substance of the performance and the object that shapes economic behavior into the 
form proposed by economic theory. This is seen especially clearly when formulas move 
from one world to another. A formula may find the proper felicity conditions within the 
university, but when it moves to another field it may find that the sociotechnical 
arrangements that would have enabled it to survive in this new world are either not 
present or are difficult to put into place (Callon 2007).  
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The preceding research demonstrates that the processes of interpretation and 
calculation rely on a multitude of social factors. Institutions serve to provide an 
authoritative, yet general, orientation to information, which actors must then further 
interpret within meso-level organizational or market settings. The particular material 
tools with which they engage in cognition often serve to draw these two environments 
into close connection. Actors use “social devices” (Beckert 1996), “judgment devices” 
(Karpik 2010) and “calculation tools” (Callon 1998a) to make sense of and act upon 
information within economic environments.  
But while this scholarship is a useful counter-position to the individualist 
cognitive approaches that analyzed only the movement, and not the interpretation, of 
information, this perspective fails to consider the socio-technical influences of the 
construction of information for the market. These approaches tend to think of 
information, prior to the social actions that enable interpretation and cognition, as under-
determined and wholly without qualities. The final approach to information concerns 
itself with precisely the issue of information’s origins and pedigree. Scholars of sociology 
and science and technology studies analyze the processes by which information is 
constructed to discover the qualities that it brings to the market irrespective of the 
institutions, culture, and material tools within which it is embedded.  
 
Construction 
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Central to this approach is to study information in relation to the infrastructures 
that support its creation, gathering, and dissemination. Infrastructure, a term drawn from 
science and technology studies, is defined as linked, interdependent, socio-technical 
systems—sets of standards and classifications, technological devices and protocols 
(Pardo-Guerra 2014)— that both support action locally and enable coordination globally 
(Bowker 1994; Star & Ruhleder 1996). Infrastructures tend to sink into other aspects of 
the environment, invisibly supporting mundane tasks and becoming visible only when 
they break down (Star & Ruhleder 1996). Infrastructures also are linked together through 
shared sets of standards, giving them scope over long distances and spans of time. They 
are able to undergird large-scale technical systems (Hughes 1987) by harmonizing 
multiple, independent technologies and communities of practice around a single, common 
standard (Barry 2001; Bijker, Hughes & Pinch 1987; Edwards, Bowker, Jackson & 
Williams 2009).  
Economic sociologists are finding infrastructure to be a useful concept as they 
begin to conceptualize markets more as material objects (Pardo-Guerra 2014; Pinch & 
Swedberg 2008). The focus on infrastructure shows the socio-technical underpinnings of 
markets and offers another site for sociological analysis. Infrastructures are politically 
contested objects, the details of which affect the lives of the individuals who use them 
every day. Classifications and metrics discard information and elide distinctions that are 
critical to actors on the ground (Bowker & Star 1999; Cronon 1991; Espeland & Stevens 
1998); they impose particular ways of seeing and governing that empowers certain 
groups while subjugating others (Foucault 1982; Lampland & Star 2009; Miller & 
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O'Leary 1987; Miller & Rose 1990).  Processes favor the goals of some groups while 
hindering others (Barry 2001; Millerand & Bowker 2009). The actors most closely 
connected with the creation of classes, standards, calculations, or processes wield great 
power to define encounters, while those farthest away often find that their own practices 
fit poorly within the system provided (Barry 2001; Latour 1987; Star & Lampland 2009; 
Thevenot 1984). The mode of construction suffuses market information with power 
relations, circumscribing the modes of thinking and talking available to economic actors 
downstream as a result. Even prior to its dissemination or interpretation, then, 
information is the subject of a highly contested process of construction, which has 
significant effects on market action. 
 
Infrastructural analyses have tended to focus on three discrete topics: (1) the 
creation of new objects and ways of understanding; (2) the creation of new market-
related processes; (3) the creation of information to be communicated, interpreted and 
acted upon. The final focus is the one to which this dissertation contributes, but also the 
least developed in the literature. Below, I briefly review research done in the first two 
areas, before developing the need for and possibilities of research in the third.   
Infrastructures enable or deny particular ways of acting and understanding by 
creating new objects, which in turn promote new ways of understanding, as well as by 
simply making possible new actions. In creating meaningful objects, infrastructures 
provide the underlying categories by which individuals understand and experience an 
environment (Bowker & Star 1999; Espeland & Stevens 1998). The effects of this can be 
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mundane, as when law schools come to understand the strengths and weaknesses of their 
programs through the classifications used to produce national rankings (Espeland & 
Sauder 2007), or when scientific research sites create new organizational structures, 
identities, and collaborative forms of work in response to the implementation of a new 
metadata standard (Millerand & Bowker 2009). But they can also have a vast 
significance, such as with the de-categorization of homosexuality as a mental disorder 
within the DSM (Kirk & Kutchins 1992).  
This significance comes from the new ways of acting that are established by 
infrastructures, actions which often rely upon the new categories they create. By 
classifying commodities (Cronon 1991) or people (Fourcade & Healy 2013) we create the 
infrastructure to incorporate them into entirely new market processes. Poon (2009) and 
Rona-Tas & Hiss (2011), for example, note how grading consumers with a credit score 
allows them to be embedded within a suite of new practices from banks, landlords, and 
employers. Of course, other infrastructural changes do not rely on creating new objects, 
but simply enable new processes that differently fulfill an established function. This is the 
case with innovations in the execution and clearing of trades, which enabled the markets 
to take on vastly different characters (Millo, Muniesa, Panourgias & Scott 2005; Pardo-
Guerra 2014).  
In several respects, these points about the construction of new ways of seeing and 
acting are similar to those made above regarding the material and calculative tools 
present on markets. But one must be careful not to conflate infrastructure with technology 
or material tools more generally (Pardo-Guerra 2014). Infrastructures have several 
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particular features that distinguish them from material technologies more generally, 
including invisibly supporting tasks, linking communities of practice, and being 
understood as natural within a community of practice. Many market technologies do not 
meet these criteria: calculative aids such as charts of long-term price movements (Preda 
2009), sheets of stock option prices (MacKenzie 2006), or tables of figures (Didier 2007), 
while influential technologies of economic decision-making, are all highly visible, local, 
and often actively contested (Pardo-Guerra 2014). These material tools are utilized 
differently than infrastructures, are embedded within different social settings, and have 
different consequences for action: infrastructures remain hidden while displays are put 
center stage; infrastructures last over long periods of time, while representations must 
continually be legitimated; infrastructures, once in place, operate largely shielded from 
the influence of social factors with which market devices must interact. 
Additionally, the definition and examples of infrastructure given above need 
qualification. The above set of features gives us the sense that we can identify a system as 
“infrastructural,” once and for all. But infrastructure is a relational concept: what is 
infrastructure to one person may be structure to another, what is infrastructural at one 
time may become structural as conditions change (Bowker 1994; Bowker & Star 1999; 
Star & Ruhleder 1996). To an office worker, the servers working in the building’s 
basement and the cables running through its walls are infrastructures that enable their 
day-to-day action to proceed without a second thought; however, to the company’s IT 
team, they are objects of intense daily focus. Thus, it makes less sense to ask what makes 
something an infrastructure than to ask when it is infrastructure (Star & Lampland 2009). 
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Infrastructure must always be situated in relation to a set of practices, never located 
simply in material properties. Just as with our thinking about what is “information,” our 
ideas about what is “infrastructure” must be in relation to practice. 
 While scholars have most carefully considered how infrastructures produce new 
objects, ways of understanding, and modes of action, infrastructures also create new 
information. Scholars have recognized this function of infrastructure, but have tended to 
collapse it together with the creation of new objects and ways of understanding. This can 
be seen in the arguments that infrastructures work in part because they facilitate 
communication among the groups that use them. Star (2002: 109), for example, calls 
infrastructures ‘communicative tools’; Bowker & Star (1999: 286) argue that 
classification systems allow people to ‘communicate across the boundaries of disparate 
communities’; and Edwards (2010: 18) notes that a classification infrastructure is, among 
other things, a ‘communication … web with both social and technical dimensions’. These 
scholars have tended to assume that communication occurs unproblematically once two 
infrastructures have been ‘plugged into’ one another via a common set of standards 
(Bowker & Star 1999: 35; see also Star & Lampland 2009; Star & Ruhleder 1996). A 
single, shared classification scheme or set of standards establishes a shared ontology 
across settings, which serves as a common language allowing actors to reference the 
same types of objects, processes, and relations (Espeland & Stevens 1998). 
Classifications, standards, and grades become information that conveys meaning to 
market actors. 
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Yet, while a shared ontology may make communication possible, it tells us 
nothing about the quality of communication that takes place. The issue of ‘work arounds’ 
serves to illustrate this point. Much research has shown that shared classifications and 
standards fail to create uniformity of practice across environments (Barry 2001; Bowker 
& Star 1999; Edwards, et al. 2009; Millerand & Bowker 2009). Familiar ways of working 
are retained without change, and simply labeled in accordance with a new classification 
scheme, for either bureaucratic or symbolic reasons (Meyer & Rowan 1977). The 
prevalence of work arounds suggests that a shared classificatory language does not 
guarantee uniform or reliable communication. Rather, understanding classification 
infrastructures as ‘communicative tools’ requires explicitly theorizing their character as 
producers of information.  
The primary example of linking infrastructure with the information it produces 
comes from Muniesa’s (2007) study of price-setting mechanisms on the Paris Bourse and 
the Bolsa de Madrid. Concentrating on the issue of how prices communicate, Muniesa 
demonstrates that different infrastructural procedures created prices that differed in their 
primary semiotic mode. Simply using the last trade of the day produced a good index, but 
failed symbolically; making an average of trades in the last five minutes produced a good 
icon, but a poor index; utilizing an algorithmic auction produced a fairly good index, 
combined with a strong symbol. These different semiotic modes in turn promoted 
divergent behaviors on the market, particularly with regard to manipulation of price. 
Thanks to the character of the sign produced in this final configuration, market 
manipulation was ‘pragmatically calibrated’ and ‘rendered costly’ (Muniesa 2007: 388). 
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The semiotic capacity of other infrastructures has also been noted. Lampland 
(2010) notes that bookkeeping practices among farmers in Stalinist Hungary used ‘false 
numbers’ that acted not as indexes, but as icons symbolizing the implementation of 
rational, written management practices. Similarly, Lea & Pholeros (2010) show how 
conditions of work led government contractors building houses in Australia to carelessly 
complete government checklists and forms, producing documents that served as icons of 
work practice rather than indexes of building quality as intended. Pinzur (2016) has 
linked differences in the semiotic qualities of commodity grades to market-level 
divergence in price volatility over a period of decades. In each case, the quality of the 
information produced by market infrastructure impacted their incorporation into the 
environment.  
Thinking about the qualities of information requires a shift in focus from the 
construction of infrastructures (Star 2002) to their implementation in practice (Hatherly, 
Leung & MacKenzie 2008). Prior research has treated the former as critical: it is the 
moment when partisans battle to establish the contours of the system and set into place an 
ontology with far-reaching political consequences (Cronon 1991; Espeland & Sauder 
2007; Foucault 1982; Miller & O’Leary 1987; Miller & Rose 1990). But it is in the latter 
moment that information acquires its qualities. By classifying a good, transmitting a 
price, or creating a statistic in one way and not another, infrastructural actors construct 
information with distinct properties. For example, Hatherly, Leung & MacKenzie (2008) 
demonstrate that the meaning of the figures produced by accountants, including the basic 
categories of profit and loss, can vary dramatically in response to changes in classifying 
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practice. As the processes by which infrastructures operate change, so too are the 
qualities of the information they produce altered (Barnes 1983; Bloor 1997; Wittgenstein 
1967). 
The preceding makes clear that there is room within an infrastructural approach to 
consider the qualities that information has as a result of the circumstances of its creation. 
This is a generally understudied topic, and a critical area for study. As seen above, 
information, even prior to being embedded within multiple social environments in the 
market, has qualities that stem from the infrastructures that produce, distribute, and 
support it. These qualities may importantly shape the ways in which the information may 
be embedded or the types of actions they enable. While these informational qualities in 
no way determine the response of market actors, but they do establish limiting conditions 
on their action (Wright, Levine & Sober 1992) and make particular actions more feasible 
and rational. By studying the social features that lead infrastructures to be implemented in 
particular ways, we can uncover a distinct layer of social influence on markets that often 
goes unanalyzed. 
 
Information infrastructure 
The perspective on “information infrastructures” developed in this dissertation 
encompasses our thinking about creation, dissemination, and interpretation of 
information. All three are shaped by information infrastructures, and the qualities of 
information are shaped by the processes underlying each. We must analyze the life cycle 
of information, the social and technical environments through which it moves and 
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operates. By examining each of these components in action, it is possible to discover the 
resulting qualities given to information. Other sociological approaches fail to recognize 
the presence of these qualities and the constraints and affordances they present to actors. 
Even when the same actions are made possible by an infrastructure (e.g., classification of 
agricultural commodities enables futures trading) the quality of information being 
produced can make certain actions (e.g., speculation, hedging, manipulation) more or less 
likely.  
In this dissertation, I study the divergent implementations of information 
infrastructures on the Chicago Board of Trade and New Orleans Cotton Exchange, and 
make an effort to broadly trace the full range of qualities of the information they 
produced. I trace out the processes by which infrastructures operated, the qualities of the 
information they produced, and consequences of those qualities on the behavior of 
market actors. Each of the following three empirical chapters primarily addresses the 
creation and impact of a different infrastructural aspect of the futures markets on these 
exchanges.  
Chapter 3 examines the systems of classification, grading and valuation, by which 
physical wheat and cotton were repackaged as standardized grades. The grading 
infrastructures on each exchange reflected material differences between wheat and cotton, 
as well as the power of various groups within each market. While both systems assigned 
grades to commodities, the differences in when they were assigned, in what fashion, and 
with which material tools, meant that they operated in distinct ways. The grades, as 
information, had divergent semiotic and legal qualities, which undergirded different 
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behaviors. On CBOT, the character of the grades made speculative trading more feasible 
and rational, while on NOCE stable hedging trades were promoted.    
Chapter 4 looks at the means of gathering and transmitting information about the 
supply and demand for both futures contracts and for their underlying agricultural 
commodities. This information took two forms: crop statistics and price quotations. This 
chapter shows how the infrastructures for both forms of information were built on each 
exchange, and why they were built differently. CBOT built up their price quotation 
infrastructure as part of their political and economic battles against Western Union and 
illegal gambling dens known as bucket shops, while doing little for the politically and 
economically unimportant crop statistics infrastructure. NOCE, by contrast, built on 
established connection with other US cotton centers to build a statistical system that 
restored control and respect to the South, while their efforts to build up telegraphic price 
systems floundered due to their poor technologies and lack of bargaining power. These 
differences enabled different processes of valuation on the exchanges: while traders on 
CBOT were encouraged to ride short-term shifts in price and seize on minute advantages 
and misalignments, traders on NOCE were moved toward longer-term perspectives and 
calculation.  
Finally, chapter 5 pulls back to look at how market information was situated 
within a framework on the connection between spot and derivative markets and finance 
more generally. The distinct political challenges facing the exchanges led to several 
significant differences in their understanding of the economic function and cultural 
legitimacy of futures trading. CBOT, as part of its response to the federal government’s 
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attempts to tax speculation, drew a sharp line between futures contracts and options 
contracts, arguing for the legitimacy of the former and danger of the latter. The 
distinction proved a powerful component of the argument that both saved futures trading 
and eliminated significant regional economic rivals. On NOCE, exchange leaders had 
little to gain from making this distinction. For them, the critical concept was the close 
linkage between spot and futures markets and the ability of the latter to build up Southern 
autonomy in the cotton trade. In reflecting the political imperatives in their local regions, 
the two exchanges created distinct economic theoretical perspectives on the functioning 
and legitimacy of derivative markets.  
Taken as a whole, this offers a perspective on what I call the “information 
infrastructures” of these markets: the systems by which information was constructed, 
disseminated, and interpreted on each exchange. These systems then serve as the basis for 
an infrastructural analysis that spotlights the unique conditions of possibility created on 
each market.  
 
 
  
68 
 
Chapter 3 – Constructing Grades 
 
The systems for grading, or classifying, primary commodities stood at the heart of 
the transition of wheat or cotton from a physical good to a certificate, or receipt, 
providing information about a physical good.1 Using these grading systems, exchanges 
would assign a particular classification (e.g., “#2 Hard Winter Wheat,” or “Strict Good 
Middling Upland cotton”) to each rail carload of wheat or bale of cotton. Traders would 
then contract to buy or sell a particular class of commodity. This deal could be made 
months ahead of time. This ability to make deals in a standardized product months ahead 
of time is the critical feature of a futures market. Before grading systems, individuals 
could of course still contract to deliver goods at some future point, but assurances of 
quality would be based on business or friendship ties, or a knowledge of the particular 
farmland and climate where goods came from. This interpersonal basis could never 
support a constant market where contracts achieve liquidity. Standardized grading 
systems enabled the high volume of trade needed to enable widespread speculation and 
hedging, the most characteristic features of modern futures markets. In short, the 
development of futures trading over the past 150 years is premised on sorting 
commodities into standardized grades. 
CBOT and NOCE utilized different systems for grading primary commodities that 
reflected the divergent circumstances of their creation. Chicago’s system developed 
                                                 
1 I use the terms “grading” and “classifying” interchangeably. But it is worthwhile to note that this does not 
fit with the usage on the two markets themselves. On CBOT, wheat was “graded,” while on NOCE, cotton 
was “classed;” adding to the complication, cotton was assigned a “grade” based on the purity of the lint, as 
part of the broader process of being “classed.” For the sake of simplicity, I ignore these distinctions in 
usage.  
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contemporaneously with the trade in futures and thus was shaped by the opportunities for 
profit it provided. These opportunities, in combination with the dominant position of 
grain elevator operators, made manipulation of wheat and fraudulent receipting viable 
practices. As a result, information produced in the Chicago market regarding the quality 
and quantity of wheat present in the city was suspect. Even involving the state of Illinois 
in a regulatory capacity failed to solve these problems. In contrast, New Orleans relied on 
a system of classing that was created entirely in isolation from the futures market, wholly 
for the benefit of spot traders. Classing was adversarial and small-scale, preventing any 
systemic manipulation of commodities or information. The powerful position of spot 
traders within the NOCE guaranteed that maintaining the fidelity of classing, even at the 
expense of efficiency, was a foremost concern.  
These grading systems, in addition to being shaped by the market relations 
surrounding their creation, made particular behaviors more feasible and rational. The 
infrastructure established on CBOT made for an uncertain relation between the 
warehouse receipts that represented wheat and the quantity and quality of physical wheat 
located in elevators. Yet, though receipts failed to accurately index the wheat they 
represented, these receipts could still be used automatically, without any danger of traders 
being held responsible for wheat being of inferior quality. This created an environment 
where speculation in futures could thrive in a highly uncertain environment, and where 
hedging would be discouraged. Conversely, NOCE created a system where the quantity 
and quality of cotton was well accounted for. The grading system also passed costs onto 
buyers and sellers by making grading a private negotiation. This meant that grades served 
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as accurate indexes of quality and that speculation had a potentially significant cost 
attached to it. Both of these features made the market more useful for spot dealing and 
hedging and kept speculation more narrowly confined.  
  
The Chicago Board of Trade: Warehouse grading & CBOT inspection 
The creation of a grain grading system in Chicago in the 1860s took place in an 
atmosphere of rapid growth. In the decade prior to the introduction of grading, railroads 
laid 2,500 miles of new track into the city, and fifteen new grain elevators were 
constructed, increasing the storage space in the city from 700,000 to 5,000,000 bushels. 
By 1860, Chicago was the clear grain shipping center of the country, bringing in more 
than twice the grain of the next largest market for the next three decades (Lee 1938).   
Most significant to the grading of wheat at this early point were the grain 
elevators.2  Elevators’ power came largely from their position as a bridge between 
distinct parties in the grain trade (Cronon 1991). First, elevators served as a meeting place 
for buyers and sellers in the spot market. Sellers could store their wheat at elevators until 
they found a suitable buyer. They could also settle transactions by handing over receipts 
issued by elevator companies, rather than delivering the wheat itself. Second, and more 
critically, elevators facilitated the transfer of grain from railroad cars to ships on the lake. 
Elevators were built with railroad tracks on one side, from which grain would be 
unloaded into the warehouse, and the water on the other, where chutes would pour grain 
                                                 
2 Grain warehouses were known as elevators because of the process by which they raised grain on conveyor 
belts before sifting it into bins. 
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into waiting ships. Nearly all the wheat entering Chicago made this switch, which 
elevators made happen much faster than previously possible.  
Elevator owners solidified this positional advantage through maintaining a non-
competitive oligopoly in the city. By 1870, 93% of the total storage space in the city was 
controlled by just five partnerships, representing ten individuals. Each of these 
partnerships was allied with one or two preferred rail lines, which served their 
warehouses exclusively. This arrangement benefited both elevator owners, who took a 
steady stream of grain into store, and railroads, which did not have to go to the expense 
of delivering to multiple locations. This combination of indispensable position, 
oligopolistic ownership, and alliance with railroads made elevator owners powerful 
figures within CBOT, despite their relatively small numbers (Lee 1938).  
From this dominant position, elevator owners introduced a system for grading 
wheat in 1856. The scheme they developed, with CBOT’s help, delineated three kinds of 
wheat—white winter wheat, red winter wheat, and spring wheat—and four gradations of 
quality—club, No. 1, No. 2, and rejected (Taylor 1917). The primary impetus behind this 
system was to increase the efficiency of grain storage (Cronon 1991). Prior to this point, 
elevators needed to store each shipment of grain separately so as to maintain its unique 
identity, which left enormous amounts of bin space within warehouses unused. Many 
elevators could store 500,000 bushels or more, yet often shipments from farmers totaled 
only a few thousand bushels (Lee 1938). A system of grades allowed elevators to 
combine grain of the same grade from different sources, maintaining the aggregate 
quality while more efficiently using the space within their warehouse bins. Buyers would 
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be issued receipts entitling them not to a particular shipment of wheat, but to wheat of a 
certain class and grade.  
It is worthwhile to pause here and consider precisely what changes wheat went 
through in being processed at an elevator. Grain processed at an elevator was twice 
transformed. First, it was physically transformed, as shipments from numerous farms 
were combined according to grade. If grain was miscategorized or combined improperly, 
the quality of the mixture would be degraded, and mills would receive an inferior 
product. The second transformation was not physical, but semiotic. When wheat was 
taken into store, the elevator produced receipts representing that grain for its owners. 
These receipts could then be traded or used as collateral for loans, with all parties secure 
in the knowledge that the holder could redeem them at will for a particular amount of 
wheat. Receipts informed market actors of the quantity of wheat present in the city’s 
elevators. These two transformations anchor the analysis that follows.  
The idea of a grading system was well received, as it benefited several classes of 
CBOT members in addition to warehousemen. Commission merchants benefited from 
lower handling charges once different shipments of wheat did not have to be kept 
separate. Also, the grading system enabled the futures market to arise. The presence of a 
futures market gave commission merchants a place where they could hedge their spot 
positions, as well as a place where speculators could bet on price movements.  
In practice, though, there were problems. CBOT traders complained that the 
classifications were too broad, mixing together wheat of substantially different kinds. 
They also complained that warehouse operators graded on a lax standard in order to 
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attract grain into store. But, most seriously, the system made manipulation simple. This 
feature hinged on the permissive grading rules that elevator owners had shepherded into 
existence. These rules allowed elevator owners to buy and sell wheat on their own 
account, in addition to storing wheat for others. This made it profitable to mix wheat 
from different grades. Elevator operators would dilute grain of a higher grade (e.g., #1 
wheat) with a lower quality grade (e.g., #2 wheat) just up to the threshold at which that 
mixture would move into the lower class. By doing so, the elevator could create an 
instant profit: by mixing 500 bushels of average quality #1 hard winter wheat with 200 
bushels of #2 hard winter wheat, elevators could create 700 bushels of low quality #1 
hard winter wheat. Of course, when creating receipts or selling this wheat on the market, 
its classification was still #1 grade – the fact that this wheat was actually of a very poor 
quality was only discovered once shipments had been made. The practice of mixing 
ruined the reputation of Chicago wheat.  
Information regarding the quantity of wheat in the city was similarly uncertain 
because of elevator operators’ production of receipts. Elevators would issue counterfeit 
receipts as a way of turning a quick profit in the speculative market. They would sell 
these forged receipts on the market when the price for wheat was momentarily high (such 
as during a corner or other speculative mania), then buy them back once the price had 
dropped. Elevator operators would profit on the price differential, at the expense of 
destabilizing information about the supply of wheat within the city (Taylor 1917). The 
charge that warehousemen were misrepresenting the quantity of grain in store and 
profiting from issuing fraudulent receipts was brought in the wake of corners in 1866, 
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1868, 1869 and 1870 (Lee 1938). These charges were verified in 1872, when two major 
elevators were discovered to have outstanding receipts far exceeding the quantity of grain 
they actually held in store (Taylor 1917).3  
In 1859, CBOT created an independent inspection force that looked to crack 
down on these practices. Most significantly it took over grading duties from the 
warehouse owners. This change was meant to remove the conflict of interest present 
when warehouse owners did their own grading (Taylor 1917). But despite CBOT’s 
oversight, grading continued to be plagued by mixing and fraudulent receipts. Why? One 
significant reason was that Board of Trade inspectors were allowed to act without 
restriction in spot and futures markets while at the same time being part of the grading 
apparatus. Thus, they faced the same temptation to manipulate receipts and disseminate 
misinformation as did elevator owners. In this sense, the antagonistic relation between 
elevators and inspectors was an illusion.  
The grading system established by warehouses, even when supervised by CBOT, 
failed to produce accurate information about either the quality or the quantity of wheat 
found in the city. This uncertainty depressed the spot trade, bringing lower prices for 
wheat coming through Chicago (Taylor 1917).4 It also created conditions where 
speculation could thrive. The lack of solid data regarding the supply of grain in the city 
                                                 
3 These frauds were only discovered through extraordinary circumstances. In the first case, the Iowa 
elevator burned to the ground and an examination of the remains revealed the shortage in grain. In the 
second, Munn & Scott elevators went bankrupt and in the sale of their holdings to Armour & Co., the 
shortfall of wheat in store had to be revealed.  
4 Chicago wheat brought four to five cents less per bushel than similar grades from other cities. Chicago 
grain was so bad that it was being rebranded with other locations in the name, e.g., Milwaukee Club, 
Amber Iowa, and Northwestern Club (Taylor 1917).  
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promoted diverse interpretations of the market environment and the future of prices, and 
an environment thick with rumors. Speculators could also be bold, knowing that elevator 
owners stood ready to flood the market with fraudulent receipts in the event of the market 
being cornered. Further, the ease with which elevators created fraudulent receipts made it 
possible to engage in manipulations in the futures market with minimal involvement in 
spots. These are conditions under which speculation becomes profitable.  
 
State intervention: the Railroad & Warehouse Commission 
The failure of the private grading system to produce accurate information 
galvanized support for state regulation of the grain trade. Through provisions in the 1870 
Constitution and four separate statutes from 1871, the state created a significant 
regulatory apparatus to protect the quality of Chicago grades and ensure the fidelity of 
elevator receipts. At the heart of the regulatory system was the Illinois Railroad and 
Warehouse Commission (RWC), created in 1871. This commission was headed by three 
men, appointed by the governor for two-year terms. As their name suggests, the 
Commission was tasked with the massive job of regulating the transportation, grading, 
and storage of grain in the state.   
The RWC had two jobs in relation to grading. First, it took over inspection duties 
from CBOT. State inspectors were stationed outside of all public elevators to sample and 
grade grain entering by rail car.5 State inspection ensured that graders of wheat would be 
                                                 
5 The distinction between public and private elevators was introduced in the 1870 Constitution. The key 
distinction was that public elevators could combine shipments of grain, while private elevators could not. 
Since the need to combine grain of the same grade to economize on storage space was the impetus for 
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entirely separated from the trade in wheat, eliminating potential conflicts of interest and 
opportunities for inside trading. Second, the Commission established an office for 
registering and tracking grain receipts to prevent fraud. All receipts had to pass through 
this office at the time of their creation and again when they were canceled through 
delivery; fraudulent receipts would have no corresponding entry with the state registrar. 
Ideally, this system of state regulation would guarantee the fidelity of information about 
the quantity and quality of grain passing through Chicago. In reality, political and 
economic conditions were such that the Commission achieved only some of its goals.  
The goal of establishing a registrar for elevator receipts initially failed. Elevators 
were required to give a bond and acquire a license to operate, both of which could be 
forfeited through engaging in any prohibited activity or interfering in the discharge of the 
Commission’s duties (Lurie 1979). Though the state had the power to revoke the license 
of any elevator not complying with its requirements, the elevators had a simple strategy 
for evading this penalty: they simply refused to take out licenses or give bonds in the first 
place. As with their earlier negotiations with CBOT, elevator operators recognized the 
strength of their position when they presented a uniform front. Elevators were eventually 
forced into compliance with the law only through financial pressure. Banks, which lent 
money on the security of warehouse receipts, were becoming increasingly nervous about 
fraudulent receipts. Accordingly, they charged higher interest rates on their loans to 
balance this increased risk. Warehouses quickly discovered that the simplest way to allay 
                                                                                                                                                 
introducing grading in the first place, it is unsurprising that nearly all of the warehouse space in Chicago 
was public (Lurie 1979). 
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these fears and reduce the interest on their loans was to register receipts with the state 
(Lee 1938).  
CBOT paired this registrar’s office with its own system of supervision. They kept 
a list of “regular” elevators, whose receipts were tenderable on trade. Only bonded 
warehouses in good standing with the RWC were declared regular. Another requirement 
of regularity was that elevators always post accurate reports of the grain they had in 
stock, allow Board of Trade certifiers yearly access to their warehouses for inspection, 
and accept grain arriving along any railroad line, not just a single, favored line. In this 
way, the Board attempted to put pressure on the elevators with the threat of making their 
receipts, and thus the grain they held in store, worthless on the Chicago market.  
This technique had some success in promoting accurate information on the 
quantity of wheat in the city. The Board used the pressure of regularity to force 
warehouses into accepting a twice-yearly examination of the interior of their warehouses. 
In 1895, the Board stripped two elevators of their regular status when they would not 
allow inspectors access to the grain in store.6 Five years later, the Board made irregular 
all Armour Elevator Company receipts, following the discovery that the company had 
outstanding receipts for wheat that was not in store.7  
The complementary systems of registration and regularity, once adopted, did 
solve several earlier problems with the previous system of grading. They made 
information on the quantity of wheat in the city’s elevators more accurate. Since all 
shipments in and out were supervised and registered through the state, statistics were 
                                                 
6 Board of Directors Records, Box 32, Folder 25, March 12, 1895. 
7 OR, Box 9, Folder 10, May 25, 1900. 
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carefully kept and disseminated. Also, registration of receipts eliminated the mixing of 
grades that had plagued the grain trade previously. Grain leaving the elevator needed to 
be matched to receipts held by the registrar. Thus, attempts to mix lower grades of wheat 
into a higher grade would produce wheat without receipts on record, which could not be 
shipped.   
Like registration, RWC’s efforts to control inspection and grading got off to a 
rocky start. Not two years into the RWC’s supervision, CBOT was arguing that 
inspectors lacked the necessary expertise for the job and that inspection should be 
returned to the Board.8 But, unlike registration, the problems with inaccurate grading 
only grew worse as time went on. By 1900, state inspection was so unreliable that many 
eastern buyers would accept the delivery of wheat from Chicago only after having their 
own private inspectors ensure its quality.9 State inspection had become so discredited 
that, according to Board president W.S. Warren, Chicago certificates “were not worth the 
paper they were printed on.”10 RWC inspectors were giving higher grades than merited, 
allowing mixed wheat in grades that should have been pure, and ignoring the minimum 
weight requirements for bushels by grade.11 By 1908, CBOT was receiving significant 
complaints from abroad. Both the American Consulate in Germany and the Liverpool 
Corn Association complained that orders of hard winter wheat were arriving instead as 
soft wheat, making them entirely unusable for the purposes of buyers.12 Liverpool 
                                                 
8 BDR, Box 1, Folder 5, Jan. 20, 1873 
9 OR, Minutes of the Annual Meeting, Box 9, Folder 4, 1901 
10 OR, MAM, Box 9, Folder 4, 1901: unnumbered page 
11 Committee Records, Box 320, Folder 1, Aug. 12, 1907 
12 CR, Box 319, Folder 4, Oct. 19, 1908 
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threatened to stop accepting Chicago inspection certificates altogether if the problems 
were not solved.13  
In addition to inaccurate grading, the RWC’s distance—both physical and 
practical—from the grain trade also led it to make poor decisions. In one such instance, 
they altered the standards for #2 spring wheat in the middle of the trading season, which 
threw existing contracts into disorder. Traders, who could not be sure that buyers would 
get the quality of product they needed, were paralyzed: “So long as there remains an 
unknown quantity of this mixed wheat, which may be delivered out as 2 spring on any 
receipts, there is no safety in loading even a single car – nor can any samples be sent out 
with safety until this stock is exhausted.”14 
CBOT pinned these problems on two sources: first, the appointment of 
inexperienced graders; second, the Commission’s unfamiliarity with the necessities of 
everyday trade. On the first point, inspectors were not required to pass an examination or 
show any special familiarity with the grain trade. The Commission even employed female 
inspectors, which the Board took as confirmation of their disregard for hiring inspectors 
with the proper experience and familiarity with the trade.15 CBOT charged that this lack 
of standards made grain inspection part of the “political machine” of Illinois.16 CBOT 
leaders took special umbrage at regulation of the grain trade being handed out as 
patronage, with President William T. Baker caustically noting that “zeal in partisan 
                                                 
13 Executive office records, Box 437, Folder 3, Nov. 3, 1909 
14 BDR, Box 22, Folder 5, Jan. 24, 1890 
15 CR, Box 320, Folder 4, Oct. 24, 1911 
16 OR, MAM, Box 9, Folder 4, 1900: np 
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campaign work does not qualify men” for work as inspectors.17 To the second point, 
CBOT argued that a three-person commission, located 160 miles away in Springfield, 
could never hope to develop familiarity with the reality of trade from moment to 
moment.18 
After over thirty years of complaint and uncertain state inspection, and 
immediately following the sharp criticism in the early 1900s, CBOT took steps to 
guarantee the accuracy of grades and the legitimacy of their contracts. In 1905, it 
established their own unofficial inspection service, parallel to that offered by the state. 
This Department of Grain Sampling and Seed Inspection was a response to the “very 
general demand … for a more efficient, disinterested and official system of resampling 
grain consigned to and being shipped from this market.”19 Though the decisions of this 
inspection service were not official and could not be used to compel any change in grade, 
they offered an alternative grading process for those merchants frustrated with state 
inspection. CBOT recommended that disgruntled buyers should stipulate that their orders 
were to be shipped subject to approval of the Board’s Department of Grain Sampling and 
Seed Inspection.20 This parallel system of inspection would offer quality assurances that 
were sorely lacking under the state system.  
But this was not a systemic fix. Permanent change needed to come from a reform 
of the RWC, particularly the procedure for assigning inspectors. To this end, CBOT 
lobbied for close to twenty years to have grain inspector positions placed under Civil 
                                                 
17 OR, MAM, Box 7, Folder 9, 1895: np 
18 OR, Report of the Trade and Commerce of Chicago, Box 86, 1873 
19 OR, MAM, Box 10, Folder 25, 1905: np 
20 CR, Box 319, Folder 6, Mar. 8, 1905 
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Service rules in order to ensure that positions were awarded on merit.21 They also pushed 
for increased accountability and centralization of supervision, so that inspectors’ decision 
could be subjected to review. CBOT’s Grain Committee communicated to the RWC their 
desire to have samples of grain sent every morning to the office of the Chief Inspector in 
Springfield, so that he could check up on the work of inspectors in the field. The Board 
maintained that this would help to reduce the number of careless and improperly drawn 
samples, which were leading to improperly graded shipments of wheat.22 The RWC 
resisted any major changes for many years. It was not until 1912—forty years after their 
inception—that the RWC adopted Civil Service rules for appointing inspectors.23 
The greater difficulty in establishing the classification system as compared to the 
registrar is unsurprising, given the interpretive nature of grain grading. Whereas the 
registrar’s job was merely clerical—collecting, compiling, and disseminating 
information—inspectors had to be familiar with the conventions of the grain trade and 
expert enough to make distinctions of grade under sometimes difficult conditions.24 They 
were required to create information that would serve as the basis of large economic 
transactions. This is a difficult task for the state to step into, especially given the lack of 
uniformity across states. This heterogeneity of standards is addressed in the next section.   
 
Opposition to standardized grades 
                                                 
21 OR, MAM, Box 7, Folder 9, 1895; OR, MAM, Box 9, Folder 4, 1901 
22 CR, Box 319, Folder 10, Jul. 16, 1907 
23 OR, MAM, Box 13, Folder 8, 1912 
24 Grading happened outside, rain or shine. Inspectors often had to work quickly to accommodate the many 
carloads of wheat waiting to get to an elevator.  
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The previous sections show that CBOT did take steps to ensure the quality of 
grading whether done privately or by the state, however feeble or ineffectual those steps 
might have been. Yet, as the following section reveals, it remained entirely unwilling to 
cooperate with other markets on the same issue. This unwillingness to work with other 
exchanges was most prominent in efforts to harmonize grading standards used across 
exchanges. CBOT showed a general disinclination to give up control over any aspect of 
its trade, whether to a state agency or a supra-organizational association of grain 
exchanges.  
By the early 1900s, the classification of wheat into grades had spread to grain 
exchanges around the world. The problem was that each exchange had its own classes 
and standards, with no guarantee of parity between them. As an example, the grading 
standards from 1905-1906 for white winter wheat show a great deal of variety.25 Some 
exchanges divided the wheat into four grades, some three; some factor in the weight of 
the bushel in their determination while others don't, and even those that do use weights 
have different cut-off points; the qualitative descriptions of the grades also vary, with 
certain exchanges holding higher or lower standards than others. Table 3, below, 
illustrates this variety in grading standards across the Chicago Board of Trade (1906), 
New York Produce Exchange (1905) and Toledo Board of Trade (1906). Key differences 
existed in the minimum weights per bushel for each grade and the amount of cheaper red 
winter wheat that could be permissibly mixed into a bushel.26  
                                                 
25 CR, Box 319, Folder 5, various dates 
26 Hill (1990: 19) notes that even if the markets had instituted identical standards, the tools used for 
inspection were crude and varied greatly from place to place. This variation would have made equivalent 
83 
 
 
Table 2. Variation in standards for white winter wheat (1905-1906). 
Grade of wheat Chicago Toledo New York 
#1 white winter No min. weight 
or percentage 
Min. 58 lb/bu; min. 
95% white wheat 
Min. 60 lb/bu; no 
min. percentage 
#2 white winter No min. weight 
or percentage 
Min. 56 lb/bu; min. 
90% white wheat 
Min. 58 lb/bu; min. 
95% white wheat 
#3 white winter Min. 54 lb/bu; no 
min. percentage 
Min. 53 lb/bu; min. 
90% white wheat 
Min. 56 ½ lb/bu; min. 
95% white wheat 
#4 white winter No min. weight 
or percentage 
Min. 50 lb/bu; no 
min. percentage 
Min. 52 lb/bu; no 
min. percentage 
 
In instances where no quantitative guidelines were given, grading relied on the 
expertise and discrimination of inspectors. All of the descriptors used to measure wheat, 
e.g., “clean,” “dry,” “plump,” and “sound,” required interpretation. Making things even 
less precise, some of the classification guidelines bordered on tautology: in Chicago, #3 
white winter wheat was described as “not clean & plump enough for #2 white winter 
wheat,” a description that offers little in the way of concrete guidelines for inspectors. 
This is not to suggest that these qualitative guidelines could not produce uniformity 
within a market or even across markets, but this uniformity depended on inspectors 
sharing similar backgrounds and knowledge. As was seen in the previous section, the 
ability and expertise of Chicago inspectors was doubted by many in the grain trade. The 
questionable skill of state grain inspectors made uniformity on qualitative dimensions 
difficult to achieve. 
                                                                                                                                                 
processing impossible. “The major obstacle to creating uniformity in grades and grading among markets 
was the lack of objective, standard measures and instrumentation.” 
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This variation in grading practice across exchanges led to numerous problems. 
First, since the quality of wheat was not strictly comparable, neither were prices. 
Merchants thus needed to perform acts of translation when comparing prices, recognizing 
that #2 Hard Winter Wheat from Kansas City was different from the same grade of wheat 
in Chicago, which was different from the same grade in Minneapolis.27 This impeded 
trade between cities. Further, without any cooperation between exchanges, changes on 
one exchange would wreak havoc in others. When Minnesota’s state inspection 
department eliminated the grade of Velvet Chaff wheat, which was still in use on CBOT, 
Chicago merchants received shipments of mixed wheat the quality of which was 
essentially in between two grades on their market.28 Variation in grades also made 
figuring the regional supply of a given grade difficult.  
By 1906, these problems were causing such trouble to the trade that multiple 
groups, including the USDA and the Grain Dealers National Association, began to push 
for uniform grading standards. Grain Dealers National Association held a “Uniform 
Grade Congress” in 1906. Addressing this Congress, a representative from the USDA 
pinned the problems of grain inspection squarely on the lack of standards:  
Conditions in the cloth trade would be similar if there was no standard 
yard-stick or measure, or there would be an added cause for dissatisfaction 
even in the grain trade if a pound was legally 16 ounces in Chicago, 14 
ounces in New York, and every city or community was allowed to make 
its own standard of weights.29  
 
                                                 
27 OR, MAM, Box 15, Folder 3, 1920 
28 BDR, Box 77, Folder 14, Feb. 20, 1915 
29 CR, Box 319, Folder 7, Dec. 11, 1906 
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The problem of inconsistent inspection was felt particularly in European markets, which 
had little redress for the receipt of incorrectly graded or spoiled grain. European boards of 
trade thus added their voices to the chorus calling for uniform standards for grading 
American grain.30 
But CBOT resisted attempts to create uniform standards. Its leaders judged them 
to be desirable in the abstract, but impracticable, because of the organic nature of 
agricultural goods.31 Reframing the above comment from a USDA representative about 
the lack of a standard “yard stick,” President C.H. Canby, argued that “products of the 
soil cannot be graded with the same exactness as is the case with manufactured products, 
and a certain degree of variation will unavoidably at times result.”32 Wheat grown in 
different parts of the country had unique properties, which could be accounted for by 
local grading systems, but would be lost in a national or international system. But, in 
addition to these product-based impracticalities, there is evidence that CBOT simply 
objected to any system that would hurt their market. CBOT rejected the uniform grading 
standards put forward by the Grain Dealers National Association in 1907, for the reason 
that the new regulations would result in much of their hard wheat being re-graded as 
mixed wheat or red wheat, which would bring a lower price. Other proposed changes, 
such as new minimum test weights for grades and addition of new grades, were also 
rejected outright, with no explanation other than that they conflicted with current 
practice.33   
                                                 
30 CR, Box 319, Folder 10, Jan. 24, 1907 
31 CR, Box 319, Folder 4, Feb. 9, 1906 
32 OR, MAM, Box 14, Folder 7, 1915: 4 
33 CR, Box 319, Folder 10, Mar. 19, 1907 
86 
 
 
CBOT’s resistance to uniform grading standards contributed to the character of 
the spot-futures system. Lack of uniformity caused major problems for spot dealers, and 
they pushed for greater alignment with other exchanges. That their call was so easily 
dismissed demonstrates the weak position of spot dealers. Non-spot interests dominated 
among CBOT members, who were able to resist external pressure to change their grades 
because of Chicago’s position as the world’s foremost grain market. The grading system 
that resulted thus lacked uniformity across markets, a significant impediment to spot 
trading on CBOT.   
 
As a whole, CBOT’s grading system failed to incorporate features that would 
promote a sound spot market environment. The constant uncertainty surrounding the 
reliability of grades introduced unnecessary risk into the merchandising of wheat. The 
grading infrastructure thus promoted speculation in the Chicago market at the expense of 
a stable spot market. We turn next to New Orleans, where the creation of market 
infrastructure took a different path.   
 
The New Orleans Cotton Exchange: Tradition of shared standards 
While in Chicago the spot and futures markets developed together, New Orleans 
had a long history as a major spot market long before futures were adopted (Sherman 
1934). The practice of classifying cotton on dimensions such as staple length, color and 
purity of the lint originated in this early environment (Garside 1935). When NOCE was 
established in 1871, eight different grades of cotton quality—ranging from good middling 
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to inferior—and twelve staple lengths were commonly used in the trade (Boyle 1934).34 
These classifications were developed to serve parties within the spot market, with no 
influence from the futures market. They were used to simplify and regulate the trade, so 
that spinners could be assured of getting the particular quality they needed. All cotton 
exchanged in the New Orleans market was judged according to a single common 
standard.  
Though classification was well-established, it still faced certain persistent 
problems. First, grading standards across markets were far from uniform. Each market 
created and relied on its own set of “types”—samples of cotton from each grade and 
color—to guide classers’ judgments and provide a standard for arbitration. But these 
local methods did nothing to harmonize standards across markets. Second, even within a 
local setting, variation in grading was not unusual. This variation was due to the fact that 
cotton classification remained private. At every sale, buyer and seller would employ an 
expert cotton classer to sample the bales and pronounce a judgment as to its grade. Since 
cotton would often change hands multiple times between the producer and the spinner, 
this meant the same bale would be classed multiple times, often with different results 
(Garside 1935). NOCE addressed the first of these issues almost immediately upon its 
founding; the latter was not addressed until the turn of the century.   
                                                 
34 NOCE futures contracts did not demand the exclusive delivery of a single grade of cotton. Rather, all 
contracts were made for “middling” grade cotton, and, if delivery was required, a range of grades could be 
tendered to satisfy the contract. Parties were compensated for any difference in quality between middling 
and the grade of cotton that was delivered through receiving an appropriate premium or discount on the 
contract price. The amount of these were determined based on market prices at the end of each day by the 
NOCE Committee on Quotations. 
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In 1872, a year after NOCE’s founding, the board of directors set to work to 
address the problem of uniformity across markets. They began by distributing 118 sets of 
official NOCE types to exchanges, mills, factors and other members of the trade around 
the world. They requested similar type samples from all major cotton markets in return, 
with the hope of ironing out any discrepancies in grading standards.35 NOCE leaders also 
pursued uniform classification standards through the National Cotton Exchange, an 
association comprised of representatives from major exchanges around the country. In 
1874, the National Cotton Exchange created the first American standard for cotton, which 
soon became the de facto world standard when Liverpool, the largest European cotton 
market, signed on in 1877. NOCE’s flexibility when producing this standard speaks to its 
desire for uniformity: leaders were willing to make changes to their own local 
classifications in order to fall in line with the common standard, a stark contrast to 
Chicago’s intransigence in such matters.36  
When this international harmony broke down in 1883, NOCE battled for several 
years to restore uniformity.37 The standard grading system fell apart when the New York 
Cotton Exchange (NYCE) decided to adopt a new standard that would benefit their 
futures trade by making more cotton available for delivery on contracts. NOCE 
immediately complained to the National Cotton Exchange about this defection from the 
international standard. The next year, in protest over New York’s refusal to negotiate, 
they refused to attend the National Cotton Exchange meeting.38 When it became clear 
                                                 
35 Annual report, 1872 
36 AR, 1874 
37 AR, 1883 
38 AR, 1884 
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that NYCE was reluctant to return the established standard, NOCE accused them of 
enriching their own futures market at the expense of Southern spot markets.  Longtime 
NOCE secretary, Henry Hester, writing in Cotton World magazine took NYCE to task, 
arguing that, “A little less of local prejudice and a more general disposition to work for 
the common good” would produce an international standard that would benefit all parties 
to the cotton trade.39  
When private coordination between exchanges failed to work, NOCE turned to 
the federal government to implement standards. In 1899, a full fifteen years before 
federal involvement in the grain trade, NOCE was pressuring the Commissioners of 
Agriculture of the cotton states to “use earnest and energetic efforts” to pass legislation 
establishing standard weights and classifications.40 The Board of Directors, advocating 
for government intervention, expressed the position of NOCE clearly: “We can 
understand why separate types should be made for Gulf and Upland cottons, but not why 
Low Middling should not be Low Middling and Middling be Middling, calling for the 
same cotton, barring differences that have nothing to do with grade, all the world over 
and at all times during the season.”41 This willingness to engage with state supervision 
continued unabated. In 1910, NOCE president W.B. Thompson pledged that NOCE 
would adopt state or federal standards, if and when they were introduced (Thompson 
1910). This was borne out by NOCE’s support for the Cotton Futures Act of 1914, which 
                                                 
39 Cotton World, Sep. 17, 1887, p. 37 
40 AR, 1899: 8 
41 AR, 1899: 10 
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standardized forms of contract, grades and modes of settlement nationwide.42 The law, 
they argued, boosted investor confidence and made futures contracts better for hedging 
purposes.43 In 1910, even before the passage of this federal law, NOCE voluntarily 
aligned their own type standards with those promulgated by the USDA, arguing that this 
alignment made their system not only smoothly connected to other exchanges, but fair 
and upright, with transactions “beyond dispute or misconception.”44 This alignment was 
so thorough that NOCE had only a few minor changes to make following the enactments 
of the 1914 Cotton Futures Act and the 1923 Cotton Standards Act (Boyle 1934). 
NOCE leaders showed a desire for uniform classification standards from the 
founding of the Exchange. It is particularly telling that these Southern businessmen 
desired uniformity so much that they supported federal intervention and control over the 
South’s staple crop. NOCE was motivated in this desire by the needs of the spot market, 
as evidenced by the fact that much of their campaigning for uniformity took place before 
futures trading even gained a foothold in the New Orleans market (Bouilly 1979).  
 
Protecting the crop 
Beyond setting standards, NOCE also sought at this early point to guarantee the 
quality and quantity of cotton remained constant throughout the process of sampling 
bales, removing damaged bits and moving them from the presses to the docks. At the 
                                                 
42The original Cotton Futures Act, making federal grading compulsory for cotton delivered on futures 
contracts, was passed in 1914. NOCE supported the law except for two features: first, a clause restricting 
foreign trade; second, the too strict limitation of grades tenderable on contract. Both objectionable features 
were removed in 1916 amendments to the law.  
43 AR, 1914 
44 AR, 1910: 8 
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time of NOCE’s founding, a number of well-known problems existed in all of these areas. 
Under pressure to move cotton quickly, workers often handled bales carelessly, rolling 
them through mud or water, diminishing their quality. Also, press operators were known 
to skim small amounts of cotton off of bales as they were processed, and petty thieves 
similarly stole small amounts from bales awaiting loading on the docks. As a result, 
buyers often found their cotton coming in far under weight requirements.45 In 1874, 
NOCE sought to curtail these abuses through the establishment of two departments—
Supervision and Inspection—tasked with preventing fraud and protecting the quality of 
the cotton from the time it arrived at warehouses, through its storage on the docks, and 
finally as it was packed onto ships.  
The supervision department’s job was to oversee the preparation of bales in cotton 
presses and warehouses. This involved overseeing the sampling of the bales and the 
removal of damaged bits, so as to put the bale into merchantable condition. The goal of 
this department was to ensure bales were processed with a minimum of waste, or “loose.” 
They recorded the amount of loose cotton stored at each press as well as the weight of the 
samples taken by each party’s classers and furnished certificates of these weights if 
desired by the parties to the trade.46 The inspection department then protected the cotton 
as it sat on the docks and ensured proper handling as it was loaded onto ships. Inspectors 
also kept books for the Exchange giving the number of bales of cotton received by every 
vessel, as well as the condition of the cotton received and the character of the weather 
                                                 
45 AR, 1876 
46 Volumes, Box 275, Folder 5, Feb. 19, 1905 
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morning, noon, and night.47 Inspectors noted whether cotton was taken on board a ship in 
wet or dry condition, and if wet, whether the cotton was received wet or became so by 
being exposed to rain on the levee or being rolled through the mud.48 They also noted if a 
ship stored cotton on its deck, exposed to the elements, a practice which had become 
common among shippers looking to haul as much cotton as possible on each trip. This 
information was available to all Exchange members and was regularly consulted when 
determining responsibility for cotton arriving out of condition.49  
The Exchange also provided the resources to make these new departments viable. 
The supervision department was well-staffed from the start: a chief supervisor, twenty-six 
assistants, fifty or more laborers, and a team of clerks for record-keeping were employed 
to oversee the cotton in the city’s twenty-four compresses and two rail depots.50 The 
Exchange also acted quickly and decisively against those parties who, protesting the 
mandatory fees attached to each service, attempted to refuse supervision and inspection. 
Members who denied supervisors access to their presses were threatened with expulsion 
from the Exchange51; shipping lines that refused inspection had their names posted on the 
exchange to discourage others from dealing with them.52 But, as with receipt registration 
in Chicago, the most convincing way to get their system off the ground was making 
registration profitable. Within a few years of its introduction, most shippers and press 
operators had come to recognize that the system raised the value of cotton abroad and 
                                                 
47 AR, 1875 
48 V, Box 285, Folder 8, Feb. 19, 1905 
49 AR, 1882 
50 AR, 1876; AR, 1877. The exact number of laborers employed varied depending on the amount of cotton 
being processed, with extra help hired during busy times. 
51 V, Box 127, Folder 42, Nov. 9, 1874 
52 V, Box 127, Folder 58, Oct. 20, 1875 
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thus provided them ample recompense for the extra fees.53 
Both systems worked as intended. An early review of the supervision system 
claimed that it “has added more to the reputation of New Orleans for care and attention to 
the produce intrusted [sic] to her merchants than any other measure ever before 
adopted.”54 The inspection department was similarly feted. It oversaw and brought 
certainty to a period during transportation where cotton had formerly been unprotected 
and vulnerable. By 1877, the amount of cotton lost to careless handling and petty theft 
was the lowest ever seen in New Orleans or any other market for which statistics 
existed.55 Through the two systems, NOCE kept an eye on cotton during its entire tenure 
in the city.  
At no other place that we know of, however, is such a thorough system of 
supervision maintained, where the cotton is guarded from the time it 
reaches the port until it is finally placed in the hold of the outgoing vessel; 
where every bundle of samples is weighed to see that its contents are not 
over the regulation weight, where the making of unnecessary loose is 
prevented by close and strict watchfulness, and where pilfering is rendered 
almost impossible. In a word, these are the objects of the New Orleans 
system of supervision and inspection, under which not a pound of the 
planters’ or country shippers’ cotton confided to the care of our merchants 
is unnecessarily wasted.56 
The general sentiment among NOCE officials was that the system of protecting the crop 
established in New Orleans had no equal at any other cotton port in the world (Boyle 
1934). 
As further evidence of the success of the NOCE system, supervision and 
                                                 
53 AR, 1876; AR, 1877 
54 AR,1881: 3 
55 AR, 1877 
56 AR,1902: 22 
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inspection departments soon spread to other exchanges. The New York Cotton Exchange 
adopted NOCE’s system of supervision in 1876, with the Liverpool Cotton Exchange 
following suit shortly thereafter, in 1877.57 In addition to its adoption in other markets, 
the reach of the system was expanded within the New Orleans market. In 1889, the 
Exchange extended its system of supervision to more thoroughly cover railroad depots, 
bringing under its control many bales that had previously escaped supervision.58 
Inspection was extended even to bales of cotton that circumvented the one-cent 
inspection fee.59 They decided that protecting the reputation of their port for safe and 
efficient handling was worth the financial loss and the risk of encouraging free-riding.60  
NOCE paid close attention to the physical crop moving through their port. 
Because bales of cotton retained their identity throughout the process, the challenge was 
to maintain the quality of the bale throughout its processing and handling. The need to 
account for the quality and weight of the cotton in their care led NOCE to build a security 
system that guaranteed the fidelity of the grades agreed on by buyer and seller. Parties in 
the spot trade could be confident that cotton would be handled well or that any cases 
where it was not would be carefully documented.  
 
Centralized grading 
Both the system of coordinating grading standards across exchanges and the 
                                                 
57 AR, 1876; AR, 1877 
58 AR, 1889 
59 These bales had not been supervised or inspected previously because they never entered cotton presses 
where supervisors were stationed. They could skip the presses altogether because they were shipped on 
through bills of lading, meaning that they could be immediately moved from rail to ship without any need 
for storage.  
60 AR, 1883 
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departments of supervision and inspection aimed to ensure the quality of cotton across 
exchanges. The goal was to help cotton and information about cotton travel well from one 
market to the next. But this focus on inter-market uniformity came at the expense of 
intra-market reliability. As mentioned in earlier section, cotton classification was a local 
and variable process. Cotton was re-classed at every sale, with the possibility that a single 
bale of cotton might be assigned multiple grades during its movement through the city’s 
marketing machinery (Garside 1935). 
This system had a number of drawbacks. First, arbitration was time consuming, 
labor-intensive and not uncommon. In 1883, the Arbitration Committee reported that they 
judged 93,300 bales over the course of the year, with 12,762 of these being further 
appealed.61 Second, private grading enabled buyers and sellers to bypass the Exchange 
altogether. Private deals could be struck in small towns in the interior of the state, after 
which cotton would be shipped on through bills of lading, passing directly from rail to 
ship. The practice of private classification, in combination with increased rail service to 
interior points, enabled this diffuse buying and selling, lessening the commercial activity 
on NOCE.62 This diffuse and private practice had financial ramifications. Without the 
imprimatur of an organizationally sanctioned grade, banks did not lend as much money 
on cotton certificates as the underlying commodity would warrant. As Exchange 
President W.B. Thompson explained in 1908:  
The cotton itself is as good as gold, but the piece of paper which is 
supposed to represent the cotton, and upon which the money is loaned, 
may be worthless. If the warehouse receipt was known to the world to be 
perfectly good, there would be no doubt about money seeking such 
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collateral.63  
The lack of a universally recognized certificate limited the potential of cotton as a source 
of capital.  
A final problem with the system of private classification has already been 
mentioned: the re-classification of cotton each time it changed hands. This practice 
created the possibility that cotton could be purchased as one class and sold as another. 
This was made more likely by virtue of the delicate nature of cotton classing, where 
subtle distinctions were made through multiple senses. The purity of the lint and color of 
the cotton was determined by visual inspection, which was sensitive to changes in light. 
In addition to their eyes, classers relied on their fingers and ears in judging the quality of 
cotton. Determining the staple length and strength of the fiber was accomplished by 
pulling apart a sample of cotton, feeling for slight differences in resistance and listening 
for the “cry” of the cotton as it was separated. Classers needed dexterity and sensitivity, 
in addition to long experience, in order to become experts.64 Given the delicacy of this 
process, it was not uncommon for a bale to be re-classed as a higher or lower type on 
resale than on purchase. This fluctuation in grade promoted a divide between futures and 
spot markets. Speculators in futures had little interest in taking on this risk. Accordingly, 
they often would try to sell any contracts they held in the days just prior to delivery to 
avoid having to handle any actual cotton. This practice would create an over-supply of 
                                                 
63 Thompson, William B. 1908. Address of W.B. Thompson, President New Orleans Cotton 
Exchange. The Central Warehouse Plan, p.7 
64 The sensitivity required for cotton classification is clearly demonstrated by the lengths USDA officials 
eventually went when they took over classification duties in 1916. Cotton was classed in special humidity-
controlled rooms with north-facing skylights and black and grey interiors designed to produce an even 
character of light throughout the day. Classing was a subtle art. As one merchant claimed, “The hands of a 
cotton classer should be as soft as a debutante’s and as supple as a violinist’s” (Garside 1935: 77).  
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contract cotton for sale, depressing prices (Garside 1935). The variability of grading 
produced a system where futures traders were discouraged from handling actual cotton.   
A centralized system for classing and certifying cotton run by NOCE officials 
would resolve these problems. In 1887, following the introduction of such a system on 
the New York Cotton Exchange, NOCE began discussing its feasibility in their own 
market. The special committee appointed to investigate the system reported that while it 
favored the certificate system upon its merits they recognized that, “under existing 
conditions for handling spot cotton in New Orleans, its success might prove doubtful.”65 
Dealers in spot cotton were loathe to relinquish their role in classification, which they 
used to their own benefit. While there was not the same opportunity for outright 
manipulation as with grain elevators in Chicago, cotton dealers did enjoy certain benefits 
from being at the center of the grading process. For instance, many believed that by 
skillfully displaying their goods they could influence the grade assigned and thus the 
value of their cotton (Garside 1935). Spot dealers also benefited from buying cotton in 
small towns, where markets were smaller and less competitive. New Orleans dealers were 
also far better informed than small-town producers and middlemen about the state of 
markets in the city and around the world, giving them an advantage (Boyle 1934). 
Handing over classification to NOCE would eliminate both advantages.  
As a result of this opposition from spot dealers, centralized grading made little 
headway for decades. The initial push made in 1887, as well as a second try coming from 
NOCE’s Futures Committee in 1897, were both handily defeated.66 Since NOCE could 
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not institute an Exchange-wide central classification system over the objections of spot 
dealers, they initially required certification only for cotton delivered on futures contracts. 
In 1909, they placed grading of contract cotton under the care of a salaried Board of 
Classers, cotton experts employed by the Exchange who would class cotton tendered on 
contract. The certificates of grade they issued were fully guaranteed by the Exchange.67 
Classers were required to work solely in this capacity and were forbidden from having 
any interest whatever in the cotton business.68  
The system immediately brought the futures and spot markets into closer contact, 
to the immediate benefit of speculators. They no longer needed to hire an expert in cotton 
classing to move cotton in the spot market.  
Under this system receivers may separate for shipment any bale or number 
of bales in a contract (as each bale has its own tag number and class) for 
use on various orders requiring particular grades of cotton. Thus every 
possible facility is given to both deliverers and receivers of cotton on 
contracts, bringing the contract and spot business into the closest possible 
accord and simplifying the business so that the advantages to deliverer and 
receiver are equal. In a word, the business has been so simplified that it 
does not require expert knowledge to either receive or deliver cotton on 
contract.69 
Speculators now had two convenient, reliable choices in the event they received cotton on 
their contract: sell it on the open market, knowing that the grade was certified and backed 
by the Exchange, or redeliver it on a contract that they had sold. This movement of cotton 
between spot and futures markets was aided by the enormous amount of practical 
information featured on certificates, including the name of the press or warehouse where 
                                                 
67 Thompson, William B. 1909. The New Future Rules of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange. New Orleans: 
J.G. Hauser. 
68 Thompson, William B. 1910. Analysis and Exposition of the Scott Anti-Cotton-Future Bill. 
69 AR 1910: 27 
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it was stored, the number or letter of the warehouse receipt, the marks of bales, the lot or 
tag number or numbers, whether compressed or uncompressed and the number of bales in 
each grade.70 This ample information—in conjunction with the Exchange’s guarantee of 
quality—made it possible for speculators to move easily between futures and spot 
markets. 
Reviewing the first year of the system, the Exchange claimed that certification 
created, “a medium through which buyers and sellers of contracts can, with implicit 
confidence in the result and at a minimum cost, settle their obligations with actual 
cotton.”71 This linkage was not only strong theoretically; in practice, the NOCE 
certification system enabled fast processing. In one particularly heavy trading month in 
1917, NOCE successfully processed over 21,000 bales delivered on futures contracts in 
the last 6 days of the month.72 It also achieved the desired goal of substantially lowering 
the number of appeals on grade.73  
The success of NOCE’s certification system was so convincing that spot dealers 
began to recognize its value to them as well. Within two years of the inspection bureau’s 
inception spot traders were bringing their non-contract cotton to be graded, even though 
they were not required to do so.74 These dealers found the NOCE certification smoothed 
their transactions, saved them the time (and possible expense) of arbitration, and made 
cotton better collateral for loans.75 This voluntary involvement by spot dealers paved the 
                                                 
70 AR, 1910 
71 AR, 1910: 8 
72 AR, 1917 
73 AR, 1910 
74 AR, 1911 
75 Only the party whose judgment was overturned needed to pay arbitration fees.  
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way for NOCE to take another step towards integrating the spot and futures markets. In 
1915, NOCE took over the duty of sampling—but still not classing—spot cotton. NOCE 
experts would draw a sample of every bale and store this sample for examination by 
interested buyers. If a seller so desired, this sample could thus be transferred to the board 
of classers for grading. The assigned certificates of grade would then be officially 
guaranteed by the exchange, and valid for delivery in the futures market. With a 
minimum of expense, traders could easily move cotton from the spot to the futures 
market.76 In the crop year ending July 31, 1917, this movement from spot to futures 
markets occurred in 19% of the samples taken.77 This meant that spot cotton could now 
move into the futures market just as easily as futures deliveries could be handled in the 
spot market.  
Following the pattern described in the previous sections, actors in the spot market 
exerted a significant impact on the actual process of classification. Spot dealers delayed 
the introduction of a centralized certification system. But at least part of their opposition 
was misplaced. Even though NOCE acted against spot dealers wishes, they did so with 
the spot market’s interest in mind. By centralizing grading, spots and futures were 
brought into closer contact, strengthening both.   
 
As a whole, NOCE’s system of classification reflected the importance of the spot 
cotton market in New Orleans. The needs of spot traders for consistency and uniformity 
informed their decisions regarding classification, certification and connection with other 
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markets. The infrastructure that resulted supported a robust spot market with close ties to 
the trade in futures. These features kept speculation and commodity trade in a healthy 
balance up until federal regulation of the futures market in 1914.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has described the development of two distinct grading systems on 
CBOT and NOCE. Each system was created within an economic, organizational, and 
institutional environment that shaped its workings. NOCE’s system reflects an 
overarching concern with the spot trade. Decisions regarding classifications were made 
for the good of the spot market primarily, if not wholly. This orientation resulted in a 
market infrastructure that promoted hedging and a close relation between spot and futures 
markets. By contrast, CBOT’s system was the product of an organization with little 
investment in the spot market. Spot dealers’ need for accurate grading was constantly 
pushed off in favor of maintaining an uncertain status quo. This uncertainty made CBOT 
better suited to speculation in the futures market than to the actual trade of primary 
commodities.   
These findings offer an interesting critique of current sociological theories about 
the classification. Most scholarship on classifications, and infrastructures generally, is 
most concerned with how infrastructures delineate the types of actors, things, and 
processes that can exist in a given setting (Foucault 1982). Analyses from this approach 
tend to have two features: first, they highlight the process of constructing an 
infrastructure as the critical moment for study. This is the moment when partisans battle 
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to enshrine the ontology that best suits their particular needs (Cronon 1991; Espeland & 
Sauder 2007; Foucault 1982; Miller & O’Leary 1987; Miller & Rose 1990). Second, they 
study the consequences of these infrastructures for the people who use them. They 
examine how people adapt their work practices so as to be in harmony with an 
infrastructure, whether by sincerely adopting it or by cynically engaging in ‘work 
arounds’ that allow them to continue the same practices, only labeled according to a new 
scheme (Barry 2001; Bowker & Star 1999; Edwards, et al. 2009; Millerand & Bowker 
2009). We can think of this research as taking an ontological approach to the topic.  
In opposition to this dominant ontological approach, my findings show the 
importance of taking a semiotic approach to classification. Theorizing classifications as 
semiotic entities requires a shift in focus from the moment of constructing classification 
schemes (Star 2002) to the practice of classifying itself (Hatherly, Leung & MacKenzie 
2008). This latter, practical moment is when classifications acquire their semiotic content. 
As this process changes, so too the meaning of classifications is altered (Barnes 1983; 
Bloor 1997; Wittgenstein 1967). The significance of even the most basic economic 
classifications, such as ‘profit’ and ‘loss’, are constantly reshaped by the evolution of 
classifying practices (Hatherly, Leung & MacKenzie 2008). The meaning of a market’s 
closing prices differs according to the algorithmic processes by which it is produced 
(Muniesa 2007). A semiotic approach to infrastructure also is less concerned with the 
constraints imposed by an infrastructure and more interested in how individuals engage 
creatively with infrastructures as meaningful objects.  
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A semiotic approach is more useful than an ontological approach for 
understanding the significance of classifications in these cases. Different types of trades 
had different semiotic requirements for classifications. For instance, for speculation that 
did not end in delivery, the grade was only required to specify which commodity’s 
market price was the object of the speculative bet. For the purposes of this type of trade, a 
futures contract for Colorado Red Wheat was essentially a bet on the price of the 
commodity being marketed as ‘Colorado Red Wheat’—the physical qualities represented 
by this label could be entirely arbitrary. Hedging, by contrast, required grades to work in 
both futures and spot markets. For a grade to function well in the spot market the content 
of classifications was paramount: the grading system had to provide a fair recompense to 
farmers based on the quality of their product and an accurate guide to manufacturers, who 
required their raw materials to meet certain physical standards. If grades did not 
accurately index these physical dimensions, the spot market component of the hedge 
would be unsatisfactory. 
To put this in explicitly semiotic language, speculation only required the 
classification system to produce viable symbols, or to act as a symbolic infrastructure, 
i.e., a logically coherent classification systems within which signs are meaningfully 
related.78 Hedging, in addition to this symbolic infrastructure, also required a 
classification system that produced signs indexed to the physical qualities of 
                                                 
78 I rely here on Peirce’s (1931-1958) trichotomy of signs: icons, indexes, and symbols. Icons signify 
through their resemblance to their object (e.g., a picture of a cigarette with a slash through it indicating, ‘No 
Smoking’); indices signify through pointing to their object (e.g., dark clouds and strong winds as a sign of 
impending rain); symbols signify through their connection to other symbols and their associations (e.g. 
words, which are meaningful primarily through their connection with other words in a language). Any sign 
can signify in any combination of one or all of these modes. 
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commodities, i.e., an indexical infrastructure.79  For indexical infrastructures, issues of 
practice—i.e., how grading was accomplished and integrated into the market—were 
critical. Recognizing these different semiotic infrastructures also makes possible an 
analysis of their interchange. How did grades move from acting as symbols to acting as 
indexes? This was a critical question on the occasions when the commodities specified on 
a futures contract were actually delivered in fulfillment of that contract. The exchanges’ 
distinct arrangements for translating between these semiotic functions acted as border 
objects or gateways (Star & Griesemer 1989; Edwards 2010), shaping behaviors on the 
market.  
The key difference in how the two exchanges mediated this translation from 
symbol to index was the presence of a warehouse receipt on CBOT, and the lack of one 
on NOCE. On CBOT, the receipt and the legal apparatus in which it was embedded, 
automatically linked the grade as a symbolic entity and tool of speculation to the grade as 
an indexical guide to the material commodity. This established what we might call 
“indexicality by fiat.” Traders who needed to settle a contract through delivery could 
simply buy receipts for the proper grade of wheat, and rest assured that these would 
satisfy their obligations. The receipt served to isolate speculators on the futures market 
from any cost related to handling and classifying wheat, even on the occasions when they 
                                                 
79 Though not featured in either of these case, iconic infrastructures also exist. The clearest example of an 
iconic infrastructure is a field guide, a pictorial system for classifying species of birds or plants. Iconic 
infrastructures are unique among the three types in that their status as infra-structural is most likely to 
fluctuate. While in routine cases of classification these icons are used passively as a background guide for 
everyday practice, they are also actively reference in more difficult cases: birders carry field guides in their 
packs and refer to them when they spot an unfamiliar species. Iconic infrastructures thus move fluidly 
between being infrastructures that invisibly support tasks and being highly visible tools. 
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were forced to deliver it. By contrast, in NOCE’s system, speculators who were forced to 
deliver cotton had to confront cotton as a physical object, in a process of “indexicality by 
negotiation.” This introduced a potentially substantial cost to settling by delivery. Parties 
had to hire expert classers to negotiate a grade, and even then risked losing money on the 
deal due to changes in grade from one transaction to another. The difference in how 
grades were incorporated into practice on each exchange—as permanent inscriptions on 
warehouse receipts on CBOT and as negotiated agreements between private parties on 
NOCE—thus shaped traders’ orientation to settling contracts through the delivery of 
goods.  
 This difference, in turn, was highly consequential for market stability. On 
NOCE, the possible cost of converting futures contracts to actual commodities placed a 
check on speculation in the futures market. Speculators were wary of the risks and costs 
associated with physical delivery, and would attempt to rid themselves of any contract 
they suspected might require it, even to the point of selling at below market price 
(Garside 1935). CBOT’s system of ‘indexicality by fiat’ removed this brake. Speculators 
could be confident that they could, quickly and at no extra cost, secure warehouse 
receipts which would satisfy their contracts. The differences in the semiotic character of 
grades produced on CBOT and NOCE thus promoted contrasting behaviors on their 
derivative markets. The low spot market fidelity of CBOT’s grade made hedging 
difficult, while the permanent relation between its symbolic and indexical functions 
enabled unfettered speculation. NOCE’s grade, by contrast, had high spot market fidelity, 
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allowing for safe hedging, and an uncertain, costly method of linking symbolic and 
indexical functions, which tamped down speculation.  
 
The grading systems analyzed above were critical infrastructural components; 
they constructed information about physical commodities that enabled their inclusion as 
abstract goods in standardized futures contracts. Each exchange needed its own grading 
system as a prerequisite to its own futures market. But of course, markets were not 
islands. Each market needed to be able to bring in for the use of its members information 
about the growth and movement of spot crops, as well as price quotations from world 
markets. They also needed to disseminate the price data produced on their own market to 
other exchanges and trading offices. Achieving these goals required building 
infrastructures, such as telegraph systems and crop reports, that moved information from 
city to city, and between the city and country. It is to these information-moving 
infrastructural components that I turn next.     
 
Chapter 3, in part, is a reprint of the material as it appears in: Pinzur, David. 2016. 
“Making the Grade: Infratructural Semiotics and Derivative Market Outcomes on the 
Chicago Board of Trade and New Orleans Cotton Exchange, 1856-1909.” Economy & 
Society, 45(3-4): 431-453. The dissertation author was the sole researcher and author on 
this paper.  
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Chapter 4 – Moving Information 
While creating a system of grades was a critical prerequisite to futures trading, it 
did not encompass the entirety of infrastructure needed by these global futures markets. 
Grades and standards were a categorical infrastructure, which gave each market a 
language with which to operate.1 In this chapter, I focus on the transmission 
infrastructures by which each market connected to its surroundings. I analyze both the 
social forces that influenced the formation of these information-moving infrastructures 
and the consequences of those infrastructures for each market.  
I look specifically at the gathering and dissemination of two types of market-
related information: price quotations and crop statistics. Quotations were the prices at 
which commodities and futures were bought and sold on exchanges. In high-volume 
auction markets, this information was being constantly produced, and was the primary 
way in which traders came to know the state of the market. Quotations were relayed to 
other exchanges via telegraph, to be displayed—and continuously updated—on 
blackboards for the use of traders. Gathering this information from other markets was 
obviously a goal of this infrastructure. But just as important was the widespread 
distribution of a market’s own quotations: the more widely a market’s quotations were 
considered, the more influence it had to move the market itself. Crop statistics provided a 
different type of information, not about the price of futures but about the growth, 
movement, and consumption of the underlying crop. Whereas price quotations arrived in 
                                                 
1 Though, of course, in the previous chapter we also saw that grades were constructed in concert with other 
exchanges, meaning that they are not entirely internal. 
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seconds or minutes, crop statistics came weekly or monthly. They allowed traders to 
understand the current market situation holistically and historically, discern trends in 
supply and demand, and estimate probable future states of the market—i.e., to adopt a 
rational, calculative approach to trading. Price quotations and crop statistics thus provide 
the short-term and long-term information by which traders make their decisions in the 
futures market. 
CBOT and NOCE, as organizations, assigned different values to each type of 
information and had distinct methods for gathering them. Their perspectives were shaped 
by the social and economic environments on each exchange. CBOT’s policies on price 
quotations varied over the years in relation to the actions of two powerful nemeses: the 
Western Union telegraph company and bucket shops.2 The Board battled these two 
groups for control over and access to the valuable price quotations on the exchange floor. 
Regarding crop statistics, CBOT publicized the data compiled by other sources, including 
the United States Department of Agriculture and private crop experts, but did not produce 
any information themselves. The information they publicized was widely recognized to 
be unreliable, and CBOT did not take steps to improve this situation. Influenced by their 
battle with Western Union and the bucket shops, CBOT treated information as private 
property, which the Board need not be involved with vetting or equally distributing. 
NOCE’s policies on both price quotations and crop statistics were motivated by the 
economic and cultural desire to be independent of northern and foreign markets. Long-
                                                 
2 Bucket shops were gambling parlors where the public could bet on fluctuations in the price of 
commodities being traded on CBOT. Price quotations were transmitted from the Board’s floor to the shops 
by telegraph. 
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time Exchange Secretary Henry Hester built a statistical system that gained worldwide 
acclaim, making New Orleans a worldwide center for cotton statistics and earning Hester 
renown as the “Father of Cotton Statistics.”3 But while NOCE was successful in creating 
the infrastructure for gathering crop statistics, its efforts at building a reliable telegraphic 
infrastructure for transmitting price quotations faltered. NOCE, beginning from a 
dilapidated physical infrastructure, simply did not have the economic leverage to pressure 
Western Union and the New York Cotton Exchange into making the changes that would 
have sped up service.    
These policies on collecting crop statistics and price quotations resulted in 
markets with distinct information milieus that promoted divergent economic behaviors. 
On CBOT, the lack of Board-verified information created a two-tiered system: traders 
with better information, faster telegraphic service, or superior ability to sift out nuggets of 
truth from the sea of dubious claims had an advantage over other members—rightfully 
so, according to the Board. This inequality and unreliability both made long-term market 
projection difficult and did little to lower uncertainty in the short-term, making 
speculation on short-term price fluctuations a profitable strategy. NOCE, on the contrary, 
produced a wealth of reliable statistics on the growth, movement and consumption of 
cotton for the benefit of members. Crop statistics allowed traders to understand the 
current market situation historically and holistically, to discern trends in supply and 
demand, and to estimate probable future states—i.e., to adopt a rational, calculative 
                                                 
3 Frost, Meigs. 1926. “Hester Says”: An Intimate Personal Sketch of the World’s Greatest Cotton 
Authority, Theo. H. Harvey Press, New Orleans. 
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approach to trading. Additionally, the lack of speedy telegraphic services made 
speculation in futures, which required quickly spotting market opportunities, more 
difficult. Thus, traders on NOCE worked with much information about the long-term 
state of the cotton spot market, but little that could serve as fodder for short-term 
speculative trades. The systems by which the exchanges gathered and disseminated 
information in the form of price quotations and crop statistics, thus affected the types of 
trading prominent on each market.  
  
Chicago Board of Trade 
CBOT’s policy on price quotations was determined in large part by their fear of 
two outcomes: a Western Union monopoly over telegraph services, and the unchecked 
growth of bucket shops. Since Western Union was a prime provider of CBOT’s price 
quotations to bucket shops around the country, these dangers were interconnected: the 
more inescapable Western Union became, the less CBOT could do to keep quotations 
away from bucket shops; the larger bucket shops grew, the more incentive Western 
Union had to seek their continued business. The three-way battle that took place was 
fought largely through the courts, and extant histories have featured this legal component 
prominently. My analysis builds on this scholarship by situating these court battles in 
relation to CBOT’s concurrent attempts to circumvent Western Union altogether and to 
leverage the value of their price quotations in their negotiations. These economic 
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maneuvers were critical to the information infrastructure that was eventually built on 
CBOT with respect to price quotations.  
 
Building alternatives to the Western Union monopoly  
By the early 1870s, CBOT and other exchanges were becoming wary of Western 
Union’s growing control of the telegraph market, with good reason. Western Union 
acquired several major competitors during the 1860s and 1870s (John 2010). In 1866, 
they swallowed up the United States Telegraph Company and the American Telegraph 
Company, the latter being one of its principle rivals. They further expanded in 1877, 
acquiring the Atlantic & Pacific Telegraph Company, which ran a competing line on the 
important Chicago-New York corridor. In 1881, they essentially acquired the American 
Union Telegraph Company by hiring its majority owner, Jay Gould, as their new 
president. CBOT and other exchanges noted that the mergers had led to price increases, 
as well as refusals to take complaints seriously or make necessary technical upgrades. 
Higher prices, the exchanges argued, were not going to improvements of service, but 
rather to paying dividends on Western Union’s highly inflated stock.4  
CBOT’s concern over monopoly led them to endorse federal regulation of the 
telegraph in the early 1870s, and also to support the establishment of a state-run system 
of telegraphy. But they also sought to exert their own power directly. The Board’s 
                                                 
4 BDR, Box 7, Folder 5, Feb. 8, 1881 
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relationship with the telegraph company was symbiotic: exchanges relied on the 
telegraph to facilitate modern worldwide trade, and telegraph companies needed the 
volume provided by exchanges in order to be profitable. In the latter half of the 19th 
century, financial news and quotations traveling between the world’s exchanges made up 
the bulk of the information being sent by telegraph. CBOT used this need to their 
advantage, leveraging their status as the world’s leading grain market to exert significant 
pressure on Western Union.  
The first instance of CBOT pushing back against Western Union came in 1880, 
when several members, in conjunction with several Milwaukee businessmen, formed a 
new telegraph company that directly linked the grain exchanges in both cities, 
circumventing Western Union’s wires. The company—named the Chicago & Milwaukee 
Telegraph—was an unqualified success. The company’s Board of Directors was 
comprised entirely of Milwaukee and Chicago grain men; stock was non-transferable 
except by consent of this board, a fail-safe designed to keep Western Union from gaining 
financial control of the company, as they had with many other competitors. The cost of 
constructing the line was recouped within two years of operation, and the company 
earned 50% and 60% dividends in its first two years.5 Additionally, the competition they 
offered drove down Western Union’s prices. In 1880, at the time of the Chicago & 
Milwaukee’s founding, Western Union charged twenty-five cents for a ten word message 
between the cities; in the coming years, upon losing a good portion of their business, 
                                                 
5 “Cheap Telegraphing Pays,” Chicago Tribune, May 26, 1886, p.9 
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Western Union reduced their rates between the two cities first to fifteen, then to five cents 
per ten words.6  
 Following the success of this maneuver in Milwaukee, the Board attempted to make 
the same direct connection with the Merchant’s Exchange in St. Louis. Members of the 
Chicago and St. Louis exchanges, claiming that consolidation of telegraph companies had 
eliminated all competition along the route between their cities, chartered the Board of 
Trade Telegraph Company in December 1881 to directly link their buildings.7 By the end 
of November 1882, construction of the line was nearly complete: poles had been planted 
and wires hung from Chicago to East St. Louis, from which point the Company planned 
to lease space on the Baltimore & Ohio Company’s poles running into St. Louis proper.  
But Western Union, having learned the lesson of the Chicago & Milwaukee 
Telegraph Company, put up significant resistance to this final stage. They sent out gangs 
of armed men on several occasions to cut down the Board of Trade Company’s wires, 
finally having them camp at the site to prevent any repairs.8 When the Board of Trade 
telegraph sought redress in court, Western Union argued that the lines were cut because 
they were in violation of an agreement between the Baltimore & Ohio Company and the 
belt railroad that encircled St. Louis.9 Western Union impressed upon the Wiggins Ferry 
Company and Illinois & St. Louis Railroad Company, which together owned much of the 
land in the area, to take out injunctions against the Board of Trade Telegraph Company, 
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preventing them from running wires across their property.10 At this point, the fate of the 
Company moved to the courts. It suffered an early defeat when, in March 1883, a judge 
in St. Clair County Circuit Court declined to dissolve the injunction filed by the Illinois & 
St. Louis railroad.11 Adding to this, Western Union succeeded in having a suit moved 
from state to the Federal Court, lengthening the process for resolving the case.12 In 
February 1884, facing these legal setbacks and losing between $500 and $1,000 every 
day as their wires sat idle, the stockholders of the Board of Trade Telegraph Company 
conceded defeat—partially. While they did give up their plan to create an independent 
telegraph company, they still gave a long-term lease of their line to a new rival of 
Western Union, the Bankers’ & Merchants’ Telegraph Company of New York.13  
In the midst of this battle over the Board of Trade Telegraph Company, CBOT 
engaged Western Union on another front: the dissemination of quotations to bucket 
shops. On December 16, 1882, CBOT notified Western Union that they must cease 
furnishing quotations to bucket shops within two weeks or they would be kicked off of 
the floor of the Board and deprived of quotations altogether.14 This was CBOT’s first 
attempt to leverage the value of their quotations to influence Western Union’s policies on 
dissemination of information. Western Union rejected the proposed change, stating that 
its execution would be impracticable and would cost both them and the Board of Trade 
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business.15 When the two week mark came, CBOT did not follow through on their threat, 
but continued to used the possibility of cutting off quotations as a bargaining chip. 
However, their ability to use this chip was curtailed by an 1883 court ruling that forbid 
the Baltimore and Ohio Telegraph Company from withholding quotations from any 
paying customer, even a bucket shop. Western Union pointed to the injunction to claim 
that they faced legal reprisal for discriminating among recipients, as CBOT asked. Given 
the unfavorable legal environment, CBOT backed away from this position. But, as will be 
seen later in this chapter, it would return in a more favorable environment twenty years 
later. 
The final attempt to fight Western Union at this early period was the effort to 
create an exchange-owned line between Chicago and New York. Linking the two major 
financial centers of the United States, this would be the Holy Grail of telegraphic 
independence. In January 1881—at the same time as the Board of Trade Telegraph 
Company was attempting to link Chicago and St. Louis—two different groups, one 
centered in New York, the other in Chicago, began planning a telegraph that would 
connect their cities. The effort had the support of the most important exchanges in New 
York City. The presidents of the New York Produce Exchange, Cotton Exchange and 
Petroleum Exchange wrote a joint letter to several major exchanges across the country 
urging them to support this effort. The planned company would follow the template of 
the Chicago & Milwaukee Company, vesting voting power on over one-half of the stock 
in a Board of Trustees, a majority of whom would be presidents of commercial 
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exchanges.16 CBOT responded positively to this letter, appointing a committee to confer 
with committees from other exchanges on the matter. By October 1883, the New York 
Produce Exchange was ready to move forward on a plan to incorporate. It had discovered 
extant lines that ran from Weehawken, NJ, to 8 miles outside of Chicago, which the 
proposed company could appropriate for their own use. The cost of additional 
construction and operation were outlined, as well as the projected revenues. CBOT, 
however, declined to get involved. They offered little explanation, other than citing “the 
result of previous attempts of a like character,” likely a reference to the Board of Trade 
Telegraph Company, which, at the time, was losing money and mired in a prolonged 
legal battle with Western Union.17  
The history of CBOT’s early efforts to form independent telegraph companies or 
dictate policy to Western Union was thus mixed. The Chicago & Milwaukee Telegraph 
Company was an early success, but later efforts were stymied by lengthy legal battles and 
adverse court decisions. Despite this checkered history, the Board clearly established that 
they could credibly resist Western Union: the Chicago & Milwaukee Telegraph forced 
down prices; the sale of the Board of Trade Telegraph Company built up a new 
competitor. The threats of establishing independent telegraph lines and imposing 
restrictions on quotations remained viable negotiating strategies, to which CBOT would 
return in later years.  
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William T. Baker and the telegraphic blackout   
The early years of the Board’s fight for control of their quotations was against 
Western Union. The next phase took on the bucket shops directly. There were two 
components of the Board’s antipathy to bucket shops. One was economic: bucket shops 
drew away business that might otherwise have gone to the exchange. This diffusion of 
trading meant that Board prices aggregated less information, which decreased their 
authoritativeness. The second, more significant, piece of their opposition was that bucket 
shops impaired the legitimacy of the Board itself. Many bucket shop patrons thought that 
the shops and Board of Trade were affiliated, and thus blamed the Board when bucket 
shops acted unscrupulously. Others in the public hit upon the similarities between the two 
establishments to impugn the activities of the Board as nothing but gambling. Bucket 
shops precipitated and featured prominently in federal anti-futures legislation aimed at 
exchanges throughout the period of my research.  
The fight against bucket shops from 1883 to 1889 took place in a highly litigious 
and uncertain environment (Lurie 1979). Bucket shops sought out injunctions against the 
telegraph companies and the Board of Trade, seeking to preserve the flow of quotations, 
while the Board countered that their quotations were private property and could be 
disseminated in any way they saw fit. The lower courts were inconsistent in their 
decisions on these injunctions, and CBOT was not willing to make any substantial moves 
until a test case had been decided by a higher court. This case came in 1889 and the result 
was not favorable to the Board. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in the case of New York 
and Chicago Grain and Stock Exchange v. Chicago Board of Trade that the Board’s 
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price quotations were vested with a public interest, and thus could not be withheld from 
any groups without first proving the illegality of their business. Subsequent court 
decisions even struck down the Board’s attempts to impose more minor restrictions, such 
as distributing quotations only to Board members or replacing continuous quotations with 
transmissions at fifteen minute intervals. By the end of the 1880s, nearly a decade into 
the fight over price quotations, CBOT found themselves constrained by legal setbacks 
and with few options for controlling quotations.   
In January 1890, faced with this conundrum, the Board elected William Baker as 
president on a platform of all-out attack on bucket shops. Baker argued that the Board 
needed to keep continuous quotations from bucket shops at all costs. If the courts would 
not allow the board to supply quotations to legitimate traders while weeding out the 
bucket shops, then the only option was to cut off quotations to all parties. Baker’s 
“blackout” policy was enacted a few months later. On March 31, 1890, CBOT eliminated 
the department of market reports and ended the dissemination of continuous price 
quotations from the floor of the exchange. This policy excluded telegraph companies 
from the floor and restricted the timing of members’ private telegraphic correspondence, 
so that instantaneous and continuous quotations could not be made.18 It cut off the flow of 
quotations not only to bucket shops, but also to commission houses and exchanges 
around the world. It was a drastic policy, but one which the Board believed was made 
necessary by the danger of bucket shops and the unfavorable rulings of the court.  
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Baker’s policy faced numerous difficulties. Members, unable to speedily furnish 
their clients with information, were put at a disadvantage compared to traders on other 
exchanges.19 The policy also gave a significant advantage in speculation to traders from 
large commission houses that were equipped with a private telegraph wire. These traders 
could still receive continuous quotations from other markets, while those relying on the 
public wire received only periodic updates. Their constant updates allowed them to act on 
information that had not yet reached members by the public wire. Finally, most galling to 
Board members, continuous quotations were still making their way off the floor and to 
outside parties despite the ban. Board members went to extreme lengths to get quotations 
out: members formed pools to collect and disseminate quotations20; commission houses 
ran secret wires to bucket shops; traders stood by the windows and used hand signals to 
communicate with correspondents outside the building (Taylor 1917). Several Chicago 
bucket shops actually grew during the first year of the policy, and even bucket shops in 
Minneapolis and St. Louis were posting quotations.21 Board member Robert Lindblom, 
an outspoken critic of the plan who sued the Board for restricting his access to the 
telegraph, argued that the policy was a failure:  
It is well known that in New York, in Minneapolis, in St. Louis, in 
Chicago, any man who wishes to pay $1.00 a week can get every shade of 
quotation that is made on the Board of Trade. My own correspondents in 
New York who are not members of this Board have had these quotations 
for a years and a half, and have had this advantage over a member, that 
while he has had them I have been prohibited from receiving or 
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disseminating them.22 
The blackout policy was failing to achieve its aim, disadvantaging Board members and 
failing to achieve its primary goal. After two years, Baker was voted out of office and 
continuous quotations restored. For the remainder of the 1890s, the Board made no 
headway in their legal right to control quotations: private telegraph companies collected 
the quotations at their own expense, and distributed them freely for own their benefit.  
 
Control over quotations 
In 1899, the Board hired a new attorney, a young Wisconsin Law School graduate 
named Henry S. Robbins. Unlike his predecessor, who, for the previous eight years had 
“ever striven to keep the Board out of litigation” (Lurie 1979: 165), Robbins believed the 
time was right for the Board to take the offensive in litigation against bucket shops. He 
soon had the opportunity, when in February 1900 a prominent bucket shop, the Christie-
Street Commission Company, filed an injunction against the Board of Trade to prevent 
any cessation of market quotations. In arguing the case, Robbins actively sought to prove 
that the Christie company was doing an illegitimate business, a strategy that the Board’s 
prior attorney had thought unwise.  
As part of their new offensive strategy, in May 1900, while awaiting judgment in 
the Christie case, the Board announced that it would resume collecting quotations from 
the floor of the exchange, taking that task away from the telegraph companies (Lurie 
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1979). This was largely understood as a first step toward exerting greater control over 
quotations by inserting CBOT’s own agents in between the trading on the floor and the 
Western Union company.23 This step paid dividends when, on June 20th, the Christie case 
was decided in the Board’s favor, stating that the bucket shop did an illegal business and 
thus had no right to quotations from the Board of Trade. The following day, the Board 
notified Western Union that they would turn over price quotations for transmission only if 
the telegraph company agreed to limit their dissemination to approved recipients. As they 
had nearly twenty years before, Western Union rejected this proposal. But this time, in 
the more encouraging legal environment, CBOT actually followed through on their threat 
and, on August 1, stopped providing continuous quotations to Western Union. Instead 
they provided updates every five minutes, a significant decrease in business.24  
Over the next eight months, as Western Union continued to only get periodic 
price quotations, CBOT increased the pressure. They did this not through additional court 
victories, but by an older strategy: threatening to circumvent the company with exchange-
controlled competitors. In September 1900, CBOT signed with the Cleveland Telegraph 
Company to provide continuous ticker service in the city of Chicago. Their contract gave 
CBOT full control over who received their quotations: Cleveland submitted a statement 
to the Board every sixty days listing the names of persons who received continuous 
quotations, and the Board was given authority to cut off transmissions to any recipient 
they deemed illegitimate.25 In addition to contracting with the Cleveland Company for 
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local ticker distribution, CBOT revived the plan to build an independent line linking 
Chicago and New York. The Board, working through a group of New York businessmen, 
incorporated the Exchange Telegraph Company in October 1900, with the goal of linking 
Chicago not only to New York but also Peoria, Indianapolis, St. Louis, Omaha, Sioux 
City, Kansas City, Minneapolis, Duluth, Milwaukee, Toledo, Cincinnati, Detroit, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Boston, and Buffalo.26 The company projected that wires could 
be up and running in just over four years.   
 While these projections may have been overly optimistic in their details, the 
threat to Western Union was still meaningful. They were already losing money from the 
lack of continuous quotations and confronting the possibility of further pro-CBOT court 
rulings, and now faced the possibility of a significant, exchange-controlled competitor. As 
a result, Western Union signed a contract that made serious concessions to the Board. 
Prior to CBOT taking control of collecting quotations in August, Western Union had paid 
$6,000 a year for continuous quotations, with no restrictions on their distribution, 
servicing offices in Chicago and beyond. In March, when they finally signed a new 
contract for continuous distribution, they were paying $30,000 a year, had agreed to 
furnish quotations only to Board-approved recipients27, and given Cleveland Telegraph 
Company exclusive rights to distribute quotations inside the city of Chicago.28 When 
Western Union returned to the floor of the exchange on April 1, it was under conditions 
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crafted by the Board to ensure their complete control over price quotations.29  
The 1905 U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the appeal of Christie, which upheld 
CBOT’s right to control its quotations, settled all quotation-related legal questions in 
favor of the Board. Following this ruling, CBOT kept its quotations under close control. 
Primarily, this meant cutting off quotations from bucket shops, which withered away. By 
1917, for the first time in nearly forty years, there were no bucket shops in operation 
anywhere in the country.30 But the Board also used its newly established property right to 
keep quotations away from a second less noxious, but still problematic, group: small 
speculators in country towns. Experience with proposed federal legislation in 1890 and 
1891 had shown the Board that speculative losses by farmers and country traders 
provided ample fodder for denunciations of the Board of Trade. Seeking to head of 
hostile legislation, the Board, in March 1911, cut off quotations to recipients in towns 
with less than 10,000 inhabitants; in 1918, the cut-off was raised to 25,000.31 Parties in 
cities that did not meet this mark could apply for an exemption to the rule, but had to 
guarantee that quotations would not be made public, and would only be for private use.32 
This policy aimed not only to forestall anti-futures legislation, but also to maintain the 
credibility of the Board’s past legal arguments. President Frank Bunch, in his 1912 
address to the Board made this connection: 
It took ten years or more of ceaseless work in the courts and the 
expenditure of many thousands of dollars to obtain our present position, 
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where we have absolute and unlimited control of our quotations. The 
strength and justice of our claims were only realized by the courts when 
we showed that the quotations were not distributed indiscriminately 
among the public but were at all times subject to our control. It therefore 
behooves all of us to guard with the greatest care the dissemination of 
these quotations in order that, if legal complications shall arise again in the 
future, we can sustain our identical position, as we did in the past and are 
doing at the present time.33  
Since CBOT had won the right to control its quotations, they bore responsibility for the 
dissemination of those quotations. The legal path that they took to defeating bucket shops 
pushed them toward an even broader conservatism in disseminating quotations than they 
had initially pursued.   
 CBOT’s varying policies on price quotations were responses to the needs of their 
battles against the monopoly of Western Union and growth of bucket shops. Their power 
in fighting both came not just from victories in the courts, but from their ability to 
effectively pressure Western Union using both the threat of creating alternate, exchange-
controlled telegraph companies and the value of their quotations as bargaining chips. The 
animating argument behind these policies was the belief that price quotations were 
private goods that could be controlled or withheld as desired. Below, we will see how this 
belief pervaded CBOT’s perspective on information more generally, including their ideas 
about crop statistics.  
 
Conflicting and unreliable crop statistics 
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 CBOT did not give much attention to the task of providing members with statistics 
on the growth, movement and consumption of grain. The Board did not gather any 
statistics itself, and simply passed on statistics from government and private sources with 
no effort to vet them for accuracy. Information was often highly general or unreliable. 
This is, of course, not to say that no one on the Board operated with good information. 
But CBOT as an organization did nothing to encourage the creation or gathering of this 
information. Good crop statistics—like price quotations—were private goods to be 
acquired and utilized by individual members, rather than public goods provided by the 
Board. This created an environment where the statistics provided to members could not 
serve as the basis for any rational, long-term prognoses of the market. As the Chicago 
Tribune, echoing a refrain among traders, stated: on CBOT, “the man who trades on 
statistics is on the highway to ruin.”34  
CBOT began producing weekly statements on the movement of grain through the 
city in the 1860s. But these statistics were too general to tell traders anything about the 
supply of wheat in the city. The report gave total amounts of wheat, corn, soybeans, and 
other commodities going into and out of warehouses, but did not distinguish these 
amounts by grade.35 Since contracts were made for one particular grade only, this general 
information was of limited use. Similarly, in records of the movement of wheat, no 
distinction was made between wheat that was actually warehoused in the city and that 
which simply passed through the city, or was sold in the city but shipped from another 
location, such as Milwaukee (Taylor 1917). This made it difficult to know how much 
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wheat was actually in the city’s warehouses. It was not until 1886 that the Board moved 
from this omnibus method of keeping accounts to a “more enlightening system of book-
keeping” that included these relevant distinctions.36  
Comparative, multi-city data on the movement and price of wheat came even 
more slowly. In 1909, the Federal Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Statistics 
complained that they were unable to make accurate national monthly reports of grain 
receipts and shipments because there was no uniformity in the book-keeping methods 
utilized by the country’s exchanges.37 In 1910, the Council of North American Grain 
Exchanges complained that the trade lacked a daily market report that would compare 
price information across multiple exchanges.38 Traders on CBOT, and others in the wheat 
trade, were unable to gain a complete picture of the movement, consumption, or price of 
wheat across the country.  
 While statistics on the extent of the growing crop were more plentiful than those 
tracking its movement, they were still of dubious value (Pietruska 2012). The United 
States Department of Agriculture’s Division of Statistics began publishing monthly crop 
reports in 1863. The USDA compiled their statistics using reports from hundreds of 
thousands of correspondents submitting from across the country.39 Each correspondent 
reported on the area planted, the condition of the crop, and its yield per acre for a 
particular assigned area. These reports were not numerical measurements, but rather 
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estimates of the forthcoming crop in relation to the previous year’s crop. Correspondents 
reported their estimate as a percentage: taking the previous year’s crop as equal to 100, 
they would assess whether the crop was, for example, 10% less (reported as “90”), 10% 
more (reported as “110”), or any other value. These returns were then weighted and 
converted into a statewide percentage.  
 Though one could certainly find fault in this method of estimation, the real source of 
error came in how the USDA converted these percentages into quantities. To do so, 
USDA statisticians made calculations using crop data from the most recent decennial 
census. The problem with this method was that figures became progressively less 
accurate the further one moved from the date of the census. Any errors in estimation were 
compounded when they served as the basis for the following year’s estimates, and so on 
(Willis 1902). The USDA’s chief crop statistician admitted in September 1886 that, as a 
result of this system, their current estimates of the growing crop were probably about 
10% too,” low.40 Despite this awareness, and pledges to fix these shortcomings, 
government crop reporting remained inaccurate for decades.41 In 1912, according to 
CBOT’s board of directors, government crop reports were still prone to “significant 
error” and “radical correction.”42 
Further complicating the value of the USDA’s data was the fact that their figures 
did not always match those produced by other government agencies. Many state 
Agriculture Boards made up their own statistics, which could diverge remarkably from 
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the USDA’s.43 For example, in May 1888, the USDA reported that about 776,300 acres 
of winter wheat was growing in Kansas, while the Kansas Board of Agriculture put the 
figure at 1,210,500 acres, over 50% higher.44 Additionally, USDA’s figures did not 
always match those provided by the Census Bureau. In 1902, the two departments 
entered into a protracted debate over the significant divergence in their numbers, leading 
a contemporary observer to remark in The Journal of Political Economy that the USDA’s 
numbers “[were] and perhaps under existing circumstances must necessarily be, so wide 
of the real facts of the case as to be practically worthless as a guide to traders and 
speculators” (Willis 1902).  
In addition, correspondents were known to underreport their harvests or refuse to 
return forms. This was often done on the advice of local organizations which taught that 
publicizing crop figures depressed prices in foreign markets.45 This attitude was not just 
found among farmers. An 1886 CBOT committee appointed to examine the financial 
state of the Board expressed a desire to keep production statistics close to the vest, stating 
that “the benefits derived from this constant advertising of our stocks are considered by 
some members doubtful.”46 This skepticism was even found in high federal offices. In 
May 1894, Secretary of Agriculture J. Sterling Morton claimed that crop statistics exerted 
a depressing influence in foreign markets by building up the expectation of great crops, 
and should thus be eliminated.47  
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All of these features made government figures poor guides to the crop situation. 
This information void created a demand for data that was met by independent statisticians 
and market prognosticators, who publicized their findings in circulars distributed by 
private commission houses. These reports mixed scattered statistical information with a 
healthy dose of gut feeling and estimation; unsurprisingly, they varied greatly. The 
Chicago Tribune, as early as 1887, was denouncing the reports of these “private-wire 
oracles,” saying that, “No two of them ever agree upon a prophecy—indeed they rarely 
agree upon statements of fact—and again no one of them yet was ever known to advise 
his Chicago correspondents and their customers to keep quiet and await events.”48 
Despite their inaccuracies, these reports continued to have a central role in the grain 
trade. A 1918 letter from commission merchant and prominent Board member C.H. 
Canby expressed frustration with the very same problem mentioned by the Tribune 
twenty years earlier:  
I would also call attention to the situation surrounding some of our 
commercial news reporters who make a specialty of so weaving together 
different disconnected threads in the situation covering all kinds of 
theories in regard to car supply, the crop position, and movement, as to 
bring about exactly the kind of speculative excitement, or undue unrest, in 
the minds of the trade which, when apparently supported by the reputation 
of a leading newspaper, gives it an importance unwarranted, and in many 
instances totally misleading. It would occur to me that our commercial 
reporters should be limited strictly and entirely to the collection of 
commercial statistics, including receipts, shipments and prices, and be 
entirely prohibited from indulging in theoretical forecasts and opinions 
which are put together for the sole purpose of attempting to forecast the 
future action of the market. One missing link in these alleged statements 
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of fact destroys their entire argument and renders these articles not only 
inaccurate, but misleading and harmful.49 
Board members agreed with Canby, and, a few days after receiving the above letter, 
adopted a measure stating that the Board would only publicize reports from crop experts 
who had registered with the Board of Trade.50 But for the first fifty years of futures 
trading on CBOT, this effort to exert any organizational authority over crop reports was 
entirely absent.  
 CBOT members thus lacked a reliable, shared body of information about growing 
crops and world markets. In place of accurate statistics, CBOT members had unreliable 
forecasts, hearsay, and misinformation. Statistics from independent commission houses 
produced more heat than light; attempts by the federal government and umbrella 
organizations such as the North American Grain Dealer's Association were plagued by 
inconsistent reporting and suspect methodologies. Information was a resource to be 
acquired independently and used for personal gain, not a public good for the benefit of 
the Board. Thus, rather than serving as a stabilizing point for the market, crop statistics 
simply became fodder for additional speculation.  
 
The New Orleans Cotton Exchange 
NOCE’s position on gathering and dissemination of information stood in stark 
contrast to CBOT’s. This was seen, in part, in the previous chapter’s discussion of the 
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departments of Supervision and Inspection, which produced vast amounts of information 
regarding the minutest details of daily cotton receipts, shipments and stocks during its 
tenure in the city.51 This same hunger for information was found in the Exchange’s 
policies on crop statistics and price quotations. The organization sought independence 
and stature by becoming an informational hub and providing members the data needed to 
make extensive market calculations. 
 
Information and the founding of the Exchange 
 When telling the story of information gathering on NOCE, one must begin with the 
person of Henry Hester. Hester was the first Secretary of the Exchange, a position he held 
continuously for sixty-one years, practically up to his death in 1934. He exerted a 
foundational influence on NOCE. At the Exchange’s founding, Hester was a 24-year old 
journalist covering cotton and financial markets for the New Orleans Price Current. He 
was offered the job of secretary directly by E.H. Summers, one of the eighteen founders 
of the Exchange and its first president, on the strength of his reporting on world cotton 
markets. Hester accepted on the condition that he would be given a wide berth in 
planning the workings of the Exchange.  
With this broad authority, he set out “to make the South the authority for facts 
concerning the growth and distribution of its great staple, cotton.”52  Hester’s work began 
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immediately. At its first meeting, the Exchange accomplished two things: found quarters 
to rent and appointed a Committee on Information and Statistics (CIS). In 1871 and 1872, 
the first two years of the Exchange, “market information” made up half of the budget 
(Boyle 1934). Prior to this time, information on stocks of cotton in the U.S. and around 
the world, as well as quotations from foreign markets, came to New Orleans from sources 
in New York and Liverpool. Traders feared that these reports were manipulated by those 
seeking lower prices, and kept New Orleans a second-tier market (Bouilly 1976). Hester 
argued that NOCE could protect itself from manipulation and empower members to form 
their own opinions on the market by building up their own statistical infrastructure rather 
than simply following New York’s lead. The CIS, writing in 1890, spoke to this point: 
The custom of awaiting the effect of important events upon the New York 
market, and following in the wake of the latter, is false, both in principle 
and in fact; but, unless we are as well, if not better, posted than New York 
upon current events, there is no alternative but for this market to remain in 
leading strings.53 
Expanding the scope of general information in order not to be in thrall to New York and 
foreign market centers was a general theme and goal of NOCE, particularly the CIS.54  
The thought among members of the CIS was that greater quantities of information 
would help members to “act more intelligently.”55 This hope of instilling rational, 
intelligent, and independent analysis of the market was a persistent feature of Hester’s 
tenure. There is some evidence that this rational orientation took among the membership. 
Soon after the Exchange’s founding, CIS committee chair Harrison Watts found that 
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early data-gathering efforts had awakened among NOCE members “a thirst for 
information heretofore considered valueless,” and fostered “more enlightened relations 
between the producer and consumer.”56 This faith in the ability of statistical analysis to 
sway traders remained central to the Exchange as an organization, exemplified by two 
cases, from 1920 and 1926, when Hester was asked to prepare statements on the cotton 
markets in response to rapidly declining prices.57 For these purposes he produced detailed 
statistical pictures drawing on a wide variety of figures—including carryover from the 
past year, government estimate of the growing crop, miscellaneous other sources of 
cotton (linter crop and city crop), probable takings of American mills, probable future 
carryover, comparisons to past years totals and prices, past years’ consumption totals, 
historical price trends, and prices of cotton from other regions—to show that the panics 
lacked any grounding in the facts. In both cases, Hester’s statistically-based assurances 
stemmed the fall of prices and restored confidence among sellers.58  
 
Crop statistics 
NOCE’s most significant infrastructure-building project was the creation of a 
system for gathering statistics on the growth and movement of the U.S. cotton crop.59 
Prior to the founding of the Exchange in 1871, this information had been provided by 
estimates from country presses and travelers. The new system created by the CIS sought 
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59 V, Box 72, Folder 8, May 24, 1871 
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to gather this information systematically by sending monthly surveys to informants in 
different cotton-producing regions. Members sent circulars to their correspondents who 
were responsible for reporting on acreage planted, weather conditions, and progress of 
the growing crop for carefully demarcated regions (Ellis 1973). The CIS noted that the 
first full year of crop reporting saw “a fair degree of success.” While the system could 
undoubtedly be improved, it was at least gathering information that had previously been 
uncollected.60  
The qualified success of the crop reports in their first two years led the National 
Cotton Exchange (NCE), in September 1874, to take over the production of reports and 
scale up the practice to the country as a whole. Under the control of the National 
Exchange, the process continued largely as it had in New Orleans: NCE split the cotton-
growing regions of the U.S. into multiple sections, which they then allotted to each of 
their member exchanges. Each exchange was in charge of sending their correspondents 
each month during the growing season a “uniform series of interrogatories … relative to 
planting, the condition, cultivation and gathering of the cotton crops.”61 These reports 
were then sent on for compilation by NOCE’s CIS, acting as the Central Committee on 
Information and Statistics for the NCE and keeping Hester in a central position at the 
national organization.62 NOCE, working now as a functionary of the National Exchange, 
continued to make progress in their methods of gathering information. In their 1876 
annual report, the CIS claimed that they were receiving more replies covering a larger 
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area every month; in 1877, they established and disseminated to other exchanges a 
uniform series of questions for use in obtaining information for monthly crop reports.63 
But the crop reporting system was not without its flaws. NCE member bodies 
were having difficulty getting accurate and commensurable data for their crop and 
acreage reports. For some years, each exchange produced its own questionnaire, which 
made comparisons difficult. Even once questionnaires were standardized, NCE found that 
correspondents still interpreted questions differently. This problem was compounded by 
NCE’s requirement that member exchanges merely compile responses as received, 
exercising no discretion as to acceptance or rejection of answers.64 In addition to 
commensurability problems, NCE’s system suffered the same problem as the USDA’s in 
using the decennial census as a baseline for estimating later years’ figures. The further it 
got from 1870, the less accurate the estimates.65 By 1879, even getting data from about 
400 respondents for its region, NOCE claimed that it could not make any “predictions” 
about the cotton crop but only present “an intelligent general view of the crop 
prospects.”66 In 1882, citing persistent inaccuracies, NCE discontinued compiling 
monthly reports of crop and acreage.67  
But this cancellation did not last long. The experience of the previous years’ 
reports, even with their problems, had awakened cotton dealers to the potential value of 
detailed crop statistics, and in 1884, after two years of advocacy from NOCE, the 
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National Exchange reinstated the Monthly Crop and Acreage Report. The Exchange 
added correspondents and implemented methodological changes that produced much 
improved numbers in its very first full year.68 In 1887, upon the dissolution of the NCE, 
the publication of crop reports and statistical data was taken over by The Cotton World, 
the weekly newspaper edited by Henry Hester in New Orleans. Under Cotton World’s 
stewardship, the enterprise grew, expanding to include weekly reports of the progress of 
cotton during the growing and picking seasons, monthly statistical statements of crop 
movements overland and to the seaboard, and an annual statement of the cotton crop of 
the United States, including reports of the cotton consumption of America.69 NOCE 
continued to devote significant resources towards gathering statistical information, 
sometimes to the incomprehension of other exchanges. Writing in 1889, following the 
introduction of weekly statistics on movement of cotton, the Committee on Information 
and Statistics, said:  
Our weekly reports seem not yet to be fully understood abroad, as other 
centres [sic] do not see how a work that was supposed to be so difficult to 
handle monthly can be done weekly. The trade wants news and facts, 
however, and as the ‘weekly’ is anticipating all the salient facts by 
monthly statements put forth elsewhere, the results are easy to anticipate.70  
By the end of the decade, NOCE was reporting more data with greater accuracy than ever 
before. Hester’s statistical work put New Orleans in a position “to furnish the world with 
the only reliable statistics of the cotton movement.”71   
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By 1890, Hester’s system was comprehensive. Each week, his report presented a 
massive amount of information: the movement of cotton at 102 interior towns, as well as 
historical statistics (listing figures for this week, this year, and last year) on movement 
into sight, visible cotton, spinner's takings, exports, stocks, and prices, as well as 
statements of mill takings, receipts, and stocks from Liverpool and Bremen.72 Hester’s 
annual statement in 1890 also was a milestone. His team of statisticians gathered reliable 
data from every delivery point, each point of crossing on the Ohio, Mississippi and 
Potomac rivers, and from all the mills in the South, obviating the need to guess or 
estimate a single detail of the entire statement.73 The report won praise and respect from 
the world’s cotton markets. By the turn of the century, no man in the cotton world would 
think of doing business without a weekly Hester’s Report, “any more than the captain of 
a ship would think of sailing from port without chart and compass and sextant.”74 
NOCE, through the construction of this impressive statistical machinery, had 
achieved the autonomy it sought thirty years before. President A. Brittin, speaking in 
1903, expressed the new powerful position their market occupied:  
Last year’s business shows beyond question that New Orleans is no longer 
in leading strings, and that while the changes and variations in other great 
market have more or less influence with us as ours have with them, it has 
come to pass that where conditions justify, this market takes the lead and 
acts independently upon its own views of the legitimate effects of supply 
and demand, or other causes which may affect values. In brief, the people 
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of the Cotton States have learned to appreciate the commanding position 
they hold in the cotton world and at last to think and act for themselves.75  
NOCE became, through the labor of Henry Hester, a center of calculation producing 
invaluable information for cotton traders (Latour 1987). While exchanges on New York 
and Liverpool remained larger in terms of the volume of trading, New Orleans 
maintained its market share as well as its status through the provision of crop statistics 
that allowed for wide-ranging and far-seeing calculation. 
 
The flow of telegraphic information 
Though NOCE created an impressive infrastructure for gathering and 
disseminating crop statistics, their efforts at securing reliable, speedy telegraph service 
was less successful. In large part, this was due to the poor state of telegraphy in the South 
following the Civil War (Thompson 1972). At the onset of war, lines extending from 
north to south across the Mason-Dixon line had been cut, and as the war continued much 
of telegraphic property in the South was destroyed. Companies serving the South barely 
had enough business during the war to stay afloat, and certainly not enough to repair 
damaged lines or expand coverage. After the war, the American Telegraph Company, 
which offered the main route to the north seemed to be making a recovery. They 
absorbed two other companies serving New Orleans—the Southwestern Telegraph 
Company and the Washington & New Orleans Telegraph Company—and made plans to 
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invest half a million dollars in repairs of their lines. These plans, however, were scrapped 
in 1866, when the American was absorbed by Western Union. Having won a monopoly 
over the north-south route, Western Union subsequently did little to rebuild or expand 
southern lines.  
As a result, telegraph service in the South lagged behind that in the north. 
Particularly critical for traders was the discrepancy in speed of transmission. As NOCE’s 
Telegraph Committee recognized, “modern methods of transacting business count 
minutes and even seconds where hours and half hours only were formerly considered.”76 
Shaving off these minutes and seconds remained a challenge for NOCE for over forty 
years. The most persistent problem related to the telegraph was the presence of “beats,” 
instances where messages and price quotations reached commission houses along private 
wires faster than the same information came to the Exchange over public lines. As a 
result of this time differential, members associated with private houses had a chance to 
act on information before it became common knowledge, giving them a significant 
advantage in the market. Beats were noted in NOCE’s annual report as early as 1883, but 
became a persistent concern starting a few years later.77 In 1888 and 1889 there were 
complaints of multiple beats on fluctuations coming from New York.78 These complaints 
were made, with some variation from year to year, throughout the next decade: in 1906, 
the Telegraph Committee of NOCE complained that beats were “a matter of daily, almost 
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hourly, occurrence”; in 1910, they were still bemoaning the “wretched quotations 
service” with New York and Liverpool.79  
The primary source of beats was the technical limitations of the public telegraph 
system itself.80 During busy times messages would take longer to transmit. This led to 
serious delays at the opening of the market and at periods of large fluctuations, precisely 
when speedy service was most needed.81 One possible solution to the problem of beats 
would have been to create a direct line between the New Orleans and New York 
exchanges, as CBOT had done with the Milwaukee Exchange. NOCE and NYCE both 
expressed interest in this idea and discussed its feasibility in 1904.82 But, as with CBOT’s 
efforts to connect directly to New York, NOCE determined that the cost of a direct line 
was too great. The Board of Directors resigned itself to the fact that NOCE simply could 
not compete with private commission houses that spent hundreds of thousands of dollars 
on telegraphing each year.83 Once they had given up on creating a new line, all NOCE 
could do was harangue Western Union and hope for improvements in service. These 
efforts did little but frustrate Exchange leaders. Writing in 1908, after two decades of 
pushing Western Union for improvements, the CIS admitted that their arguments had, 
“been gone over so often with the telegraph officials with no appreciable result, that [they 
were] at loss what further to do.”84  
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Another source of beats was not technical, but procedural, and regarded the rules 
governing transmission between NYCE and NOCE. Some of these rules gave a 
significant advantage to private wire houses. One such rule, which NOCE first became 
aware of in 1896, was NYCE’s so-called “ten-minute rule.” This rule allowed a member 
to withhold reporting a trade in futures to the Exchange for ten minutes. During this time, 
they would privately wire news of the trade to their constituents in New Orleans, who 
would get the jump on other members.85 A second procedural problem was that NYCE 
only transmitted sales—not offers and bids—to NOCE over the public wire. Private 
commission houses, though, did receive offers and bids. This let them see the movements 
of the market at a finer grain, sussing out trends early. A trader who relied on the public 
wire, complaining of this arrangement, gave the following example: 
Some days since a certain month was quoted at 10:30 A.M. in New York, 
11 cents; by 10:31, it was offered at 10.99; then at ’98, ’97, ’96, and ‘95 
successively; but because there were no sales we did not get a quotation 
until 10:33, when a transaction was made at 10.95. The successive offers 
of ’99 to ’95 were known through private resources, but the Exchange was 
without information because it had to wait until an actual sale.86  
Thus, it was not just the technical relation with Western Union that influenced the speedy 
gathering of price quotations. Even when telegraph wires were in perfect working order 
the organizational relations with NYCE posed another obstacle.  
Addressing these problems with NYCE, while not as intractable as the technical 
issues with Western Union, involved their own challenges. Convincing New York to alter 
their rules for the benefit of New Orleans took work, and changes only happened slowly. 
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It took three years of lobbying to get NYCE to change the ten-minute rule; the effort to 
get NYCE to report all bids and offers took over a year to be implemented. In general, 
any request from New Orleans had to be made compatible with, or at least not onerous to, 
existing practices on NYCE, or it would simply not get done.87    
In addition to establishing a fast, reliable connection with traders in northern and 
European financial centers, NOCE also needed to attract traders from the Southern 
interior to place their trades in New Orleans, rather than New York. Establishing a strong 
telegraphic connection was the first step in winning this business. In fact, some of the 
difficulty NOCE faced in establishing their futures market stemmed from their inability 
to secure satisfactory telegraphic communication with interior points, which led traders 
interested in futures to do their business on the NYCE.88 The need to win this business 
led NOCE to adopt a liberal policy respecting dissemination of their quotations. In 1883, 
the CIS recommended a vast increase in dispatches to the interior: 
Under present arrangements with the Western Union Telegraph Company, 
some forty interior towns are now served three times daily with quotations 
of our future market. Would it not be in the long run true economy if this 
service were doubled as regards the number of points to which the 
information is communicated.89 
So convinced was NOCE of the necessity of sending quotations to the interior that it did 
so even though interior points reimbursed less than half of its total outlay.90  
                                                 
87 AR, 1907 
88 AR, 1882 
89 AR, 1883:38 
90 AR, 1884 
143 
 
 
 Despite connecting with interior points through wide dissemination of their 
quotations, NOCE still found that their antiquated telegraph facilities were driving away 
business.91 New York simply offered a faster connection, and thus, a safer market. The 
CIS noted in 1904 that from many points in the South, it took fifteen minutes for a 
message to travel to and from New York, whereas the time to and from New Orleans was 
three or four-fold greater.92 Six years later, the discrepancy in speed was exactly the 
same.93 Not only did this mean that New Orleans saw hedges and speculative trades 
going to New York, but it also precluded an entire class of trades from taking place on 
the New Orleans market. If telegraph service were faster, the Committee claimed, it 
would open up the opportunity for a “straddle” business, where traders could arbitrage 
price discrepancies with New York.94  
 NOCE continually struggled to obtain fast, reliable telegraph service. While they 
were able to build an impressive statistical infrastructure, their position as a secondary 
market to New York had a significant effect on their telegraphic infrastructure. They 
simply did not have the stature to force the hand of the New York Cotton Exchange or 
the various telegraph companies. As a result, they were never able to attract orders from a 
broad enough area to compete with NYCE in terms of volume. These telegraphic issues 
served to circumscribe the New Orleans market, particularly hurting the speculative 
business that thrived on the speedy transmission of information.   
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Conclusion  
 The analysis above reveals a stark contrast between the methods of gathering and 
disseminating information on the Chicago Board of Trade and the New Orleans Cotton 
Exchange. These divergent approaches emerged in response to distinct political, cultural 
and economic factors on each exchange, and had particular consequences for the types of 
trading found on their futures markets.  
CBOT’s battles with Western Union and the bucket shops led them to consider 
information as a private good. This position was central to their battles in court, where 
they sought the legal right to control the dissemination of price quotations. But this 
perspective also spread beyond the legal sphere into other areas of Board policy. For 
example, the Board did little to promote accurate public information, choosing instead to 
publicize unreliable government and private crop reports, with the warning of caveat 
emptor to members. Directors also put into place policies, like the blackout policy in 
1890 and the switch from continuous quotations to updates every five minutes in 1900, 
that hurt those traders relying on public wires while enriching those using private wires. 
CBOT’s battle with Western Union was purely over the transmission of information: they 
wanted information coming in to be fast and cheap, and information going out to be 
carefully controlled. The quality of that information and the equitable receipt of 
information among members were not express concerns.  
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On NOCE, information was conceived of as a public good. From its founding, 
NOCE sought to make available for its members vast quantities of information, with the 
goal of making New Orleans the world’s authority on the cotton trade. This policy drew 
upon the significance of cotton as an economic and cultural product, and the perceived 
indignity of relying on northern and foreign financial centers for crop statistics. Henry 
Hester’s skill as a statistician, and NOCE’s active cooperation with other exchanges, 
mills, and railroads made NOCE an informational hub and center of calculation for the 
cotton trade. While the public character of information was realized in the collection of 
crop statistics, it was undercut by poor telegraphic service, where slow transmission times 
to NOCE divided traders based on their access to private wires. NOCE, being the smaller 
of the two main American cotton exchanges, lacked the power to force the telegraph 
companies to make technical changes that would have ameliorated these problems.   
These differences created divergent information environments on the two 
markets. In terms of crop statistics, NOCE clearly had a more reliable system in place. It 
devoted significant resources to gathering crop information and forming partnerships 
with other cotton exchanges across the United States. CBOT, on the other hand, was not 
involved in the collection of crop data, nor did it make efforts to harmonize with other 
centers of the grain trade. The picture on price quotations was less clear cut, particularly 
for CBOT. The Board was eventually able to exert control over its quotations, which 
increased their value and their ability to authoritatively convey information about short-
term trends. It also was able to force Western Union into providing reliable, fast 
telegraphic service. However, it achieved both of these ends using drastic measures 
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which at least temporarily exacerbated differences between traders with access to private 
wires and those who relied on the public transmission. The situation on NOCE was more 
straightforward. Telegraphic service was always poor, leading to a significant division 
based on access to private wires. Also the Exchange’s price quotations remained less 
important than New York’s for traders around the country.  
These differences provided the conditions of possibility within which divergent 
types of trades and strategies could arise. On CBOT, the lack of accurate, shared 
information made long-term planning and statistical analysis difficult. Given this 
difficulty and the volume of trading enabled by the reliable—if occasionally lessened or 
eliminated—telegraphic service to CBOT, short-term trends were more visible and a 
better source of information for traders. The information being gathered and disseminated 
on CBOT thus encouraged speculation based on the minute-to-minute movement of 
prices. On NOCE, the combination of widely disseminated, highly regarded statistical 
information and slow, two-tiered telegraphic service pushed traders in the opposite 
direction. Trading on momentary price misalignments was difficult, as the speed of the 
telegraph meant that members were often running just behind other traders. Yet, the mass 
of statistical data commonly disseminated to all members enabled and promoted clear-
eyed analyses of long-term market trends. Traders on NOCE would thus be more likely 
to engage in long-term calculation than short-term speculation.   
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 The differences in the methods of gathering and disseminating information explored 
in this chapter created distinctions in the raw information with which traders worked on 
these markets. But this raw information still needed to be situated within a framework for 
understanding what effect futures trading had in the economy. Information would allow 
traders to act, but would not give their actions value, purpose, or legitimacy. This 
required a separate process of economic and cultural meaning-making on each exchange. 
This is the topic to which we now turn.  
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Chapter 5 – Theorizing Futures 
 
Both exchanges faced challenges regarding economic and cultural value of 
speculation. To the public and many elected representatives, the vast speculative business 
seemed to be little more than gambling, utterly disconnected from the production and 
consumption of physical goods. Detractors pointed to the discrepancy between actual 
commodities marketed and futures traded as evidence of this disconnect. For instance, in 
1875, the Chicago Tribune estimated trades in grain futures to be ten times greater than 
the cash business, a chasm that seemed inexplicable to many.1 Additionally, many found 
the practice of short selling—where a speculator contracted to sell a commodity in the 
future, hoping to profit from a decline in prices below the contracted level—to be 
particularly objectionable. Many viewed “bears” with suspicion, believing them to be 
engaged in machinations to keep prices artificially low. The downward pressure that 
shorts exerted on the market was particularly odious because they almost never 
exchanged actual physical goods as a result of their contract: sellers almost always 
entered into contracts to sell commodities that they did not own and never intended to 
own. To critics, this was just another way in which futures speculation transformed the 
reality of staple crops into mere fictions in a speculative game (Fabian 1990).  
CBOT and NOCE defended speculation in futures and short selling in terms that 
were similar in several respects. Both broadly defined speculation as taking on a risk 
stemming from the uncertainty of price movements. Such uncertainty could not be 
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eliminated from the market entirely, but it could be borne by different parties. 
Speculators took on the burden of risk, in exchange for the opportunity to profit from that 
risk.2 Speculation was a specialized way of efficiently managing natural market risk. 
Both exchanges also argued that futures markets benefited producers and consumers in 
spot markets. Speculation on futures markets created a constant demand for goods, a 
high-volume, year-round market which enabled agriculturalists to sell commodities 
independent of a “strictly consumptive demand.”3 This eliminated the disruptive seasonal 
price cycles that had characterized agricultural marketing up to that point.4 Futures 
markets also could be used to insure a spot market position, by hedging. This enabled the 
marketing of grain with less expense and a smaller intervening margin of profit than 
under previous marketing systems.5 Futures markets, and the system of speculation, were 
defended by CBOT president Hiram Sager as a “natural and legitimate outgrowth of the 
great system that has been perfected for the marketing of our crops.”6 These defenses of 
futures markets and speculation, as well as their relation to agrarian movements and court 
cases, have been covered in a great deal of scholarly work (Cowing 1965; Cronon 1991; 
de Goede 2005; Fabian 1999; Ferris 1988; Goldstein 1928; Levy 2006).7  
But beyond these similarities, there were several significant differences in how 
the exchanges understood the economic function and cultural legitimacy of futures 
trading. Futures were not simply understood to be valuable because they generated 
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150 
 
 
demand and evened out price fluctuations: both exchanges made other arguments 
uniquely shaped by the local and state-level economic, political, and cultural 
environment.   
The argument of the chapter, in brief, is this: On CBOT, the legitimacy of futures 
were constructed largely in opposition to the non-legitimacy of a closely related 
derivative instrument, options (also known as “privileges” or “puts and calls”). This 
served two purposes. First, it was politically valuable as a method for distinguishing the 
Board from both bucket shops and the rival Chicago Open Board of Trade. Both 
distinctions were critical to forestalling proposed state and federal anti-futures regulation. 
Second, it served to establish the economic value of speculation among Board members. 
Members argued that options created dull markets, while futures stimulated speculation 
and market vitality. On NOCE, the legitimacy of futures derived from their ability to 
impact the spot market and their capacity to increase Southern autonomy. The distinct 
socio-economic environment in New Orleans at the adoption of futures trading, the 
cultural significance of cotton, and federal efforts to impose cotton-specific regulations 
all contributed to this particular understanding. These differences between major 19th 
century markets illustrate that theorization of futures was a contingent, local process with 
wide variability. It was only later, through the institutional alignment imposed by the 
Supreme Court and federal government, that these differences began to disappear.  
 
The Chicago Board of Trade: The problem of options 
In Chapter 3, we saw that futures trading developed in tandem with the spot 
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market on CBOT. This chapter examines another key simultaneous development: the 
growth of trading in options alongside of futures. Options, also known as privileges or 
puts and calls, were similar to futures in that they were contracts for a future transaction, 
at a particular price for a particular good. But there was a significant difference between 
the two instruments. While futures contracts compelled the contracting parties to 
exchange goods or warehouse receipts at a particular date, options gave one party—either 
the buyer or seller—the ability to decide whether or not to make the transaction at the 
contract’s call date. If that party stood to lose money by consummating the deal, they 
would simply not exercise the option, calling off the transaction. For instance, a trader 
who, at the end of the day, saw #2 wheat trading at $1.25/bushel might secure an option 
to sell the very next day at $1.23/bushel; for this privilege he would pay to his 
counterparty a small fee, traditionally $1 per 1,000 bushels (Lurie 1979). Having 
purchased this privilege, the trader would then take one of two courses the next day: (1) if 
prices dropped below $1.23/bushel, he would invoke his option, buy low in the spot 
market and sell at the higher, prearranged rate, making money on the deal; (2) if prices 
had not dropped below this mark, he would forego the option, make no sale, and lose out 
only on the small fee he had paid. Thus, options were inexpensive ways of making 
money on short-term price movements.  
From the outset, the trade in options was generally condemned. The Board 
prohibited them in their first set of official rules for futures trading in 1865, and the state 
of Illinois made them illegal in 1874. Yet, despite this general disapproval and the 
regulations it spawned, all of CBOT’s efforts, for close to fifty years, to eliminate these 
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trades from its pits failed. In 1888, a CBOT special committee investigated more than 80 
Board members over the course of a month for engaging in puts and calls. But, following 
the investigation, the committee revoked punishments and softened new rules in the face 
of member anger, e.g., by rewording them so that a punishment “should” or “ought” to 
follow discovery of option trading, rather than “shall” follow it (Lurie 1979). In 1892, 
Directors again passed a resolution barring trading in options, but found the resolution 
impossible to enforce and rescinded it a few months later. In 1895, William T. Baker was 
elected President on a platform that prominently called for the prohibition of options 
trading. But the resolutions he proposed to that end shortly after his election were 
soundly beaten back. In 1900, the Board passed a rule calling for the expulsion of 
members who traded in puts and calls, but it was not generally enforced, and was 
repealed five years later. In 1911, the Board passed a resolution attempting to rein in 
options trading among members on venues outside of the Board. But this final effort, like 
those before it, had little impact. Two years later, the Illinois legislature gave up the fight 
against options, passing a bill allowing puts and calls under certain restrictions. The 
Board gave up soon thereafter, passing a resolution allowing puts and calls on the floor of 
the exchange (Taylor 1917).  
  I ask two questions related to this history: first, why did options trading persist on the 
Board despite their continual efforts at regulation; second, how did the continued salience 
of options shape traders’ understandings of futures contracts? In answering these 
questions I highlight several factors. Regarding the first question, the fact that there were 
multiple local sites where options trading took place made it difficult to eliminate the 
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practice. As to the second question, the political environment established by proposed 
anti-futures legislation, and the powerful position of speculators within the Board, meant 
that options became a moral and economic scapegoat, allowing speculation in futures to 
remain an unvarnished good.    
 
Outlets for options 
The Board of Trade was not the only place where Chicago speculators could go to 
trade in options. Operating alongside CBOT were two other local venues that could fill 
this need: the competing Open Board of Trade and the myriad bucket shops that 
populated the city. Both allowed speculators to trade in options—or, in the case of bucket 
shops, engage in a reasonable facsimile of trading options—any time the Board attempted 
to crack down on the practice in its own pits.8 These alternative venues made it difficult 
to stamp out options trading, and kept the practice of option trading a lively topic of 
debate into the 1910s.  
The Open Board of Trade was established in 1879 as a smaller exchange offering 
a less expensive alternative to the “Big Board.” The Open Board had a lower membership 
fee and permitted trading in far smaller lots. In 1882, for example, CBOT’s membership 
fee was $10,000 and the minimum lot that could be traded was 5,000 bushels (Lurie 
1979); the Open Board, by contrast had a fee of $1,000 and permitted trading in 1,000 
bushel lots (Taylor 1917).  Soon after its establishment, the Open Board developed into a 
smaller, yet significant site of trade. By March, 1883, it had 180 members, and had raised 
                                                 
8 OR, MAM, Box 9, Folder 27, 1902 
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the membership limit to 400 to accommodate growing interest.9 Like the regular Board, 
the Open Board featured both spot and future markets, and speculators on the Open 
Board, like those on the regular Board, entered into binding legal contracts.  
 The relationship between the Open Board and the Big Board was, at the best of 
times, one of uneasy cooperation. The exchanges did each get something from the other: 
CBOT provided market quotations to the Open Board; the Open Board provided a site for 
trading by call auctions, a form preferred by many members, yet not found on the regular 
Board. This cooperation was often punctuated by periods of animosity and competition, 
usually related to the state of options trading on each exchange. The Open Board did not 
have the same qualms about allowing options trading on their exchange. In fact, they had 
found that they could attract a sizeable business by offering a convenient outlet for 
displaced traders whenever CBOT would take actions to quash options trading on its own 
exchange. For instance, in 1887, when the Board of Trade passed a resolution prohibiting 
trade in puts and calls, the Open Board continued to allow it, and that week saw its 
transactions jump to incredible new heights (Taylor 1917).  
CBOT directors recognized this problem and took steps to punish both members 
who circumvented their rules and the Open Board as an organization. In 1883, the Board 
passed a resolution prohibiting members from belonging to the Open Board.10 This 
blanket prohibition was scaled back following member anger, but new members were still 
forced to pledge that they would not to use the Open Board to trade in puts and calls.11 
                                                 
9 For comparison, CBOT had 1,936 members in 1883 (Annual Report, 1883).  
10 BDR, Box 9, Folder 13, Apr. 2, 1883 
11 BDR, Box 21, Folder 6, Apr. 8, 1889 
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Additionally, CBOT cut of the supply of price quotations to the Open Board on multiple 
occasions—in 1883, 1887, 1904 and 1911—each time citing trade in puts and calls as the 
offending reason.12 But the Open Board was not helpless in these fights with CBOT, and 
was often able to negotiate a settlement that entailed keeping the right to trade in puts and 
calls. Two weapons in their arsenal were extending trading hours and lowering 
commission rates. Both practices had the effect of drawing traders away from the Big 
Board and thus decreasing the value of their market’s information. The Open Board used 
these tactics in both 1883 and 1904 to force the Board into restoring quotations.13 In 1887 
they took a more direct route: when the Board cut off their official supply of quotations, 
the Open Board simply gathered the same quotations from other markets (Taylor 1917). 
Thus, the Open Board was able to maintain its autonomy and reject the attempts of 
CBOT to enforce rules against trading options.  
In addition to the Open Board, members could execute options trades in bucket 
shops. These small gambling shops rose to prominence shortly after the Open Board. At 
their peak, in 1895, there were 80 distinct bucket shops operating in the city.14 CBOT 
tried to prevent members from using bucket shops, but this proved even more difficult 
than keeping them off the Open Board. Unlike the Open Board, CBOT had no direct 
relationship with bucket shops and thus, cutting off quotations was far more difficult., as 
seen in the Chapter 4. As a result they had to rely on disciplining their membership. In 
1883, the Board prohibited members from using bucket shops, a rule that had weak 
member support and lax enforcement. Bucket shops were also spread around the city, 
                                                 
12 BDR, Box 9, Folder 13, Apr. 2, 1883; P, Box 2, Folder 3, Dec. 3, 1911 
13 BDR, Box 9, Folder 13, Apr. 2, 1883 
14 OR, MAM, Box 8, Folder 15, 1899 
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making it harder to surveil members’ use of them. Directors briefly hired private 
investigators to stake out bucket shops across the city, but this was discontinued after 
member outrage over the practice (Lurie 1979).  
These alternative local venues undercut CBOT’s efforts at banning privileges. 
Option trading thus continued, despite its prohibitions in Illinois state law and the Board’s 
own rules. The continued presence of these disfavored trades became a central focus of 
proposed federal regulations. This legislation only served to further the importance of 
defining futures in relation to options. The following section demonstrates this relational 
definition, and how its construction was influenced by features of the proposed laws.  
 
The response to regulation 
The Board’s inability to enforce the law and their own regulations prohibiting 
options trading provided fodder for public criticism of the Board, and featured 
prominently in proposed federal regulations of trading, including the Butterworth bill of 
1890 and the Hatch bill of 1892, which struck at both futures and options trading with the 
same penalties. As a result, distinguishing between the two types of derivatives became a 
key point of CBOT’s defense of their methods as a whole. The Board hammered on the 
distinction between options and futures, a distinction that was often minimized or 
overlooked entirely in the bills. They drew distinctions between futures and options along 
two lines. First, they defended speculation in futures as a way to handle naturally existing 
risk in the marketing process, while painting options as unnecessary, parasitic, gambling 
contracts. Second, they argued that futures contracts, at their termination, necessitated the 
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delivery of real goods, whereas options contracts did not. In these two critical ways, 
CBOT’s economic and cultural valuation of futures was shaped by the political 
imperative to distinguish the two types of derivative trading found on their exchange. 
  
As we have seen, the Board argued that futures trading and speculation were vital 
components of modern agricultural marketing. Options trading, on the other hand, was, 
according to President Charles D. Hamill in 1892, “a pure bet that the market will be 
either higher or lower the next day.”15 CBOT leaders pointed to several features of 
options when making this claim. Options usually covered only very short periods of 
time—generally one day—and they could be entered into for very little money (Lurie 
1979). Such short-term contracts, they argued, could not possibly offer any of the 
legitimate hedging or risk allocation purposes of futures. The small amount of money 
required to trade options was also significant. In futures trading, there was no limit as to 
how much money one could gain or lose in the market, while in options losses were 
limited to the small amount already paid as a fee. CBOT leaders, such as the anti-bucket 
shop crusader John H. Hill, maintained that this limitation on losses “[tended] to cause 
speculation to degenerate into gambling.”16 The relative ease and low cost of trading 
options meant they could be traded without the same careful consideration as futures and 
by non-expert people of small means.  
Additionally, CBOT claimed that options lacked legitimacy because of their 
characteristic feature: the transaction specified in the contract was optional. Futures 
                                                 
15 Quoted in Grain Exchanges Hearing Before the Committee on Rules, House of Representatives, 63rd 
Congress, Mar. 3-7, 1914: 84 
16 Hill, John H., Jr. 1921. The Octopus and Lesser Evils. p. 15, emphasis added 
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contracts bound the holder to a transaction, in one form or another, at the contract’s call 
date. This made it, at its core, similar to any contract used in the spot market. Options 
contracts, on the other hand, could be exited by one party with no exchange being made. 
This seemed to pervert the very notion of contract, and placed options at a greater 
distance from the actual physical exchange of wheat. For this reason, Board member and 
commission merchant, Samuel H. Greeley, could claim that, as opposed to futures, which 
played a vital part in the marketing of agricultural commodities, “a put or call never in 
the history of the trade marketed a bushel of grain.”17 John H. Hill made this same 
accusation more colorfully, saying: “‘Puts’ and ‘calls’ have no more relation to commerce 
than a deck of cards or a box of dice. Horse-race gambling at least inspires the breeding 
of fine horses; ‘puts and calls’ breed embezzlers and financial wrecks.”18  
CBOT also drew on the distinction between futures and options when establishing 
themselves as the sole group with the economic knowledge to competently regulate trade 
in futures. Legislators and agrarian activists often conflated the two terms, referring to 
their stance against non-spot trading broadly as “anti-option” (Lurie 1979). Board 
members used this confusion to paint their critics as ignorant of the true marketing 
processes at work. While this may not have been entirely untrue, it failed to acknowledge 
that confusion over the terms ‘futures’ and ‘options’ was also found among Board 
members. In the 1883 investigation of the Board of Trade by a special committee of the 
Illinois House of Representatives, witnesses in the same line of work, trading on the same 
Board, offered contradictory definitions of options, one defining them in relation to 
                                                 
17 Grain Exchanges Hearing Before the Committee on Rules, House of Representatives, 63rd Congress, 
Mar. 3-7, 1914: 86 
18 Ibid. 
159 
 
 
privileges, the other to futures.19 This confusion still existed up to the first efforts at 
federal regulation. In 1891, right in between the debates over the 1890 Butterworth and 
1892 Hatch bills, prominent Board member W.S. Crosby published a popular pamphlet 
which referred to futures as “options” throughout.20 At the root of this confusion were 
two different understandings of the term. When futures were referred to as options, the 
“option” referred to was the choice given to sellers, of determining on what date during 
the month they wanted to make delivery or settle by differences. The “option” referred to 
in privileges, or puts and calls, was the choice whether to execute the transaction at all. 
The use of the term “option” to describe both instruments caused not a small amount of 
trouble, spawning two cases in the Illinois Supreme Court in 1875 and 1877, and a third 
in the Illinois Court of Appeals in 1879 (Lurie 1979).  
                                                 
19 “Report of the Special House Committee to Investigate Concerning the Mode of Conducting Certain 
Stock Speculations on the Chicago Boards of Trade, Together with the Testimony Taken Before the 
Committee.” May 11, 1883.  
     Excerpts from these testimonies are given below. They are dialogues between legislators and two 
different commission merchants who had been called before the committee. The first merchant draws a 
clear distinction between futures and options, and claims that options are synonymous with privileges: 
Q: One of the purposes of this investigation is to see whether a means can be devised without prejudicing 
or injuring the legitimate deals in real property by circumscribing what is commonly called this option 
business. You call it futures, on the Board of Trade. It used to be called options. 
A: There is quite a difference between options and futures.  
Q: […] What is the difference between an option and a future? 
A: An option is merely a privilege of buying and selling. If I sell for future delivery I have made a 
contract—I buy for the future. 
   The second commission merchant offers a different definition, using the term “option” to refer to a 
futures contract, which he distinguishes from a privilege, or puts and calls.  
Q: What is understood by the term option dealing, or option contract? 
A: Well, the option just gives the man that sells the option of the day. For instance, you sell for the month 
of July; you can have any day you see fit in the month to deliver it.  
Q: Is that what is ordinarily meant by the term option? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Isn’t there another meaning to it? 
A: I don’t know how there can be. 
Q: That is, the option to sell or buy on a privileged contract? 
A: Those are puts and calls; those are privileges.  
   Thus, even at the same point in time, in the same city, among men in the same line of business, the 
meaning of an “option” was unsettled.  
20 Crosby, W.S. 1891. The Chicago Board of Trade and Its Policy, Knight, Leonard & Co: Chicago. 
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Having made these arguments to the state, drawing the distinction between 
legitimate futures speculation and illegitimate puts and calls, CBOT recognized ever 
more urgently the need to suppress options trading on its floor. The state had been kept at 
bay with a particular line of argument and CBOT was now committed to keep to that 
tack. John H. Hill complained that: 
With a degenerate board of trade, such as would result from this 
legislation [to legalize the trade in privileges], Congress would have very 
little patience. That plank of the Democratic platform upon which 
President Wilson was elected which denounced gambling in food products 
would be easily justified into an act that would destroy the great grain 
market in Chicago.21  
President Edward Andrew also made a point of exhorting the membership to good 
behavior with regard to puts and calls, given that the eyes of the nation were watching. In 
his Presidential address of 1913, Andrew called upon members to “avoid in any way 
giving offense to public opinion” by engaging in the controversial practice.22 Three years 
later, President Joseph Griffin reported that efforts to cut down on illegal privilege 
trading were having a positive effect on federal legislative bodies, noting that, “The 
Chairman of the Agricultural Committee assures me that the apparently earnest efforts of 
the Exchanges to eliminate abuses and maintain a high degree of business integrity and 
efficiency meets with his cordial approval.”23 Practically speaking, the distinction 
between futures and options thus became a tool for forestalling federal regulation. 
Options became the scapegoat derivative—linked to gambling and decried as unrelated to 
the underlying trade—enabling futures to be framed as entirely legitimate.  
                                                 
21 Grain Exchanges Hearing Before the Committee on Rules, House of Representatives, 63rd Congress, 
Mar. 3-7, 1914: 85 
22 OR, MAM, Box 13, Folder 25, 1913: 12 
23 OR, MAM, Box 14, Folder 10, 1916: 2 
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Options and speculation 
In addition to these moral distinctions based on the relation to the underlying spot 
trade, CBOT directors also highlighted the significant economic differences between 
futures and options. As we have seen, directors were unified in their defense of 
speculation as economically beneficial; many would be inclined to agree with Board 
President William S. Warren’s effusive claim that speculation was “the very life-blood of 
the grain market.”24 This defense of speculation provided the framework for the 
economic devaluation of options.  
Traders objected to options because they “cooper[ed] prices within a narrow limit 
day after day.”25 They argued that options dampened fluctuations in markets to the point 
that opportunities for speculation in futures were significantly diminished.26 This sapped 
the market of the energy needed to continue along at a high volume. Without using the 
term, the traders were arguing for the benefits of volatility. In fact, even those who 
supported options trading did so not by arguing that less volatility was good for the 
market, but by disputing options’ purported dampening effect. In a 1905 resolution 
seeking to have privileges legalized in the state of Illinois, members noted the symbiotic 
relation of speculation and option trading, writing that options trading had become, “so 
necessary to the speculative trading in Grain that it has become almost co-extensive with 
it.”27 Thus, on both sides of the debate, the economic value of options was judged in 
                                                 
24 OR, MAM, Box 9, Folder 4, 1900: np 
25 OR, MAM, Box 7, Folder 9, 1895: np 
26 OR, MAM, Box 9, Folder 4, 1900 
27 OR, MAM, Box 10, Folder 25, 1905: np 
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relation to their relation to market volatility and the opportunities for speculation. The 
unquestioned value of speculation was central to these exercises in economic theory, as it 
was to debates over the value of futures.  
   
The above shows us that the Chicago Board of Trade understood futures primarily 
in contrast to another financial instrument, the options contract. The co-evolution of 
futures and options during the Civil War, combined with the multiple local settings for 
engaging in trades, allowed options to be traded at a high level despite Board regulations 
and Illinois law. The importance of distinguishing futures and options for the purposes of 
combating federal legislation and producing economic theory kept this contrast salient. 
By smearing options trading as economically unproductive and immoral gambling, 
CBOT leaders could offer its prohibition as a concession to those pushing legislation, 
while still holding onto the more widely utilized futures trade.  
 
New Orleans: Adopting futures 
As opposed to Chicago, the New Orleans futures market was established within 
the context of a long-running, major spot market. Prior to the War, New Orleans was the 
largest cotton port in the United States, with a well-entrenched system for financing the 
cotton crop known as factorage. In this system individuals called factors would finance 
the production of a farmer’s entire crop, as well as advance him money for supplies 
throughout the year. In exchange, he would have exclusive rights to merchandise the 
entirety of that crop, as well as a claim to future harvests if, as often happened, the farmer 
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was still in debt at the end of the year (Hammond 1897; Stone 1915). Futures markets 
replaced this entrenched system only slowly. Factors themselves opposed the futures 
system, saying that it inculcated a “spirit of gambling inconsistent with the [spot] trade” 
and brought ruin to spot markets (New Orleans Daily Picayune, Dec 27, 1879). 
Commission merchants also were not rushing to utilize the new system. Though the 
trading of futures contracts was allowed from the founding of NOCE in 1871, eight years 
passed in which they simply were not traded.28  
NOCE members only entered into the futures game in 1879 when it became clear 
that they either needed to act or lose this business to other exchanges. Locally, this was 
represented by the New Orleans Stock Exchange, which was angling to create its own 
futures market (Ellis 1973). More broadly, this was represented by the New York and 
Liverpool Cotton Exchanges, whose futures markets were continually growing. NOCE’s 
Future Committee, writing in 1882, three years after the exchange embraced futures 
trading, made this plain: 
It is not desirable to enter into an argument upon the peculiar merits of the 
[futures] business, suffice it that no really leading market of the world has 
succeeded without affording proper facilities for the purchase and sale of 
merchandise and produce for forward delivery.29  
The committee thus did not argue for a futures market by citing economic theory, but 
simply with reference to the pragmatic issue of retaining market influence. As prominent 
member J.W. Labouisse later explained to the House Committee on Agriculture, NOCE 
                                                 
28 AR, 1877 
29 AR, 1882: 36 
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had adopted futures trading when it did simply because “it found it necessary to fall into 
line with everybody else.”30   
 
The nature of speculation 
 Given the pre-eminence of the spot market on NOCE, it is unsurprising that the value 
of futures trading was tied to its ability to promote the spot trade. Reflecting on the first 
two full years of futures trading, the Board noted approvingly that receipts of actual 
cotton had increased since the introduction of futures trading.31 Cotton continued to be 
the acknowledged mainstay of the market and futures merely “an adjunct to the spot 
trade.”32 The futures trade was conceptualized primarily as a form of insurance which 
allowed NOCE greater control over the spot business.33 This orientation toward the spot 
market continued long after the futures market had grown large and influential. Nearly 
thirty years after futures trading began in earnest, President William B. Thompson could 
still claim that, “The spot business is the most valuable division of the cotton trade to the 
city of New Orleans, and the spot market is the basis of the existence of the Cotton 
Exchange and the foundation upon which the Future contract business stands.”34  
Traders claimed that this relation to the spot market made their futures market 
particularly sound and legitimate, and claimed that the speculative abuses found on other 
exchanges stemmed from the lack of a robust spot market. Looking back on the first three 
years of futures trading on the Exchange, Henry Leopold, Chairman of the Future 
                                                 
30 “Fictitious Dealing in Agricultural Products,” Committee on Agriculture, 1892: 94 
31 AR, 1881 
32 AR, 1888:15 
33 AR, 1888 
34 AR, 1908: 10  
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Committee explained that the large spot market was, “ a guarantee of the soundness and 
stability of the [futures] business.”35 To President Abraham Brittin, in 1903, the spot 
trade made the futures market, “by nature beyond the attempts of speculators to sway it 
without respect to supply and demand36; to President William B. Thompson, six years 
later, it ensured “the security of the trader and the accuracy of the quotations.”37 One year 
later, Thompson discussed at length the importance of the connection between markets: 
Furthermore, I am of the opinion that a responsive future contract cannot 
be maintained in independence of an actual spot market, or in isolation 
therefrom; that the effort to maintain the same away from and independent 
of a spot market, necessitates arbitrary and artificial methods of fixing the 
relative value of the several contract grades; that such arbitrary and 
artificial devices cannot result in other than fictitious values and discounts; 
and finally, that the power to control such valuation, in the hands of a few 
men, and subject to manipulation by these, as their interest may dictate, 
makes such a market, so controlled, the breeding grounds of the evils of 
which complaint is made. Or to phrase the conclusion differently, the 
existence and activity of such an artificial future market as I have outlined, 
logically accounts for the abuses which have attracted general attention 
and condemnation.38  
The abuses found in other futures markets stem from their distance from the spot market, 
which necessitates “artificial” and “arbitrary” connections. NOCE, being a “natural 
cotton market” and at no such distance from the market in spot cotton, was naturally free 
from the attendant evils.39  
Additionally, there was a strong belief that the interests of Southern markets like 
                                                 
35 AR, 1882: 35 
36 AR, 1903: 8;  
37 Thompson, William B. 1909. The New Future Rules of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange, Press of J.G. 
Hauser: New Orleans, p. 6. 
38 Thompson, William B. 1910. Letter to Georgia Industrial Association, p.3-4. 
39 AR, 1901; AR, 1902 
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NOCE were “naturally in sympathy with Southern producers.”40 This alliance with the 
producer translated into a natural tendency to push for higher prices. NOCE’s futures 
market was thus seen as a necessary counter-balance to those in New York and Liverpool, 
both of which were “affiliated with the spinning interests” and “almost always do believe 
that prices will be lower, and to that end direct their efforts.”41 NOCE’s futures market 
was thus predicated not only on economic interest, but also the duty to resist surrendering 
control of the market for the South’s staple crop. Were New Orleans to abdicate its 
market position, New York and Liverpool would be empowered “to dictate to the South 
and to the entire world.”42  
 Such arguments offered a distinct perspective on the relation between price-setting 
on futures and futures markets. Rather than framing price as an function of worldwide 
supply and demand—as was standard practice on CBOT—NOCE highlighted the power 
of regionally-massed buyers or sellers. In a pamphlet opposing the 1908 Scott Anti-future 
Act, the Exchange made the following argument: 
Because Liverpool is the great market patronized by consumers, the 
predominant influence there is bearish, more men being interested in a 
declining market than in an advancing market. Because New Orleans is 
the great market patronized by producers, cotton bankers and merchants 
and by exporters, who purchase future deliveries and hedges as a 
protection against loss on the cotton of specific grade they contract to 
deliver to spinner during months to come, the predominant influence here 
is naturally bullish, more men being interested in an advancing market 
                                                 
40 AR, 1908: 12 
41 Thompson, William B. 1908. Address Before the Joint Committee on Agriculture of the Senate and 
House of Representatives: Contracts for Future Delivery, and Effects of Adverse Legislation, L. Graham 
Company, New Orleans, p.19 
42 The New Orleans Cotton Exchange: Its Functions and Method of Transacting Business in Contracts for 
the Future Delivery of Cotton. c. 1908. L. Graham Co., New Orleans, p.6 
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than in a declining market.43  
This argument, that price was linked to traders’ “interests,” is at odds with the notion that 
prices are set by the balance of supply and demand. In fact, according to the theory of 
supply and demand the argument is backwards: the greater number of buyers in Liverpool 
would tend to increase prices, while the number of sellers in New Orleans would lower 
them. Thompson’s position amounts to arguing that groups of bulls and bears colluded, at 
least tacitly, to push prices in a direction favorable to their market position.  
Arguments about traders’ interests in cotton were also expressed in terms that 
evoked the desire for Southern autonomy, and which must have resonated with men who 
had been youths during the Civil War and matured during Reconstruction. This is found 
in the rhetoric used to convince members on a number of topics. President William B. 
Thompson made such appeals while campaigning in support of the construction of public 
warehouses meant to lower costs and attract more cotton to New Orleans. He claimed the 
warehouse would “liberate the cotton trade and the commercial South from the financial 
domination of alien interests” and allow the South to achieve “financial and industrial 
enfranchisement.”44 He reminded listeners that, “We cannot be great so long as we are 
supplicants, and we shall be supplicants no longer, when we shall have placed ourselves 
in a position to hold that which is ours and to reap what we have sown.”45 On other 
issues, the rhetoric was just as hot, if not more so. At the 1905 conference of the Southern 
                                                 
43 The New Orleans Cotton Exchange: Its Functions and Method of Transacting Business in Contracts for 
the Future Delivery of Cotton. c. 1908. L. Graham Co., New Orleans, p.24 
44 Thompson, William B. 1908. Address of W.B. Thompson, President New Orleans Cotton Exchange. The 
Central Warehouse Plan, p. 8-9. 
45 Ibid. 
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Cotton Growers Association, which met in New Orleans and hosted several powerful 
Exchange members, Tom Watson of Georgia directly drew the link between the freedom 
won through control of capital and the freedom won at the barrel of a gun. Speaking on 
the seemingly innocuous topic of acreage reductions, he rallied the various state 
delegations by likening the task at hand to the military battles that their forefathers had 
fought in the past—North Carolinians were reminded of “the last charge of Appomattox,” 
Texans of the Alamo, South Carolinians of Fort Moultrie, and so on (Saloutos 1960). The 
battle for control of the cotton crop, Watson argued to great cheers, would require similar 
bravery and resolve. 
NOCE thus offered both unorthodox economic arguments and distinct cultural 
arguments in an effort to legitimate futures speculation. Futures markets were 
conceptualized as valuable tools by which to ensure the vitality of the spot market and the 
autonomy of Southern producers and traders. Futures contracts were figurative weapons 
with which to fight for the full prices and full control that had been denied to Southern 
traders in the past.  
 
Bucket shops, regulation, and delivery on contracts  
 
 
We have seen above that a key feature of CBOT’s defense of futures was the fact 
that all futures contracts, as opposed to options, legally bound their parties to an actual 
delivery of goods or receipts. This legal obligation was critical to their defense of the 
non-delivery that occurred in the vast majority of cases: practices such as offsetting 
settlement or ring settlements were conceptualized as simplified methods that were 
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equivalent to what would otherwise occur via a long string of deliveries. In this way, non-
delivery was reframed as delivery by other means. This perspective was forged in 
response to the challenges from bucket shops, which threatened the Board’s economic 
success and cultural legitimacy, and proposed federal legislation that conflated futures 
and options. For CBOT, stressing delivery was a useful way of dealing with both issues 
at one time.  
The political context in which NOCE defended speculation was different. It did 
not face nearly the same problem with bucket shops as did CBOT. While bucket 
shopping was enough of a concern for the Exchange to form a special committee 
dedicated to the problem in 1901, the committee often had little to report.46 Their 1903 
report noted that only one member had been investigated for suspected bucket shopping, 
and no positive proof of illegal practices was found. Compared with the same year in 
Chicago, where CBOT initiated nine separate lawsuits aimed at keeping quotations from 
bucket shops, and obtained injunctions against 70 bucket shops in Chicago, Milwaukee 
and Kansas City, the relative lack of urgency is clear.47  
NOCE was also responding to two pieces of cotton-specific legislation that 
presented different challenges than the earlier Hatch and Washburn bills that CBOT had 
fought off. The first of these was the 1910 bill introduced by Representative Charles 
Scott of Kansas. The Scott Bill proposed to tax out of existence any speculative dealing 
in futures contracts that did not culminate in delivery. The bill would require that parties 
to a trade sign an affidavit stating that they intended to actually deliver or receive cotton 
                                                 
46 AR, 1901 
47 OR, MAM, Box 10, Folder 1, 1903; NOCE, AR, 1903 
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on the contracts entered into, and failure to do so would be prima facie evidence of 
gambling. The second threat was a 1913 amendment to a tariff bill, introduced by Senator 
Clarke of Arkansas, which imposed a 1/10 of one cent tax upon sales of cotton for future 
delivery, refunding the tax when cotton was actually delivered by the seller to the buyer. 
Critically, neither conflated futures and options as had earlier legislative attempts to 
eliminate speculation.  
In the face of these legislative threats, and not under pressure to make any clear-
cut distinction between the Exchange and bucket shops, leaders made a more 
sophisticated argument about the nature of delivery. As opposed to CBOT, which focused 
on the delivery that came at the end of every speculative futures contract, NOCE 
highlighted the delivery that occurred in the spot market as one half of a hedge.48 Traders 
who sell futures contracts as a hedge do, in fact, deliver cotton—but it is spot cotton, not 
the cotton specified in a futures contract. Hedging worked by allowing parallel trades in 
spot and futures markets—having those markets intersect through forced delivery would 
ruin the system, by requiring traders to acquire and deliver extra cotton. 
NOCE president William B. Thompson argued, in opposition to the 1913 Clarke 
amendment, that hedgers quite legitimately entered into futures markets with no intention 
to deliver or receive the commodities specified on their contract. Further, Thompson 
argued that, oftentimes, the nature of delivery was the exact opposite of what Congress 
                                                 
48 Recall that hedging involved simultaneous operations in the spot market and the futures market: hedgers 
would buy or sell actual cotton in the spot market, while insuring their spot cotton against adverse price 
movements in the futures market. 
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believed: manipulative trades were often those where delivery was made. This was true 
of corners, which hinged on forcing an unsuspecting party to pay high prices in order to 
deliver physical goods. Thompson’s recognition of a clear division between the spot 
market, where delivery occurred, and the futures market, where it did not, mapped onto 
another distinction: that between cotton and contracts for cotton. Thompson explains: 
Proponents propose to annihilate speculation in cotton contracts, but in the 
attempt to accomplish this result they will force speculation in cotton, and 
thus render the actual cotton business on stupendous speculative hazard.49  
This position on the nature of futures contracts and their relation to the provision of real 
goods is distinct from both the position taken by CBOT. Contracts for cotton in the 
futures market were recognized to have an ambiguous relation to real cotton as found on 
the spot market. As opposed to CBOT’s argument, Thompson argued that non-delivery 
was not equivalent to a pared down version of what could happen through the exchange 
of actual goods. The futures portion of a hedge was given a distinct identity and purpose, 
for which delivery was not a legitimating feature.  
This argument about the insurance value of futures could not assume the same 
prominence on CBOT, not for any theoretical reason, but because of their battle with 
bucket shops. The insurance function provided by the futures portion of a hedge could be 
provided just as easily by a bet placed in a bucket shop. In fact, since bucket shops 
executed trades for very low rates, they were actually the cheapest option for traders 
looking to hedge against changes in the spot market. This was an argument made 
                                                 
49 Thompson, William B. 1913. Statement Concerning the Cotton Future Tax Amendment to the Tariff Bill, 
p. 6, emphasis original.  
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forcefully by bucket shop owners and supporters, who saw the Board’s opposition as 
based less in moral scruples and more in the desire to maintain a monopoly over certain 
types of trades (Cronon 1991). The relative lack of bucket shops in New Orleans 
compared to Chicago opened up a distinct line of argument by which to establish the 
economic value of futures speculation.  
 
NOCE thus presents an interesting comparison to CBOT. The futures market 
emerged slowly and was conceived of as ancillary to the extant spot market. The 
presence of a vibrant spot trade was additionally thought of as a safeguard against the 
excesses of the financial market, protecting NOCE traders from the manipulation found 
in other financial centers. Maintaining control of the cotton crop was also a framed as a 
duty to the people of the South, a way to retain autonomy from foreign interests. This 
position toward the spot market, combined with proposed legislation aimed only at cotton 
markets, led NOCE to articulate a unique perspective on futures trading and the 
legitimacy of delivery. These features led futures contracts to be understood differently 
on NOCE than on CBOT. Their economic value lay in their ability to boost cotton prices 
for consumers, while their cultural legitimacy came from the autonomy and control they 
brought to the South.  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, we have seen that CBOT and NOCE understood futures contracts 
and markets in different ways. On CBOT, futures contracts were understood as positive 
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economic and moral devices. Futures enabled speculation but involved large enough 
sums of money and long enough periods of time to distance themselves from mere 
gambling. They were enforceable contracts, which legally bound a party to close a deal, 
through the delivery or receipt of warehouse receipts or physical goods. Non-delivery of 
goods was conceptualized as, in fact, a simplified process equivalent to a long string of 
deliveries and re-deliveries. Both of these features were constructed in contrast to 
options, which was scapegoated for both the moral and economic failings of the market. 
This perspective was shaped by the CBOT’s needs to fight off competition from the Open 
Board of Trade and bucket shops, while simultaneously forestalling legislation that 
lumped together all kinds of speculative trades in derivatives. On NOCE, futures 
contracts had value for a different set of reasons. Futures bolstered the spot market, lifting 
prices and providing insurance by means of hedging. They also promoted Southern 
interests and autonomy from foreign control. The status of delivery, and particularly non-
delivery, on contracts was more ambiguous than that presented on CBOT. Non-delivery 
on contracts was not equated to a string of deliveries, but rather was conceptualized as a 
distinct part of a hedge, one that was entirely legitimate even though, or precisely 
because, delivery was never intended. NOCE’s position was made possible by the distinct 
cultural value of cotton as a Southern emblem, their lack of local competitors, and the 
details of the particular, cotton-specific legislation proposed in Congress.  
By drawing out these distinctions, the chapter demonstrates the local economic, 
cultural, and political factors contributing to the processes of theorizing and legitimating 
speculation in futures. Creating ideas about the economic worth of speculation and the 
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cultural legitimacy of speculation were not two separate processes, but two components 
of a single process. On CBOT, the needs to distinguish the Board from bucket shops and 
also to fight off indiscriminate legislation both influenced the form taken by the 
economic claims of speculation’s value. Similarly, on NOCE, the justifications of 
speculation as a hedge that could raise spot market prices and also increase Southern 
autonomy were formed in response to local desires and the particulars of cotton-specific 
legislation. The economic and cultural content of justifications for controversial new 
products reflects local political struggles (Espeland 1998). It is through the political 
legitimation work that had to occur, and the context in which it occurred, that futures 
contracts came to take on particular cultural and economic characteristics (Callon, 
Meadel & Rabeharisoa 2005).  
A correlate of this argument is that previous studies that focused solely on CBOT 
may have offered too narrow a perspective on the development of futures markets in the 
United States. Within economic sociology, CBOT has become the paradigmatic case for 
discussing the development of futures markets or the construction of standardized 
grading systems. This is not without reason. Chicago was the first and largest market for 
agricultural futures, and has continued to grow even until this day. CBOT was also 
involved in significant court cases that defined the legal environment in which futures 
markets flourished. But my findings from New Orleans suggest that the lack of 
comparative case studies may have promoted over-generalizations on the topic of 
attitudes toward and legitimation of speculation in futures.    
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For instance, scholars have highlighted the issue of delivery as central to the 
legitimation of futures trading (Levy 2006). It is indeed true that the “contemplation of 
delivery” was central to Justice Holmes’ 1905 Supreme Court decision affirming the 
legality of CBOT traders’ practice of settling futures trades by difference. This decision 
regarding delivery subsequently became an important touchstone for exchanges whose 
methods were called into question. But the case of NOCE shows that delivery, in and of 
itself, was not a universal concern, nor a universal good. The President of NOCE made 
multiple public addresses, even after Holmes’ ruling, denying the importance of an intent 
to deliver on futures contracts, highlighting instead the ability for futures contracts to 
offer insurance on spot trades. To focus on delivery and its significance in the Supreme 
Court’s logic is to ignore other ways of legitimating speculation in futures that co-existed 
with those coming from Chicago.  
As a second example, the distinction between speculation and gambling was 
central to CBOT’s legitimation efforts. But this matter was far less prominent on NOCE, 
opening the possibility that the salience of this issue might have varied across exchanges. 
The findings of this chapter suggest that this lack of salience was largely economic and 
political. The distinction between speculation and gambling was simply less useful in 
proving the value of the futures trade in New Orleans. CBOT’s statements about 
speculation in relation to gambling were not simply responses to public criticism, but also 
strategic claims that usefully mapped onto the distinctions CBOT sought to draw between 
futures and options trading on one hand, and the Board and bucket shops on the other. 
NOCE had no incentive to draw on this same distinction. It is also possible that this 
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moral distinction may not have had the same power in New Orleans as it did in Chicago. 
After all, Louisiana had a popular state lottery from 1868-1893, which suggests that 
Louisianans may have held more liberal ideas about gambling than other people around 
the country. While my two-case design cannot speak to this possibility authoritatively, it 
does show that attitudes towards gambling across the country were not homogenous. The 
distinction between speculation and gambling was critical to CBOT’s efforts to attain 
legitimacy, but cannot unproblematically be applied to all 19th century American futures 
markets.  
 This chapter thus uncovers the variety of ways in which futures trading was deemed 
useful and legitimate. It shows that, in contrast to scholarship which has focused 
exclusively on the case of Chicago, futures were conceptualized in a number of ways, and 
that no one set of features was central to their legitimacy. The orthodox conception of 
what futures are and what they are good for could well have been quite different had a 
legal challenge from another exchange made it to the Supreme Court first, or if CBOT 
had been able to reach consensus with their competitors. The particular understanding of 
speculation as “the self-adjustment of society to the probable” and the “contemplation of 
delivery” need not have been the centerpieces around which futures trading was 
legitimated. Alternative formulations existed and gave rise to unique market 
environments throughout the formative decades of futures markets.  
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Conclusion- Infrastructure and Outcome 
 
 This dissertation has studied the information infrastructures that linked extant 
spot markets in agricultural commodities to newly-developed futures markets, and 
enabled their co-functioning. Chapter 1 served as an introduction to the cases and a 
methodological justification for their selection. Chapter 2 outlined the meaning of 
infrastructure as a feature of, and approach to studying, markets. Chapters 3-5 offered 
empirical analyses of three features of these infrastructures: (1) the classification schemes 
by which spot commodities were assigned grades; (2) the material means of gathering 
and disseminating data, both statistics on the growth and movement of the spot crop, as 
well as price quotations from global markets; (3) the economic and cultural theories by 
which traders understood the nature of speculation in futures and its effect on spot 
markets. These infrastructural connections made futures markets viable by enabling 
futures traders to make intentionally rational buying and selling decisions based on a real 
or perceived relation with the underlying spot market.  
 The dissertation asked two questions about these infrastructures: What factors 
caused each feature to take the shape it did? And, what consequences did these 
infrastructures have for market behavior? I begin this chapter by reviewing the answers to 
these questions given over the course of this dissertation. Following this, I discuss the 
larger lessons of the dissertation and directions for future research. 
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What factors caused each infrastructural feature to take the shape it did? 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that, on CBOT, powerful grain elevator owners shaped 
the grading system to their own ends. Despite supervision from CBOT inspectors, 
warehouse owners gamed the system by diluting wheat and forging elevator receipts. 
These actions produced uncertainty over both the quality and quantity of wheat in the 
city. State-run grading had its own problems. The politicized Railroad & Warehouse 
Commission did not require that appointees have any prior knowledge of the grain trade, 
and officials remained unresponsive to traders’ day-to-day needs. Finally, CBOT itself 
influenced the classification system by refusing to negotiate grading standards with other 
exchanges, a stance enabled by their dominant market position. The grading system that 
emerged from this context often failed to index wheat’s physical qualities and had an 
uncertain relation to other markets’ systems. 
NOCE’s system, by contrast, was developed for the spot trade, and was in use 
long before futures markets emerged. Spot market traders and merchants thus exerted a 
great deal of influence on the workings of the system. They ensured that grading on 
NOCE remained an antagonistic negotiation between buyer and seller, rather than a 
centralized process. NOCE also built a significant supervisory apparatus in response to 
spot traders’ concerns about the maintenance of grades as cotton moved through the city. 
Finally, NOCE directors worked to align standards with other exchanges and promote 
harmony within the spot trade. These features led to a grading system that accurately 
indexed the physical qualities of cotton and promoted uniformity in trading across 
markets.  
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Chapter 4 showed that CBOT’s methods for gathering and disseminating 
information were shaped by the larger conflicts they had with Western Union and bucket 
shops. CBOT exerted pressure on Western Union to tighten control over the 
dissemination of price data and keep price quotations away from illegitimate recipients. 
They leveraged the value of their quotations as the world’s leading commodity market, 
and made credible threats to create their own telegraph companies that would circumvent 
Western Union. In this fight to control their quotations, CBOT argued that market 
information was a private good, a perspective which they brought to their policies on 
crop reports as well. CBOT made no effort to authenticate reports from outside sources or 
to gather statistics on their own. As a result, multiple reports circulated at any given time, 
creating uncertainty and rumor around the growth and movement of wheat. 
NOCE developed a crop reporting system that was spurred on by their Board of 
Directors’ desire to free themselves from reliance on Northern sources of information. 
Their mistrust of this information, combined with the subordinate position in which it 
placed NOCE, led the Exchange to build a sophisticated statistical network that traced the 
growth and movement of the cotton crop. Long-serving Exchange Secretary Henry 
Hester used his positions on the National Cotton Exchange and the editorial board of 
Cotton World magazine to expand this network across the nation, and the system he built 
gained renown worldwide. However, NOCE’s weak position relative to Western Union 
and the New York Cotton Exchange made it difficult to improve the technical capacity of 
telegraphs and amend prejudicial rules of information sharing. Though their commitment 
to providing information as a public good for their members made problems with “beats” 
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by private wires a hotly debated topic, the Exchange was unable to force any significant 
improvements. This created an environment where spot market statistics were plentiful, 
but up-to-the-minute market quotations were not.  
Chapter 5 established that CBOT evaluated futures speculation largely in contrast 
to a closely related type of derivative, options contracts. This was done in response to two 
different challenges. First, alternative local venues for trading—bucket shops and the 
Open Board of Trade—made options trading impossible to eliminate. The continued 
presence of options despite their illegality hurt the Board’s legitimacy. Second, options 
trading featured in two proposed pieces of federal legislation that aimed to bar 
speculation in futures. CBOT seized upon the distinction between options and futures as a 
way to fight both their local rivals and the proposed legislation. On the one hand, they 
linked the differences between futures and options contracts to the distinction between 
speculation and gambling. On the other, they capitalized on confusion over these terms 
within legislation to delegitimate federal efforts at regulation. Options also served as a 
useful foil when evaluating the economic value of speculation. Speculators contrasted the 
lively market that resulted from futures speculation with the dullness which accompanied 
options trading, arguing that the use of options contracts killed beneficial fluctuations in 
price.   
On NOCE, the economic and cultural importance of the spot trade shaped the 
valuation of speculation in futures. NOCE’s leaders argued that their robust spot market 
guaranteed the value of futures trading on their exchange, in contrast to markets that 
needed to rely on artificial means for establishing value. They also claimed that a 
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significant component of the futures market’s worth was that it gave New Orleans traders 
a tool with which to boost spot market prices. This perspective was further enabled by 
cotton-specific legislation proposed at the federal level. Unlike the bills which CBOT 
faced two decades before, these made no distinction between futures and options, but 
rather focused narrowly on ensuring the delivery of goods on contract. NOCE justified 
non-delivery on contracts through a full-throated defense of hedging. As opposed to 
CBOT, which attempted to cast non-delivery as equivalent to delivery by other means, 
NOCE argued that non-delivery on futures contracts was critical to preserving the value 
of actual spot goods.  
 
What consequences did these infrastructures have for market behavior? 
Chapters 3 and 4 also explore the consequences of these infrastructural features 
on market behavior. On CBOT, the information conveyed by grades was more likely to 
misrepresent the physical quality of wheat and the quantities being stored in the city. The 
Board’s policy of treating information as a private good created a two-tiered system, 
where traders with better information or faster telegraphic service had an advantage over 
other members. Warehouse receipts that automatically called forth particular grades of 
wheat enabled speculation to grow quite large, as traders could be assured that they could 
satisfy contracts with little cost simply through the purchase of a standardized contract. 
These systems would have made long-term market projection difficult, while doing little 
to lower uncertainty in the short-term. As a result, we would expect to see increased 
speculation on short-term price fluctuations and the loss of hedging to other markets.  
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Conversely, NOCE created a system where grades closely indexed the quality of 
cotton, and quantities were ensured by the careful supervision of bales as they moved 
through the city. The Exchange produced a wealth of reliable statistics on the growth, 
movement and consumption of cotton, which gave members a detailed perspective on the 
spot market. Also, the lack of speedy telegraphic services made speculation in futures, 
which required quickly spotting market opportunities, more difficult. Finally, the cost of 
negotiating grade every time delivery was involved served as a potential cost that 
speculators were keen to avoid. These features combined to create a market that would 
promote relatively more spot market-related hedging and less pure speculation.  
These infrastructural differences established distinct, limiting conditions for 
action on the two exchanges. Irrespective of the influence of social structural factors such 
as network ties, regulative institutions, or cultural attitudes toward speculation, the 
infrastructure of CBOT would promote a higher proportion of speculative trades than that 
of NOCE. I argue that these infrastructural differences were a significant reason why 
CBOT saw such greater price volatility than NOCE over the period of my research.  
 
In the remainder of this chapter I note two general lessons we can draw from the 
questions and answers presented in this dissertation. First: Market infrastructure, broadly 
understood, is a particularly useful concept for studying market creation, particularly for 
derivative markets. Second: An infrastructural approach enables meaningful new 
analyses of system-level outcomes, market volatility being an example. I discuss each 
and propose areas for future exploration below.  
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Infrastructure and derivative market creation  
 Infrastructures offer practical solutions to some of the theoretical problems posed 
by the creation of a new market (Beckert 2009, 2012; Callon 2008; Preda 2009; Rona-
Tas & Guseva 2014). Infrastructures are critical components by which new markets give 
commodities the proper characteristics (Callon 1998b; Healy 2010; Zelizer 1979), equip 
traders with appropriate interests, capacities, and orientations (Caliskan & Callon 2010; 
Callon 2008; Crouch & Streeck 1997; Hollingsworth & Boyer 1997; Polanyi 1957), and 
enable actors to make rational decisions despite the fundamental uncertainty of the 
market (Beckert 1996; 2009; Knight 1921; Millo, Muniesa, Panourgias & Scott 2005). 
Established at the genesis of markets, infrastructures both solve these problems and 
establish conditions that influence behavior on the market long into the future. The same 
is true of infrastructures on derivative markets: they also help define actors and 
commodities, and make possible action under uncertainty. But, in solving these problems, 
they face the additional challenge of doing so in ways that are compatible with the 
solutions in place on the underlying spot market. If actors in the derived market are acting 
in ways that are illegitimate in the underlying market there will be conflict between them; 
if derived commodities are being handled in ways that clash with established 
understandings and practices in the underlying market, this will be contested; if derived 
and underlying markets require different levels of uncertainty, their conflicting needs will 
cause strife. Establishing a compatible relation can be difficult, as underlying and derived 
markets have different aims and may benefit from quite different infrastructural features. 
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Several findings from the dissertation illustrate this tension. Futures markets 
created a new economic actor in the speculator, and a new commodity in the futures 
contract. Defining the character of both was a contentious process, largely because the 
cultural orientations present in the underlying market constrained action in the derivative 
market. Futures, for instance, challenged the traditional spot market-based understanding 
of contracts. While futures ostensibly bound two parties to a transaction of physical 
goods, traders realized early on that the physical delivery of goods—the raison d’etre of 
spot markets—was an unnecessary drag on speculation in the futures market. They 
created new processes, such as standardizing contracts and offsetting trades, that allowed 
settlement of deals without delivery. To actors in the spot market, this appeared to pervert 
the meaning of contracts in a morally questionable sleight-of-hand. Speculators also 
strained the accepted orientations to exchange by selling short items that they did not own 
and often never intended to own. To them, this behavior was market-making, but to many 
in the product market accustomed to exchanging physical goods it was gambling. The 
orientations in place on the spot market were challenged by new futures market practices, 
and compromise was only reached through decades of court battles and legislation.   
Aligning the methods for managing uncertainty across underlying and derived 
markets also was difficult. The challenge was seen most clearly on the topic of grading 
the spot commodity. On both markets, spot and futures traders clashed over the 
acceptable level of uncertainty of grades in relation to contracts. On CBOT, the 
uncertainty created by a shoddy grading system caused problems for traders in the spot 
market, as the quality of wheat failed to meet their customers’ expectations. But futures 
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traders could accept this uncertainty, given their general non-involvement with the 
physical commodity. On NOCE, the situation was reversed. Uncertainty over grading 
was worrisome to speculators because of the potential cost it imposed. This was why 
speculators lobbied for, and eventually convinced NOCE to create, a centralized grading 
service for contract cotton. Spot dealers, however, used the grading system to their 
advantage, mobilizing their own expertise to profit from the uncertainty present in 
transactions. In both cases a single infrastructure struggled to solve the problem of 
uncertainty in a manner satisfactory to parties in both markets.1  
Studying derivative markets in terms of their infrastructures offers a way to 
examine these challenges inherent in their construction. It focuses on the constitutive 
linkage that material tools, information networks, and cultural evaluations produce 
between derivative and underlying markets, and how this connection entangles the 
markets in a complex, two-market system. More research on these market systems and 
their infrastructures is needed to address some of the particular questions suggested by 
this dissertation. How does the form of an extant underlying market influence the creation 
of its derived market? Conversely, once a derived market has been built, how does it 
redound infrastructurally on the underlying market from which it grew? What factors—
organizational, political, cultural, or economic—impact the nature of this relationship? 
Under what circumstances do these linking infrastructures change over time? These 
                                                 
1 Interestingly, as these examples show, there is not a pre-established relation between the type of market 
and the level of uncertainty traders optimally desire: on NOCE, spot traders had a higher tolerance for 
uncertainty, while on CBOT, spot traders had less. The significance of uncertainty in the market is filtered 
through the institutional environment.  
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questions are critical for understanding the modern economy. One need only recall the 
2008 housing crash and financial crisis to recognize that the links between derivative and 
underlying markets fundamentally shape the workings of the economy. Developing a 
sociological understanding of linked underlying-derivative market systems thus remains 
an important task for economic sociologists.  
 
Infrastructural analysis & market regulation  
The second broad contribution of this dissertation is demonstrating the ability of 
an infrastructural analysis to explain market-wide dynamics and outcomes. By comparing 
the information required for two different types of trades—speculation and hedging—
with the information created by infrastructures on CBOT and NOCE, I demonstrate that 
the two markets would see divergent baseline levels of each type of trade. This analysis is 
unique in that it focuses on the infrastructures that set limiting conditions for market 
action, rather than the social structures that constrained it. Since these infrastructural 
differences persist over long stretches of time, they are well-suited to explain long-term 
divergences in behavior such as those seen in price volatility on the two exchanges. This 
provides a non-deterministic method for linking foundational infrastructures with system-
level outcomes and dynamics. That is, it helps us to see how infrastructures shape 
behavior, without reducing those behaviors to mechanical effects of the infrastructures in 
which they occur.  
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This connection between infrastructure and systemic market behaviors is useful 
for thinking about the regulation of financial markets. It echoes the argument made by 
Schneiberg & Bartley (2010), who use the tools of organizational sociology to analyze 
market architectures. Modern financial markets, they claim, combine incredible 
complexity with tight coupling, an arrangement that makes them prone to “normal 
accidents” (Perrow 1984). Rather than attempting to regulate such markets, a difficult and 
resource-intensive fix, they suggest that we might make markets more stable by re-
shaping their architectures, i.e., by re-segmenting and decentralizing markets, and 
building in redundancies. These changes in market architectures would weaken 
interconnections between markets and prevent failures or errors from cascading through 
large sectors of the economy. In this way, their argument expands the claim made in this 
dissertation. Both Schneiberg & Bartley’s (2010) article and this dissertation make 
similar claims about how the form of markets can impact behavior, irrespective of any 
additional coercive regulation. 
Combining the “infrastructural” approach outlined in this dissertation with 
Schneiberg & Bartley’s (2010) “architectural” approach has promise. But the connection 
between these approaches still requires theoretical elaboration and empirical testing. 
What exactly is the distinction between market infrastructures and architectures? How, if 
at all, are they related to each other? Do infrastructures and architectures correspond to 
particular types of market behaviors, e.g., price volatility versus cascading of errors? 
Most broadly, how does each relate to, and interconnect, flows of information and flows 
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of capital? Answering these questions will go a long way toward understanding the 
relation between a market’s foundations and its outcomes.   
 
The value of infrastructure  
Economic sociologists have amassed a vast body of knowledge about the social 
structural influences that shape behavior on individual markets. But this dissertation 
suggests that it is also critical to direct attention away from the social structural factors 
that directly influence market behavior and onto the infrastructural features that indirectly 
shape the conditions of possibility on the market. Market infrastructures are created to 
solve fundamental problems of economic action; they set limiting conditions on behavior 
within markets. This dissertation has highlighted these elements in the case of 19th 
century futures markets. There, infrastructures were created to construct, disseminate, and 
evaluate information on futures markets, making those markets viable spaces of rational 
calculation. The particulars of their construction had a significant impact on behavior, 
making particular types of trading more feasible, or rational, on each exchange.  
As a whole, the dissertation pushes toward a deeper, systemic, sociological 
analysis of markets, both on their own and in combination with markets to which they are 
constitutively linked. It offers a fresh line of thought in economic sociologists' broad 
move away from the traditional orienting metaphor of social structural “embeddedness” 
(Beckert 2003, 2007, 2009; Callon 2008; Krippner 2001; Krippner & Alvarez 2007). By 
shifting analysis from the market’s social context to the fabric of the market itself, this 
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approach draws from science and technology studies, information studies, and 
anthropology to create a perspective on markets as socio-technically constructed objects. 
This multi-disciplinary, socio-material approach is necessary in order to understand the 
continual processes of evolution, diversification, and inter-connection that sit at the heart 
of modern markets.   
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Appendix A. – Glossary of Economic Terms 
 
Bucket shop – Shops that allowed patrons to place bets on the movement of commodity 
prices without actually entering into legally binding contracts. Prices from a legitimate 
exchange (e.g., CBOT) were relayed to the shop by telegraph. At bucket shops, patrons 
could deal in small quantities, far below the minimums set by exchanges. They could also 
deal in options, which were, by and large, prohibited on legitimate exchanges.  
Corner – A gambit wherein a trader simultaneously buys up both futures contracts and 
the underlying spot commodity called for in these contracts. By doing so, he hopes to 
own a significant portion of that commodity by the time his contracts come due. At the 
contract’s call date, he would then demand that his counterparties meet the contract by 
physical delivery of commodities. Since he controlled the majority of the supply, his 
counterparties would be forced to come to him to buy, at which point he could charge a 
highly inflated price. This would earn the trader a large profit. Corners required large 
sums of capital and were often the work of secret syndicates of traders. They could 
impact prices on an exchange for weeks or months. A less severe version of the same 
price increased cause by a shortage of supply was known as a squeeze.  
Derivative – Any financial instrument the value of which is a function of a separate, 
underlying entity. This underlying entity can be any asset, an index, or an interest rate. 
During the time period covered in this research the underlying entities were concrete 
physical commodities, such as agricultural products or gold.  
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Factors –  An all-purpose commission merchant who connected Southern planters to 
financial interests, shipping companies, and merchants. Factors would lend money to 
planters at the start of the season, advance them money after the harvest, sell cotton on 
consignment, and buy goods needed on the farm and homestead. Factors served as the 
central node in the ante-bellum marketing of the South’s cotton crop.  
Futures contract – A contract for the purchase or sale of a specified quantity of a 
commodity at a specified price and future date. Futures contracts on CBOT specified the 
grade of wheat that was to be exchanged; contracts on NOCE did not. Contracts matured 
in a particular month, and could be settled at any time during that month.  
Futures market – A secondary market for the purchase and sale of futures contracts. 
These markets were enabled by the standardization of commodity grades and futures 
contracts. This allowed contracts to be exchanged at a high volume and for traders to 
easily maintain portfolios of speculative trades.  
Hedging – The act of buying or selling in the futures market in order to insure against 
adverse price movements in the spot market. Hedging was done by individuals who were 
involved in the spot trade of commodities in order to reduce the inherent risk of adverse 
price movements. In a hedge, a trader balances a purchase or sale in the spot market with 
the opposite action in the futures market. That is, a buyer of spot goods would sell the 
same amount of goods in the futures market, and a seller of spot goods would buy in the 
futures market. The futures market portion of a hedge was generally offset; the spot 
market portion was delivered.  
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Long / short position – A long position is taken when a trader buys futures anticipating a 
rise in their price; a short position is taken when a trader sells futures anticipating a drop 
in their price. Often, these positions were taken by traders with no desire to own the 
commodities promised in the contracts, nor any desire to.  
Offsetting settlement – A method of cancelling one’s obligation in the futures market 
through assuming an opposite position. A trader who had bought a futures contract for 
500 bales of basis middling cotton could offset his position by selling a contract for the 
same amount. His two contractual obligations would then cancel each other out. Traders 
could then simply pay whatever difference existed in the price at which the contract was 
bought and sold. This chain of offsetting transactions often extended to several traders 
who would need to meet and settle their respective positions. These were known as ring 
settlements, as they involved a circle of trades (e.g., A to B, B to C, C to D, D back to 
A). Clearinghouses were developed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to keep track 
of the long trails of deals and simplify the clearing process at the end of each month.  
Options – Options, also known as privileges or puts and calls, were contracts for a future 
transaction, at a particular price for a particular good. But, unlike futures contracts, 
options gave one party—either the buyer or seller—the ability to decide whether or not to 
make the transaction at the contract’s call date. Securing an option to either buy or sell 
required paying a counter-party a small fee, traditionally $1 per 1,000 bushels. When the 
option came due, the trader could decide either to execute the deal as specified, or to 
decline to do so, in which case he would forfeit the fee he had paid.   
Ring settlement – See offsetting positions. 
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Speculation – Buying or selling in the futures market in order to profit from price 
fluctuations. As opposed to hedging, speculation does not involve a counter-position in 
the spot market.  Speculators bet on price movements in the spot market, which would in 
turn affect the value of their contracts. Speculators generally avoided any actual 
involvement in the spot market, and did not come into contact with primary commodities.  
Spot market – A market for the purchase and sale of physical commodities (e.g., wheat 
or cotton), where buyers pay money and receive goods from sellers on the spot.  
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Appendix B. – Monthly high and low prices of wheat and cotton on CBOT & NOCE 
 
Monthly high and low price data come from Boyle (1922) and Boyle (1934). 
Cotton prices from NOCE are for middling cotton; this was the basis grade for all futures 
contracts. On CBOT, prices are for “that grade of wheat in which the most transactions 
were had” (Boyle 1922: 9). This grade changed over the period of time measured. The 
following type of wheat was used in each year: 1870: No. 1 spring; 1871-1897: No. 2 
spring; 1898-1904: “Regular” wheat; 1905-1913: No. 2 red winter wheat. 
I created the intra-month volatility statistic to compare the movement of prices 
across markets. It is calculated as the difference between monthly high and low prices 
divided by the average of the two; in mathematical terms, V = (Monthly high – monthly 
low)/[(Monthly high + monthly low)/2]. Intra-month volatility is a particularly useful 
measure of volatility in futures markets. Contracts came due each month in succession 
and would have converged with spot prices. Thus large spot price changes within a 
month suggest significant volatility in futures markets.  
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Month CBOT Wheat Prices NOCE Cotton Prices 
 
  Low High Volatility Low High Volatility 
September 1870 97 107 0.098039216 18 1/4 15 1/2 0.162962963 
October 1870 104 111 0.065116279 16 1/2 14 1/2 0.129032258 
November 1870 95 103 0.080808081 16 1/4 15 1/8 0.071713147 
December 1870 105 106 0.009478673 15 1/8 14 1/4 0.059574468 
January 1871 110 130 0.166666667 15 1/8 14 1/4 0.059574468 
February 1871 122 132 0.078740157 15     14 1/4 0.051282051 
March 1871 123 131 0.062992126 14 3/4 13 7/8 0.061135371 
April 1871 124 134 0.07751938 14 3/4 14 3/8 0.025751073 
May 1871 125 133 0.062015504 16 3/8 14 1/2 0.12145749 
June 1871 127 132 0.038610039 21     16 5/8 0.23255814 
July 1871 109 129 0.168067227 20 3/4 20     0.036809816 
August 1871 99 125 0.232142857 Missing Missing   
September 1871 106 132 0.218487395 20 1/4 18 1/2 0.090322581 
October 1871 112 124 0.101694915 19 7/8 18 1/8 0.092105263 
November 1871 118 122 0.033333333 18 7/8 17 7/8 0.054421769 
December 1871 117 121 0.033613445 19 3/4 18 1/2 0.065359477 
January 1872 120 125 0.040816327 22     19 1/2 0.120481928 
February 1872 123 126 0.024096386 22 3/8 21 7/8 0.02259887 
March 1872 118 126 0.06557377 22 1/2 21 3/4 0.033898305 
April 1872 119 136 0.133333333 23 1/8 22 1/2 0.02739726 
May 1872 135 154 0.131487889 23 1/2 22 7/8 0.026954178 
June 1872 121 155 0.246376812 25 1/4 24     0.050761421 
July 1872 120 132 0.095238095 24 1/2 22 1/4 0.096256684 
August 1872 111 156 0.337078652 20 3/4 19 5/8 0.055727554 
September 1872 117 129 0.097560976 21 1/4 18     0.165605096 
October 1872 107 121 0.122807018 19 1/2 18 3/4 0.039215686 
November 1872 101 111 0.094339623 19 3/8 18 3/8 0.052980132 
December 1872 109 121 0.104347826 19 7/8 18 7/8 0.051612903 
January 1873 119 126 0.057142857 20     19 3/8 0.031746032 
February 1873 120 126 0.048780488 19 7/8 19 3/8 0.025477707 
March 1873 118 123 0.041493776 19 1/2 18 1/2 0.052631579 
April 1873 114 125 0.092050209 19 1/4 18 1/2 0.039735099 
May 1873 123 134 0.085603113 18 3/8 18 1/8 0.01369863 
June 1873 117 128 0.089795918 18 3/4 18 1/4 0.027027027 
July 1873 114 123 0.075949367 18 3/4 18 5/8 0.006688963 
August 1873 117 146 0.220532319 18 3/4 18 1/2 0.013422819 
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September 1873 89 120 0.296650718 19     17     0.111111111 
October 1873 93 109 0.158415842 18 3/4 15 7/8 0.166064982 
November 1873 92 109 0.169154229 16 5/8 14 3/8 0.14516129 
December 1873 106 117 0.098654709 16 7/8 15 3/4 0.068965517 
January 1874 114 127 0.107883817 16 3/4 15 3/4 0.061538462 
February 1874 115 124 0.075313808 16 1/4 15 3/4 0.03125 
March 1874 117 123 0.05 16 5/8 15 1/2 0.070038911 
April 1874 119 128 0.072874494 17 1/2 16 3/8 0.066420664 
May 1874 117 127 0.081967213 18     17 3/8 0.035335689 
June 1874 116 123 0.058577406 17 3/4 16 7/8 0.050541516 
July 1874 108 117 0.08 17     16 3/4 0.014814815 
August 1874 91 110 0.189054726 16 7/8 16 5/8 0.014925373 
September 1874 93 102 0.092307692 16 7/8 14 5/8 0.142857143 
October 1874 81 99 0.2 14 3/4 14 1/8 0.043290043 
November 1874 83 93 0.113636364 14 1/2 14 1/8 0.026200873 
December 1874 87 93 0.066666667 14 1/4 13 7/8 0.026666667 
January 1875 88 91 0.033519553 14 7/8 14     0.060606061 
February 1875 83 88 0.058479532 15 3/4 14 7/8 0.057142857 
March 1875 85 96 0.121546961 16     15 5/8 0.023715415 
April 1875 93 105 0.121212121 16 1/8 15 5/8 0.031496063 
May 1875 89 106 0.174358974 15 3/4 15 1/8 0.04048583 
June 1875 90 102 0.125 15 1/2 15     0.032786885 
July 1875 100 128 0.245614035 15 3/8 14 1/4 0.075949367 
August 1875 115 130 0.12244898 14 5/8 14 1/8 0.034782609 
September 1875 105 119 0.125 14 3/8 12 7/8 0.110091743 
October 1875 108 113 0.045248869 13 1/2 12 3/4 0.057142857 
November 1875 104 113 0.082949309 12 3/4 12 1/2 0.01980198 
December 1875 94 97 0.031413613 12 5/8 12 1/2 0.009950249 
January 1876 95 102 0.07106599 12 1/2 12 1/4 0.02020202 
February 1876 97 106 0.088669951 12 3/8 12 1/4 0.010152284 
March 1876 97 105 0.079207921 13 1/4 12 1/4 0.078431373 
April 1876 99 105 0.058823529 12 7/8 12     0.070351759 
May 1876 96 108 0.117647059 12     11 3/8 0.053475936 
June 1876 102 108 0.057142857 11 3/4 11 3/8 0.032432432 
July 1876 83 105 0.234042553 11 3/8 11 1/8 0.022222222 
August 1876 84 96 0.133333333 11 1/8 10 1/8 0.094117647 
September 1876 82 111 0.300518135 11     10 1/2 0.046511628 
October 1876 105 116 0.099547511 11     10 1/4 0.070588235 
November 1876 107 114 0.063348416 12     11     0.086956522 
December 1876 112 127 0.125523013 12 1/8 11 3/8 0.063829787 
January 1877 125 131 0.046875 12 7/8 12 1/4 0.049751244 
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February 1877 121 133 0.094488189 12 1/4 11 3/4 0.041666667 
March 1877 121 129 0.064 11 7/8 11     0.076502732 
April 1877 126 175 0.325581395 11 1/2 10 7/8 0.055865922 
May 1877 141 176 0.220820189 11     10 1/2 0.046511628 
June 1877 141 155 0.094594595 11 3/8 10 3/4 0.056497175 
July 1877 127 148 0.152727273 11 3/8 11 1/8 0.022222222 
August 1877 100 129 0.253275109 11 1/8 10 1/8 0.094117647 
September 1877 106 118 0.107142857 11 1/8 10 1/8 0.094117647 
October 1877 104 114 0.091743119 11 3/8 10 3/4 0.056497175 
November 1877 105 114 0.082191781 10 7/8 10 1/2 0.035087719 
December 1877 106 112 0.055045872 11 1/8 10 3/4 0.034285714 
January 1878 102 109 0.066350711 10 7/8 10 5/8 0.023255814 
February 1878 101 109 0.076190476 10 5/8 10 1/2 0.01183432 
March 1878 108 112 0.036363636 10 3/4 10 1/8 0.05988024 
April 1878 106 114 0.072727273 10 1/4 10     0.024691358 
May 1878 105 113 0.073394495 11     10 1/4 0.070588235 
June 1878 88 106 0.18556701 11 1/4 11     0.02247191 
July 1878 89 105 0.164948454 11 1/4 11     0.02247191 
August 1878 89 108 0.192893401 11 3/8 11     0.033519553 
September 1878 85 89 0.045977011 11     10 3/8 0.058479532 
October 1878 77 88 0.133333333 10 1/4 9 3/8 0.089171975 
November 1878 79 85 0.073170732 9 1/2 8 7/8 0.068027211 
December 1878 81 84 0.036363636 9 1/4 8 3/8 0.09929078 
January 1879 82 87 0.059171598 9 3/8 9 1/8 0.027027027 
February 1879 85 94 0.100558659 9 5/8 9 1/4 0.039735099 
March 1879 89 96 0.075675676 10 1/8 9 1/8 0.103896104 
April 1879 84 93 0.101694915 11 3/8 10 1/4 0.104046243 
May 1879 89 103 0.145833333 13 1/8 11 3/8 0.142857143 
June 1879 101 107 0.057692308 12 3/4 11 7/8 0.07106599 
July 1879 91 110 0.189054726 12     11 1/8 0.075675676 
August 1879 84 92 0.090909091 11 1/2 10 1/2 0.090909091 
September 1879 52 105 0.675159236 11 5/8 10 1/8 0.137931034 
October 1879 103 120 0.152466368 10 3/4 9 3/4 0.097560976 
November 1879 110 122 0.103448276 11 3/4 10 1/2 0.112359551 
December 1879 122 133 0.08627451 12 1/4 11 1/2 0.063157895 
January 1880 115 132 0.137651822 12 1/2 11 7/8 0.051282051 
February 1880 118 125 0.057613169 13     12 5/8 0.029268293 
March 1880 114 126 0.1 13     12 1/2 0.039215686 
April 1880 107 115 0.072072072 12 5/8 11 3/4 0.071794872 
May 1880 112 119 0.060606061 11 3/4 11 1/4 0.043478261 
June 1880 88 114 0.257425743 11 3/4 11 1/4 0.043478261 
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July 1880 87 96 0.098360656 11 3/4 11 1/4 0.043478261 
August 1880 86 92 0.06741573 11 3/4 11 3/8 0.032432432 
September 1880 86 95 0.099447514 11 3/4 10 7/8 0.077348066 
October 1880 91 102 0.113989637 11 3/8 10 7/8 0.04494382 
November 1880 101 112 0.103286385 12     10 3/4 0.10989011 
December 1880 94 110 0.156862745 11 3/4 11 3/8 0.032432432 
January 1881 95 100 0.051282051 11 5/8 11 3/8 0.02173913 
February 1881 96 100 0.040816327 11 3/8 11 1/8 0.022222222 
March 1881 98 104 0.059405941 11     10 1/2 0.046511628 
April 1881 100 107 0.06763285 10 5/8 10 1/4 0.035928144 
May 1881 100 113 0.122065728 10 1/2 10 1/8 0.036363636 
June 1881 107 114 0.063348416 10 3/4 10 1/2 0.023529412 
July 1881 108 121 0.113537118 11 7/8 10 3/4 0.099447514 
August 1881 119 138 0.147859922 12 1/4 11     0.107526882 
September 1881 121 138 0.131274131 11 3/8 11     0.033519553 
October 1881 131 143 0.087591241 11 3/8 10 7/8 0.04494382 
November 1881 124 132 0.0625 11 1/2 11 1/8 0.033149171 
December 1881 123 129 0.047619048 11 5/8 11 3/8 0.02173913 
January 1882 126 136 0.076335878 11 5/8 11 3/8 0.02173913 
February 1882 120 132 0.095238095 11 5/8 11 1/4 0.032786885 
March 1882 124 135 0.084942085 12     11 1/2 0.042553191 
April 1882 133 140 0.051282051 12     12     0 
May 1882 123 140 0.129277567 12 1/8 12     0.010362694 
June 1882 125 133 0.062015504 12 1/2 12     0.040816327 
July 1882 125 135 0.076923077 12 7/8 12 1/2 0.02955665 
August 1882 101 135 0.288135593 12 3/4 12 3/8 0.029850746 
September 1882 97 108 0.107317073 12 1/2 11 3/8 0.094240838 
October 1882 92 97 0.052910053 11 1/4 10 3/8 0.080924855 
November 1882 91 94 0.032432432 10 1/4 9 3/4 0.05 
December 1882 91 95 0.043010753 10     9 11/16 0.031746032 
January 1883 93 103 0.102040816 9 7/8 9  9/16 0.032154341 
February 1883 101 111 0.094339623 9 15/16 9 5/8 0.031948882 
March 1883 105 109 0.037383178 9 3/4 9 1/2 0.025974026 
April 1883 102 112 0.093457944 9 7/8 9 3/8 0.051948052 
May 1883 108 113 0.045248869 10 1/4 10     0.024691358 
June 1883 98 113 0.142180095 10 1/8 9 13/16 0.031347962 
July 1883 97 103 0.06 9 13/16 9  9/16 0.025806452 
August 1883 100 103 0.02955665 9 3/4 9 5/8 0.012903226 
September 1883 93 101 0.082474227 10  5/16 9 5/8 0.068965517 
October 1883 90 96 0.064516129 10 11/16 10  3/16 0.047904192 
November 1883 92 98 0.063157895 10  5/16 10       0.030769231 
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December 1883 95 99 0.041237113 10  3/16 9 7/8 0.031152648 
January 1884 88 95 0.076502732 10 1/2 10 1/4 0.024096386 
February 1884 91 96 0.053475936 10 1/2 10  5/16 0.018018018 
March 1884 83 94 0.124293785 11 1/8 10  7/16 0.063768116 
April 1884 76 92 0.19047619 11 3/4 11 1/8 0.054644809 
May 1884 85 95 0.111111111 11 5/8 11 3/8 0.02173913 
June 1884 85 90 0.057142857 11 3/8 11     0.033519553 
July 1884 80 85 0.060606061 11     10 11/16 0.028818444 
August 1884 76 84 0.1 11 3/4 10 1/2 0.112359551 
September 1884 73 80 0.091503268 10 3/4 9 3/4 0.097560976 
October 1884 73 79 0.078947368 9 15/16 9  7/16 0.051612903 
November 1884 71 75 0.054794521 10 1/8 9 1/2 0.063694268 
December 1884 70 74 0.055555556 10 1/2 10  1/16 0.042553191 
January 1885 76 81 0.063694268 10 5/8 10  5/16 0.029850746 
February 1885 74 79 0.065359477 10 11/16 10 1/2 0.017699115 
March 1885 73 80 0.091503268 10 5/8 10 1/2 0.01183432 
April 1885 77 92 0.177514793 10 5/8 10 1/8 0.048192771 
May 1885 85 91 0.068181818 10 1/2 10  3/16 0.03021148 
June 1885 84 90 0.068965517 10  7/16 9 15/16 0.049079755 
July 1885 85 90 0.057142857 10     9 3/4 0.025316456 
August 1885 78 89 0.131736527 9 3/4 9 1/2 0.025974026 
September 1885 76 87 0.134969325 9 1/2 9 1/8 0.040268456 
October 1885 85 91 0.068181818 9 3/8 9     0.040816327 
November 1885 84 91 0.08 9     8 7/8 0.013986014 
December 1885 84 89 0.057803468 8 7/8 8 5/8 0.028571429 
January 1886 77 85 0.098765432 8 3/4 8  9/16 0.02166065 
February 1886 78 81 0.037735849 8 11/16 8  3/16 0.059259259 
March 1886 76 81 0.063694268 8 3/4 8 1/4 0.058823529 
April 1886 72 80 0.105263158 8 15/16 8 11/16 0.028368794 
May 1886 72 79 0.092715232 9     8 13/16 0.021052632 
June 1886 71 78 0.093959732 8 7/8 8 7/8 0 
July 1886 73 79 0.078947368 9  3/16 9       0.020618557 
August 1886 74 79 0.065359477 9  3/16 8 15/16 0.027586207 
September 1886 72 77 0.067114094 9 3/8 8 7/8 0.054794521 
October 1886 70 75 0.068965517 9 1/4 8  9/16 0.077192982 
November 1886 73 76 0.040268456 8 3/4 8 1/2 0.028985507 
December 1886 75 79 0.051948052 9 1/8 8 11/16 0.049122807 
January 1887 77 80 0.038216561 9  1/16 8 7/8 0.020905923 
February 1887 72 78 0.08 9 1/8 8 7/8 0.027777778 
March 1887 72 80 0.105263158 10  1/16 9 1/8 0.09771987 
April 1887 77 84 0.086956522 10 3/8 10  1/16 0.03058104 
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May 1887 81 89 0.094117647 10 5/8 10 3/8 0.023809524 
June 1887 65 95 0.375 10 3/4 10  7/16 0.029498525 
July 1887 68 71 0.043165468 10  7/16 9 1/2 0.094043887 
August 1887 66 70 0.058823529 9 1/2 9  3/16 0.033444816 
September 1887 67 72 0.071942446 9 1/8 8 13/16 0.034843206 
October 1887 69 72 0.042553191 9 1/8 8 3/4 0.041958042 
November 1887 72 77 0.067114094 9 13/16 9 1/8 0.072607261 
December 1887 75 79 0.051948052 9 7/8 9 11/16 0.019169329 
January 1888 75 78 0.039215686 9 7/8 9 3/4 0.012738854 
February 1888 75 76 0.013245033 9 7/8 9 13/16 0.006349206 
March 1888 72 76 0.054054054 9 7/8 9 3/8 0.051948052 
April 1888 71 82 0.14379085 9 1/2 9 3/8 0.013245033 
May 1888 81 89 0.094117647 9 1/2 9 1/2 0 
June 1888 78 86 0.097560976 9 3/4 9 3/8 0.039215686 
July 1888 79 85 0.073170732 10 1/8 9 3/4 0.037735849 
August 1888 81 93 0.137931034 10 1/8 9 5/8 0.050632911 
September 1888 90 165 0.588235294 10     9 5/8 0.038216561 
October 1888 103 117 0.127272727 9 3/4 9 1/4 0.052631579 
November 1888 102 117 0.136986301 9 5/8 9 1/3 0.0330033 
December 1888 97 105 0.079207921 9 1/2 9 3/8 0.013245033 
January 1889 94 102 0.081632653 9 5/8 9 3/8 0.026315789 
February 1889 93 108 0.149253731 9 3/4 9 1/2 0.025974026 
March 1889 96 105 0.089552239 9 15/16 9 3/4 0.019047619 
April 1889 79 98 0.214689266 10 5/8 9 15/16 0.066869301 
May 1889 77 87 0.12195122 10 3/4 10 5/8 0.011695906 
June 1889 75 82 0.089171975 10 7/8 10 3/4 0.011560694 
July 1889 77 85 0.098765432 11 10 7/8 0.011428571 
August 1889 75 79 0.051948052 11 1/8 11     0.011299435 
September 1889 76 83 0.088050314 10 7/8 10 1/4 0.059171598 
October 1889 78 83 0.062111801 10  1/16 9  7/16 0.064102564 
November 1889 79 81 0.025 9 11/16 9  9/16 0.012987013 
December 1889 77 80 0.038216561 9 11/16 9 5/8 0.006472492 
January 1890 74 78 0.052631579 10 11/16 9 5/8 0.104615385 
February 1890 74 76 0.026666667 10 11/16 10 3/8 0.029673591 
March 1890 76 80 0.051282051 11       10 11/16 0.028818444 
April 1890 77 90 0.155688623 11 11/16 11     0.060606061 
May 1890 90 100 0.105263158 11 7/8 11  9/16 0.026666667 
June 1890 84 93 0.101694915 11 7/8 11  7/16 0.037533512 
July 1890 85 94 0.100558659 11 3/4 11  7/16 0.026954178 
August 1890 89 108 0.192893401 11 3/4 10 3/8 0.124293785 
September 1890 95 105 0.1 10 1/4 9 3/4 0.05 
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October 1890 96 103 0.070351759 10  1/16 9 11/16 0.037974684 
November 1890 91 102 0.113989637 9  9/16 9  1/16 0.053691275 
December 1890 88 93 0.055248619 9  1/8  8 13/16 0.034843206 
January 1891 87 96 0.098360656 9  5/16 8 15/16 0.04109589 
February 1891 93 97 0.042105263 9  1/16 8 3/4 0.035087719 
March 1891 94 104 0.101010101 8 3/4 8 5/8 0.014388489 
April 1891 102 114 0.111111111 8 11/16 8  5/16 0.044117647 
May 1891 99 108 0.086956522 8 3/8 8  5/16 0.007490637 
June 1891 92 101 0.093264249 8  1/4  7 7/8 0.046511628 
July 1891 85 95 0.111111111 7 15/16 7 3/4 0.023904382 
August 1891 87 113 0.26 8       7 5/8 0.048 
September 1891 91 100 0.094240838 8 1/2 8     0.060606061 
October 1891 92 99 0.073298429 8 3/8 7 15/16 0.053639847 
November 1891 91 97 0.063829787 7 7/8 7 3/8 0.06557377 
December 1891 89 93 0.043956044 7 1/2 7     0.068965517 
January 1892 84 90 0.068965517 7  3/16 6 13/16 0.053571429 
February 1892 82 92 0.114942529 6 7/8 6 1/2 0.056074766 
March 1892 77 90 0.155688623 6 1/2 6 1/4 0.039215686 
April 1892 77 85 0.098765432 7     6 3/8 0.093457944 
May 1892 80 86 0.072289157 7  3/16 7     0.026431718 
June 1892 78 88 0.120481928 7 1/2 7  1/16 0.060085837 
July 1892 76 80 0.051282051 7  3/16 7     0.026431718 
August 1892 74 80 0.077922078 7  3/16 6 15/16 0.03539823 
September 1892 72 74 0.02739726 7  7/16 6 15/16 0.069565217 
October 1892 69 74 0.06993007 7 13/16 7  7/16 0.049180328 
November 1892 70 73 0.041958042 9 7/8 7 11/15 0.243256034 
December 1892 69 72 0.042553191 9 11/16 9  5/16 0.039473684 
January 1893 72 77 0.067114094 9 5/8 9  3/16 0.046511628 
February 1893 72 76 0.054054054 9 1/4 8 13/16 0.048442907 
March 1893 73 78 0.066225166 9     8  5/16 0.079422383 
April 1893 71 85 0.179487179 8  3/16 7  7/16 0.096 
May 1893 68 76 0.111111111 7 5/8 7 1/4 0.050420168 
June 1893 64 69 0.07518797 7 7/8 7  5/16 0.074074074 
July 1893 55 66 0.181818182 7 3/4 7  7/16 0.041152263 
August 1893 56 64 0.133333333 7 5/8 6 13/16 0.112554113 
September 1893 63 69 0.090909091 8  3/16 7  5/16 0.112903226 
October 1893 61 66 0.078740157 8 1/8 7 5/8 0.063492063 
November 1893 59 62 0.049586777 7 3/4 7  7/16 0.041152263 
December 1893 59 64 0.081300813 7  9/16 7 1/8 0.059574468 
January 1894 59 63 0.06557377 7 3/4 7  5/16 0.058091286 
February 1894 54 60 0.105263158 7  7/16 7  1/16 0.051724138 
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March 1894 56 59 0.052173913 7  5/16 7 1/8 0.025974026 
April 1894 57 64 0.115702479 7  5/16 7       0.043668122 
May 1894 53 59 0.107142857 7  1/16 6 13/16 0.036036036 
June 1894 53 60 0.123893805 7 1/8 6 7/8 0.035714286 
July 1894 50 58 0.148148148 6 7/8 6 5/8 0.037037037 
August 1894 52 55 0.056074766 6 5/8 6  7/16 0.028708134 
September 1894 51 55 0.075471698 6 1/2 5 11/16 0.133333333 
October 1894 51 52 0.019417476 5 3/4 5  3/16 0.102857143 
November 1894 51 56 0.093457944 5 1/2 4 7/8 0.120481928 
December 1894 53 57 0.072727273 5  5/16 5  1/16 0.048192771 
January 1895 49 55 0.115384615 5  3/16 5       0.036809816 
February 1895 50 52 0.039215686 5  3/16 5       0.036809816 
March 1895 52 55 0.056074766 5 7/8 5  1/16 0.148571429 
April 1895 54 63 0.153846154 6 3/8 5 3/4 0.103092784 
May 1895 61 81 0.281690141 7       6  3/16 0.123222749 
June 1895 69 81 0.16 7       6 5/8 0.055045872 
July 1895 61 71 0.151515152 6 3/4 6 1/2 0.037735849 
August 1895 59 69 0.15625 7 11/16 6  9/16 0.157894737 
September 1895 55 62 0.11965812 8 3/4 7  9/16 0.14559387 
October 1895 59 61 0.033333333 9  3/16 8  5/16 0.1 
November 1895 56 58 0.035087719 8 5/8 8  1/16 0.06741573 
December 1895 54 59 0.088495575 8  3/16 7 3/4 0.054901961 
January 1896 57 64 0.115702479 8     7 13/16 0.023715415 
February 1896 62 67 0.07751938 8       7 1/2 0.064516129 
March 1896 61 66 0.078740157 7 13/16 7 3/8 0.057613169 
April 1896 62 67 0.07751938 7 3/4 7 5/8 0.016260163 
May 1896 58 63 0.082644628 7 3/4 7 3/8 0.049586777 
June 1896 54 59 0.088495575 7 3/8 6 13/16 0.079295154 
July 1896 54 59 0.088495575 6 13/16 6 1/2 0.046948357 
August 1896 54 59 0.088495575 8     6 13/16 0.160337553 
September 1896 55 67 0.196721311 8 1/8 7 5/8 0.063492063 
October 1896 67 77 0.138888889 7 5/8 7 1/8 0.06779661 
November 1896 72 82 0.12987013 7 1/2 7  3/16 0.042553191 
December 1896 76 81 0.063694268 7 3/8 6 11/16 0.097777778 
January 1897 73 81 0.103896104 7     6 7/8 0.018018018 
February 1897 72 76 0.054054054 7  3/16 6 11/16 0.072072072 
March 1897 71 76 0.068027211 7  3/16 6 15/16 0.03539823 
April 1897 66 77 0.153846154 7  9/16 6 15/16 0.086206897 
May 1897 69 76 0.096551724 7  9/16 7  5/16 0.033613445 
June 1897 67 73 0.085714286 7 5/8 7 3/8 0.033333333 
July 1897 68 78 0.136986301 7 13/16 7 5/8 0.024291498 
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August 1897 76 100 0.272727273 7 11/16 7  1/16 0.084745763 
September 1897 85 100 0.162162162 7  1/16 6  1/16 0.152380952 
October 1897 83 90 0.080924855 6 1/8 5 1/2 0.107526882 
November 1897 86 91 0.056497175 5 1/2 5 1/4 0.046511628 
December 1897 86 91 0.056497175 5 3/8 5 1/4 0.023529412 
January 1898 89 108 0.192893401 5 3/8 5  3/16 0.035502959 
February 1898 95 108 0.128078818 5 11/16 5 1/4 0.08 
March 1898 100 107 0.06763285 5 3/4 5  7/16 0.055865922 
April 1898 101 123 0.196428571 5 13/16 5  9/16 0.043956044 
May 1898 117 185 0.450331126 6  1/16 5 11/16 0.063829787 
June 1898 75 120 0.461538462 6  1/16 5 15/16 0.020833333 
July 1898 66 88 0.285714286 5 7/8 5 5/8 0.043478261 
August 1898 65 75 0.142857143 5 11/16 5 3/8 0.056497175 
September 1898 63 68 0.076335878 5 3/8 4 7/8 0.097560976 
October 1898 62 70 0.121212121 5       4 13/16 0.038216561 
November 1898 65 69 0.059701493 5  1/16 4 3/4 0.063694268 
December 1898 63 70 0.105263158 5 1/4 5     0.048780488 
January 1899 67 76 0.125874126 5 3/4 5  3/16 0.102857143 
February 1899 70 74 0.055555556 6     5 3/4 0.042553191 
March 1899 67 74 0.09929078 6  1/16 5 11/16 0.063829787 
April 1899 70 76 0.082191781 5 3/4 5 5/8 0.021978022 
May 1899 68 79 0.149659864 5 7/8 5 11/16 0.032432432 
June 1899 72 79 0.092715232 5 3/4 5 1/2 0.044444444 
July 1899 69 75 0.083333333 5 13/16 5 5/8 0.032786885 
August 1899 69 74 0.06993007 5 15/16 5 3/4 0.032085561 
September 1899 69 75 0.083333333 6 1/2 5 3/4 0.12244898 
October 1899 68 75 0.097902098 6 15/16 6 3/4 0.02739726 
November 1899 65 71 0.088235294 7  7/16 6 7/8 0.07860262 
December 1899 64 69 0.07518797 7 1/2 7  3/16 0.042553191 
January 1900 61 67 0.09375 7 3/4 7 1/4 0.066666667 
February 1900 64 67 0.045801527 9     7 7/8 0.133333333 
March 1900 64 67 0.045801527 9  7/16 9     0.047457627 
April 1900 65 68 0.045112782 9 1/2 9 1/8 0.040268456 
May 1900 64 67 0.045801527 9 1/2 8 13/16 0.075085324 
June 1900 65 87 0.289473684 9 13/16 8 13/16 0.10738255 
July 1900 74 80 0.077922078 10 1/4 9 7/8 0.037267081 
August 1900 72 76 0.054054054 10 1/4 9 3/8 0.089171975 
September 1900 72 79 0.092715232 11 1/8 9 3/8 0.170731707 
October 1900 72 77 0.067114094 10 3/8 8 13/16 0.16286645 
November 1900 70 74 0.055555556 9 7/8 9     0.092715232 
December 1900 69 75 0.083333333 9 13/16 9 1/4 0.059016393 
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January 1901 71 76 0.068027211 9 11/16 9  5/16 0.039473684 
February 1901 72 75 0.040816327 9  5/16 9  1/16 0.027210884 
March 1901 73 76 0.040268456 9  1/16 7 15/16 0.132352941 
April 1901 69 74 0.06993007 8  5/16 8       0.038314176 
May 1901 70 75 0.068965517 8       7  9/16 0.0562249 
June 1901 66 77 0.153846154 8  7/16 7 3/4 0.084942085 
July 1901 63 71 0.119402985 8  7/16 8 1/8 0.037735849 
August 1901 67 77 0.138888889 8 15/16 8       0.110701107 
September 1901 68 71 0.043165468 8 5/8 7 15/16 0.083018868 
October 1901 67 71 0.057971014 8  5/16 7  7/16 0.111111111 
November 1901 70 74 0.055555556 7  7/16 7 1/4 0.025531915 
December 1901 73 79 0.078947368 8  1/16 7 3/8 0.089068826 
January 1902 74 80 0.077922078 8       7 13/16 0.023715415 
February 1902 73 76 0.040268456 8  3/16 7 13/16 0.044444444 
March 1902 70 76 0.082191781 8 5/8 8 1/4 0.129692833 
April 1902 70 77 0.095238095 9 3/4 8  9/16 0.066225166 
May 1902 72 76 0.054054054 9 3/4 9 1/8 0.04109589 
June 1902 71 76 0.068027211 9  5/16 8 15/16 0.049469965 
July 1902 71 78 0.093959732 9  1/16 8 5/8 0.036900369 
August 1902 68 76 0.111111111 8 5/8 8  5/16 0.05204461 
September 1902 70 95 0.303030303 8 5/8 8  3/16 0.045801527 
October 1902 67 75 0.112676056 8 3/8 8       0.045801527 
November 1902 70 77 0.095238095 8     7 5/8 0.048 
December 1902 72 77 0.067114094 8 3/8 7 15/16 0.053639847 
January 1903 71 79 0.106666667 8 7/8 8  7/16 0.050541516 
February 1903 74 80 0.077922078 9 7/8 8 7/8 0.106666667 
March 1903 70 76 0.082191781 9 7/8 9  9/16 0.032154341 
April 1903 72 79 0.092715232 10  3/16 9 3/4 0.043887147 
May 1903 75 81 0.076923077 11 11/16 10  3/16 0.137142857 
June 1903 74 86 0.15 13 5/8 11 11/16 0.15308642 
July 1903 75 84 0.113207547 13 5/8 12 5/8 0.076190476 
August 1903 77 90 0.155688623 13 1/4 12 1/2 0.058252427 
September 1903 74 93 0.22754491 12 3/8 9 3/4 0.237288136 
October 1903 77 88 0.133333333 10 1/4 9 1/8 0.116129032 
November 1903 76 85 0.111801242 11  3/16 9 7/8 0.12462908 
December 1903 78 87 0.109090909 13 5/8 11 1/2 0.169154229 
January 1904 81 93 0.137931034 15 15/16 13     0.203023758 
February 1904 86 110 0.244897959 16  7/16 13 1/4 0.214736842 
March 1904 90 103 0.134715026 16       14 3/8 0.106995885 
April 1904 93 102 0.092307692 15  5/16 13 7/8 0.098501071 
May 1904 100 106 0.058252427 13 7/8 12 5/8 0.094339623 
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June 1904 98 106 0.078431373 12 3/8 10 11/16 0.146341463 
July 1904 94 112 0.174757282 11 1/8 10 1/2 0.057803468 
August 1904 94 113 0.183574879 11 3/8 10 1/4 0.104046243 
September 1904 105 119 0.125 11  3/16 10     0.112094395 
October 1904 110 119 0.07860262 10  3/16 9 1/2 0.06984127 
November 1904 110 118 0.070175439 9 3/4 8 7/8 0.093959732 
December 1904 109 119 0.087719298 8  9/16 6 1/2 0.273858921 
January 1905 115 121 0.050847458 7       6 5/8 0.055045872 
February 1905 113 123 0.084745763 7 3/4 7     0.101694915 
March 1905 111 118 0.061135371 7 11/16 7  3/16 0.067226891 
April 1905 86 120 0.330097087 7 1/2 7  3/16 0.042553191 
May 1905 87 111 0.242424242 8 3/4 7  7/16 0.162162162 
June 1905 94 107 0.129353234 9 3/4 8  3/16 0.174216028 
July 1905 86 105 0.19895288 11 1/8 9 3/4 0.131736527 
August 1905 78 87 0.109090909 10 5/8 10  5/16 0.029850746 
September 1905 79 86 0.084848485 10 1/2 10  1/16 0.042553191 
October 1905 83 91 0.091954023 10 11/16 9 3/4 0.091743119 
November 1905 83 90 0.080924855 11 5/8 10 3/4 0.078212291 
December 1905 85 89 0.045977011 12 1/8 11 3/8 0.063829787 
January 1906 85 90 0.057142857 11 3/4 11  3/16 0.049046322 
February 1906 83 87 0.047058824 10 7/8 10  9/16 0.029154519 
March 1906 78 85 0.085889571 11 1/4 10 1/2 0.068965517 
April 1906 84 91 0.08 11  7/16 11 1/8 0.027700831 
May 1906 86 97 0.120218579 11  7/16 11     0.038997214 
June 1906 83 89 0.069767442 11 1/8 10 13/16 0.028490028 
July 1906 72 85 0.165605096 11 1/8 10 5/8 0.045977011 
August 1906 69 73 0.056338028 10 5/8 9  3/16 0.14511041 
September 1906 69 74 0.06993007 9 3/8 9 1/8 0.027027027 
October 1906 71 74 0.04137931 11 3/8 9 11/16 0.160237389 
November 1906 72 74 0.02739726 11 3/8 9 5/8 0.166666667 
December 1906 73 75 0.027027027 11 3/8 10 1/8 0.11627907 
January 1907 71 75 0.054794521 10  9/16 10 1/4 0.03003003 
February 1907 73 77 0.053333333 10 5/8 10  7/16 0.017804154 
March 1907 72 76 0.054054054 11  1/16 10 5/8 0.040345821 
April 1907 74 81 0.090322581 11 3/8 10 1/2 0.08 
May 1907 79 100 0.234636872 12 1/2 11 1/2 0.083333333 
June 1907 87 98 0.118918919 13     12 1/2 0.039215686 
July 1907 89 97 0.086021505 13 1/8 12 5/8 0.038834951 
August 1907 82 92 0.114942529 13  9/16 12 3/4 0.06175772 
September 1907 91 98 0.074074074 13  9/16 11 1/2 0.164588529 
October 1907 91 105 0.142857143 11 5/8 10  5/16 0.11965812 
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November 1907 88 97 0.097297297 11 3/8 10 5/8 0.068181818 
December 1907 92 101 0.093264249 11 7/8 11 1/8 0.065217391 
January 1908 91 102 0.113989637 12 1/4 11 3/8 0.074074074 
February 1908 89 100 0.116402116 11 7/8 11 3/8 0.043010753 
March 1908 92 101 0.093264249 11 3/8 10 1/2 0.08 
April 1908 89 100 0.116402116 10 1/2 9 13/16 0.067692308 
May 1908 99 111 0.114285714 11 1/2 9 15/16 0.145772595 
June 1908 89 100 0.116402116 11 7/8 11 3/8 0.043010753 
July 1908 84 92 0.090909091 11 3/8 10 3/8 0.091954023 
August 1908 90 96 0.064516129 10 3/8 9 1/8 0.128205128 
September 1908 95 102 0.07106599 9  3/16 9     0.020618557 
October 1908 97 102 0.050251256 9     8 3/4 0.028169014 
November 1908 99 106 0.068292683 9  1/16 8 7/8 0.020905923 
December 1908 99 107 0.077669903 8 15/16 8 11/16 0.028368794 
January 1909 103 108 0.047393365 9 5/8 8 7/8 0.081081081 
February 1909 107 124 0.147186147 9 1/2 9  5/16 0.019933555 
March 1909 117 126 0.074074074 9 1/2 9 1/4 0.026666667 
April 1909 125 145 0.148148148 10  5/16 9  7/16 0.088607595 
May 1909 142 154 0.081081081 11     10  3/16 0.076696165 
June 1909 150 160 0.064516129 11 1/2 10 7/8 0.055865922 
July 1909 106 124 0.156521739 12 3/8 11 1/2 0.073298429 
August 1909 99 106 0.068292683 12 1/2 12 1/8 0.030456853 
September 1909 100 115 0.139534884 13  3/16 12  3/16 0.078817734 
October 1909 116 121 0.042194093 14  7/16 13     0.104783599 
November 1909 115 121 0.050847458 14 11/16 14 1/8 0.039045553 
December 1909 116 128 0.098360656 15 3/4 14 1/4 0.1 
January 1910 121 127 0.048387097 15 3/4 14 7/8 0.057142857 
February 1910 118 127 0.073469388 15  1/16 14 5/8 0.029473684 
March 1910 115 125 0.083333333 14 13/16 14  9/16 0.017021277 
April 1910 106 121 0.13215859 14 13/16 14  9/16 0.017021277 
May 1910 98 118 0.185185185 15 1/8 14 5/8 0.033613445 
June 1910 98 104 0.059405941 15       14 1/2 0.033898305 
July 1910 98 112 0.133333333 15  3/16 14 5/8 0.037735849 
August 1910 99 104 0.049261084 15 1/4 14 5/8 0.041841004 
September 1910 95 101 0.06122449 14 1/4 13 1/4 0.072727273 
October 1910 91 99 0.084210526 15 5/8 13  9/16 0.141327623 
November 1910 89 94 0.054644809 14 3/4 14  3/16 0.03887689 
December 1910 90 96 0.064516129 14 15/16 14 11/16 0.016877637 
January 1911 92 101 0.093264249 15     14 15/16 0.004175365 
February 1911 86 96 0.10989011 14 15/16 14 1/2 0.029723992 
March 1911 84 92 0.090909091 14 5/8 14 3/8 0.017241379 
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April 1911 83 92 0.102857143 15 1/4 14 3/8 0.05907173 
May 1911 90 104 0.144329897 15 11/16 15 1/4 0.028282828 
June 1911 86 96 0.10989011 15  7/16 15     0.028747433 
July 1911 83 91 0.091954023 15  1/16 12 3/8 0.195899772 
August 1911 87 92 0.055865922 12 1/8 11 1/2 0.052910053 
September 1911 89 97 0.086021505 11 7/8 10  9/16 0.116991643 
October 1911 94 103 0.091370558 10  3/16 9 3/8 0.083067093 
November 1911 90 99 0.095238095 9 1/2 9 1/4 0.026666667 
December 1911 91 98 0.074074074 9 1/4 9  1/16 0.020477816 
January 1912 93 102 0.092307692 9 13/16 9  3/16 0.065789474 
February 1912 95 103 0.080808081 10 1/2 9 7/8 0.061349693 
March 1912 98 105 0.068965517 10 15/16 10 3/8 0.052785924 
April 1912 99 117 0.166666667 12     11     0.086956522 
May 1912 105 120 0.133333333 11 15/16 11 1/2 0.037333333 
June 1912 106 113 0.063926941 12 1/4 11 5/8 0.052356021 
July 1912 97 110 0.125603865 13 1/4 12 3/8 0.068292683 
August 1912 100 108 0.076923077 13 11  3/16 0.149870801 
September 1912 101 107 0.057692308 11 1/2 11  3/16 0.027548209 
October 1912 102 111 0.084507042 11  7/16 10 11/16 0.06779661 
November 1912 99 107 0.077669903 12 3/4 11  7/16 0.108527132 
December 1912 99 112 0.123222749 13     12 5/8 0.029268293 
January 1913 107 115 0.072072072 13     12 1/4 0.059405941 
February 1913 102 112 0.093457944 12 3/4 12 3/8 0.029850746 
March 1913 101 108 0.066985646 12 1/2 12 3/8 0.010050251 
April 1913 102 109 0.066350711 12  9/16 12  3/16 0.03030303 
May 1913 99 109 0.096153846 12  7/16 12 1/8 0.025445293 
June 1913 93 108 0.149253731 12 5/8 12  3/16 0.035264484 
July 1913 84 96 0.133333333 12 5/8 12  3/16 0.035264484 
August 1913 84 90 0.068965517 12  5/16 11 7/8 0.036175711 
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